
Sixth Annual Conference
November 2019
Introduction

Ideologies and Politics
Ambiguities and contestations in and of the welfare state

From Le Droit à la Ville to Rechte Räume. Legacies and legends of the Movement for the Reconstruction of the European City
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Political Postmodernism. Architecture and democracy in Chile, 1975–1990
Lidia Klein (University of North Carolina)

Manuel López Segura (Harvard University)

From Harlem to New Haven. The emergence of the advocacy planning movement in the late 1960s
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Community Actions
Protest, negotiations and lived experience

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Architecture and Democracy.

A Research Programme

The Jaap Bakema Study Centre was established in 2013 as a collaboration between Het Nieuwe Instituut and TU Delft’s Faculty of Architecture and the Built Environment. The goal was and is to instigate academic research in the fields of architecture and urban planning based on the rich holdings of the State Collection of Dutch Architecture and Urbanism, which is accommodated by Het Nieuwe Instituut. Not only between Delft and Rotterdam, but also together with third parties depending on the scope of each project. In 2019 and 2020 the Jaap Bakema Study Centre collaborates with the Calouste Gulbenkian Museum in Lisbon for the museological project ‘Art on Display 1949–69’, which revisits the special relationship between art and architecture and the involved conceptual exchanges between the two disciplines.

Speaking in general terms, the research programme of the Jaap Bakema Study Centre is situated at the intersection of advanced historical-theoretical studies and urgent social issues. The results of the programme are made public through various formats, from spatial installations and exhibitions, to books, cahiers and online dossiers, archive explorations and public seminars. Each year, the Jaap Bakema Study Centre organizes an international conference on topics related to its research programme. The conference series is devised as a platform for exchange and discussion, open to junior and senior scholars from around the world, a nexus between the domains of academia and culture, between experts and the larger audience. Previous editions dealt with themes such as the open society, the relationship between research and exhibitions, architectural drawing in the digital age, the tools and knowledge of the architect, and the legacy of Aldo and Hannie van Eyck.

This year’s edition, Architecture and Democracy, focuses on the years 1965 to 1989, in which welfare state arrangements were contested by counterculture movements and the rise of populism. While government institutions sought a proper response, urban renewal and city repair became a new field of work for architects and planners. The focus on Architecture and Democracy was chosen in connection with the start of the new PhD-programme of the same name. Starting in 2018, the research group Architecture, Culture and Modernity was established at TU Delft by my colleague Jorge Mejia Hernandez and myself. The new PhD-programme Architecture and Democracy is at the core of the group’s research work. It reframes much of our long-lasting interest in the post-war histories of architecture and planning, modern architecture and the welfare state.
For the purpose of the conference and the overall research programme the two terms of Architecture and Democracy are deliberately juxtaposed next to one another. Their interrelationships are manifold as they are complicated. The collection of twenty papers, the archive presentations and the keynote lecture by Esra Akcan, that make up the full programme of the conference make this crystal clear in a most eloquent way. Looking at the contributions brought to the conference, the question of the place of democracy in architecture and vice versa, is answered by investigations into social justice and how this plays out into space, especially urban space, by ways of contestation, appropriation, planning and design, from practices of direct democracy and participation to the critique of institutional policies. To refocus once again on the political and ideological dimensions of architecture, is in function of a reflection on and a speculation about the societal relevance of our work. And as such, it also aims to critically probe the autonomy of the architectural discipline, to redefine the values of our work, and to explore the possibilities of alternatives to current models of knowledge production.
Ideologies and Politics.
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INTRODUCTION

In 1975 Léon Krier assembled Architecture Rationelle: Témoignages en Faveur de la Reconstruction de la Ville Européenne. Denouncing the functionalist urban planning promoted by Le Corbusier and his acolytes, this publication launched a plea to embrace the traditionalist city as a new aesthetic and political model for urban design, and fuelled the rise of the Movement for the Reconstruction of the European City. Arguing for the rediscovery of pre-modernist urban forms, the return to traditional building techniques, and a greater distinction between city and countryside, this movement ostensibly defied the emancipatory aspirations of modernism. Yet, one of its key underpinnings was the desire to resist the annihilation of difference under capitalist urban development, as well as the profession’s alliance with capitalist development in se, which in many European cities had resulted in the displacement of large swaths of — often socio-economically vulnerable — inner-city residents. For instance, Chapter X of the Déclaration de Bruxelles, published by the Archives d’Architecture Moderne (AAM) following the 1978 Reconstruction of the European City colloquium, was entitled Le Droit à la Ville and pinpointed Marolles, a densely populated working-class district at the heart of Brussels, as “the last bastion of difference [and a] stain of freedom at the gates of a landlocked world.”

Thanks to their populist appeal and resonance with contemporary efforts towards sustainability — reuse rather than renewal — and cultural
conservation,⁴ the ideas promoted by the Movement for the Reconstruction of the European City became widespread. In Europe, they inspired numerous urban reconstruction projects, whereas in the United States they informed the rise of new urbanism; a building approach that has since become intricately associated with a neotraditional form of city building that is, often, highly profit-driven. Today, reconstruction projects undertaken in Europe founded on the principles promoted by the Movement for the Reconstruction of the European City are not only considered conservative, but have also become associated with right-wing politics, as is exemplified by the current issue of the journal ARCH+ on Rechte Räume (right-wing spaces).⁵ However, the movement’s origins were more complex and multifaceted than these current connotations would suggest.

With this paper we attempt to untangle some of this complex history, by focusing on two key tensions that were innate to the movement’s conception. First, we analyse the political ambiguity that was engrained in the Movement for the Reconstruction of the European City from its very foundation, namely the simultaneous adoption of both progressive and reactive concepts and beliefs. Subsequently, we posit that this political ambiguity resulted in a field of tension between politics and aesthetics, which was expressed in the tools that those involved in the Movement for the Reconstruction of the European City used, as well as in the roles that they adopted. Intended as a position piece and a tentative effort towards an agenda for future research, this paper does not present finite conclusions, but seeks to open up the discussion by exploring new pathways to examine the legacies and legends of the Movement for the Reconstruction of the European City.

**POLITICAL AMBIGUITIES**

In Brussels, the Reconstruction of the European City originated in the urban activism of the Atelier de Recherche et d’Action Urbaines (ARAU) which, along with architects affiliated to the AAM and architecture students of La Cambre, resisted the destruction of the historic city by functionalist urban planning. Founded in 1969 by urban sociologist René Schoonbrodt, theologian and priest Jacques Van der Biest and Maurice Culot, an architect and teacher at La Cambre, the ARAU was influenced by Henri Lefebvre’s *Le Droit à la Ville* (1968).⁶ Its foundation had been spurred by the so-called Battle of the Marolles. In the 1860s, this area in Brussels had been gravely affected by urban redevelopment efforts. To enable the construction of architect Joseph Poelaert’s mammoth Palace of Justice, a section of the Marolles was demolished and many residents were forcibly relocated. One hundred years later, in the 1960s, history threatened to repeat itself when an extension to Poelaert’s building was proposed. However, this time

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⁴ For instance, 1975 was the European Architectural Heritage Year.
the Marolliens succeeded in preventing the further demolition of their neighbourhood, spurring the budding ARAU to devote itself to supporting the urban struggle of the working classes.

Nonetheless, from the very beginning, the movement’s involvement in urban struggles for the right to the city was paralleled by activisms of a more cultural persuasion.⁷ In the same year that the ARAU was established, Culot co-founded the AAM in Brussels, which was dedicated to saving historic sites and monuments from demolition and to preserving the archives of architects. Culot maintained that, despite their different objectives, the actions of the ARAU and the AAM were part of the same struggle. Furthermore, in 1968, when residents of the Avenue Louise, located in a more affluent part of Brussels, fought against the construction of an office tower for the International Telephone and Telegraph Company (ITT),⁸ Culot argued that the middle-class had also become part of the luttes urbaines. In his article La Longue Marche he stressed the importance of this joint struggle — the socio-economic and cultural on the one hand; the working-class and middle-class on the other — and suggested that the press attention garnered by the ITT case benefitted the struggles of the Marolliens.⁹

If the actions of those concerned with the reconstruction of the European City were ambiguous in their political motivations, so too were the aesthetics of their projects, which eventually possessed the semantic scope to embrace contradictory political intentions.

A case in point is the 1974 Presidential Competition for Les Halles in Paris. A “Contemporary Palais Royal” is what Pierre Richard¹⁰, the personal counsellor of Valérie Giscard d’Estaing, told the newly elected French President — who was also the leader of the Independent Republicans party, which favoured economic liberalism — to promote.¹¹ The quest was to design an emblematic structure that would cover the gigantic building pit of the future underground train station cum shopping mall, and replace the by then demolished cast-iron market halls by Victor Baltard. Ricardo Bofill, a close friend of Richard, fulfilled this assignment with verve.¹² Blending architectural quotations from the French Renaissance to the Italian Baroque, he designed a sequence of squares that divided the Plateaux des Halles into smaller stages. The result anticipated the return to ‘urbanity’ and ‘quality’ that would come to characterise Giscard d’Estaing architectural and urban politics; namely the promotion of familiar environments of parks,

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⁷ See: Maurice Culot, Brussels Architectures from 1950 to the Present (Brussels: AAM, 2012).
⁸ This tower was proposed and eventually constructed in one of the most peaceful areas of the Avenue Louise, overlooking the Abbey of La Cambre, on land donated to the City of Brussels in 1922 by the sculptor Guillaume De Groot.
¹⁰ Pierre Richard would later in 1987 become the Chairman of Dexia, a position that he retained until 2008.
¹² In the office, Ricardo Bofill Taller de Arquitectura, architect Manuel Núñez Yanowsky and poet José Agustín Goytisolo worked on this project.
baroque fountains, and Italian squares which, the President believed, were best experienced by strolling pedestrians.\textsuperscript{13}

However, Bofill’s design not only met the expectations of Giscard d’Estaing,\textsuperscript{14} but also those of Bernard Huet, the new editor-in-chief of *Architecture d’Aujourd’hui* and one of the most vocal opponents of the demolition of Baltard’s market halls.\textsuperscript{15} For Huet, Bofill’s design combined the political demand for collective participation in public space with the art of designing the city as a collective oeuvre.\textsuperscript{16}

The ambivalence of Bofill’s design, which resulted from its ability to allow different ideological ambitions to be projected onto it, becomes even more palpable when one recalls that the Palais Royal was an important reference for Henri Lefebvre to illustrate the properties of a Fourierist utopia.\textsuperscript{17} Lefebvre’s interest in the Palais Royal not only stemmed from its architectural properties — the sheltered garden with shopping arcades that invites daydreaming and pleasure — but also from its specific performance in pre-revolutionary Paris, as a site of political resistance, sexual transgression, and consumption. The trope of the Palais Royal could thus be charged with opposing political attributions, as Bofill’s project demonstrates. On the one hand, the historic references embedded in the project embodied an ‘architecture of liberalism’ that could cater to bourgeois pedestrians in a gentrifying city. On the other hand, playing up the poetry of the non-usable and evoking an urban dream world that resists the normative logics of modernist technocracy also alluded to both freedom of choice and the right to the city. Yet, in spite of embracing the ambivalences of urban design and governance of 1970s France, Bofill’s project became a matter of major political and economic contention, and was ultimately never realised.

**POLITICS/AESTHETICS**

The political ambiguity that was embedded in the project for the Reconstruction of the European City and the desire to shape good cities opened up a field of tension between politics and aesthetics. For instance, while Léon Krier was particularly concerned with the physical form of the city\textsuperscript{18} and sets out formal and numerical regulations for how this could best

\textsuperscript{13} Valéry Giscard d’Estaing and Robert Franc, ‘Changeons la ville (interview)’, *Le Point* 133 (1975): 60.
be achieved, Culot maintained that the stakes were “a great deal higher than simply aesthetic ones: what is involved is the battle to retain the liberating tool which is the city and to maximise its gains to the profit of the working class.” This tension had an effect on the tools that those involved in the Movement for the Reconstruction of the European City used, as well as in the roles that they adopted.

From the late 1960s, those supporting the Reconstruction of the European City began designing counter-projects. Founded on the “memory of […] pre-industrial European Cities,” these paper projects illustrated alternative modes of urban design that defied the C.I.A.M. dogmas and were conceived as instruments in the “battles conducted by the workers […] against the appropriation of the city by monopolies […] and in active opposition [to] private and public speculation.” Culot and his colleagues drew up dozens of such counter-projects for Brussels at the behest of the residents’ committees. These projects were not intended to be built, but rather to critique existing proposals prepared by architects, authorities, and developers for specific sites. The counter-projects were thus tools for political provocation; to assist residents’ committees and action groups in placing pressure on decision makers by demonstrating that other, better, urban solutions were possible.

Initially, these counter-projects were not very refined aesthetically, and adopted various formal guises. For Schoonbrodt, counter-projects were after all not about aesthetics but first and foremost about politics. However, gradually, they did adopt a more pronounced historicist aesthetic. The proposals that the architectural staff and students of La Cambre produced during the 1970s, for instance, became increasingly articulate, and drew mostly on the architectural language of the historic city. Activism and engagement in the struggle for le droit à la ville through site-specific interventions thus gave way to theoretical reflections on the city, which were conceived as self-contained exercises for urban scar tissue that had fallen prey to the perceived malfeasance of the Modern Movement.

19 Krier, for instance, stipulated that urban conglomerates should not exceed 35 ha in size and should not house more than 15,000 inhabitants. See: Krier, 'The Reconstruction of the European City'.
23 Many of these projects are documented in: Maurice Culot, Rene Schoonbrodt, Leon Krier, La Reconstruction de Bruxelles: Recueil de projets publies dans la Revue des Archives d’Architecture Moderne de 1977 a 1982 (Brussels: Editions des Archives d’Architecture Moderne, 1982).
As the counter-projects shed their role as political provocateurs focused on specific local sites and instead became aesthetic and theoretical exercises, their appeal broadened. Apart from activists engaged in *les luttes urbaines*, also others, whose interests mainly lay in reviving traditional and historical urban aesthetics, became interested in the work of the Movement for the Reconstruction of the European City. One of these ‘traditionalists’ captured by the polemics potential of counter-projects was His Royal Highness Prince Charles, Prince of Wales. Convinced that the post-war planning of London had caused more damage to the city than the bombs dropped by the German Luftwaffe, he pushed for a return to pre-modernist urban forms, and from the early 1980s became heavily involved in the British architectural debate. In 1987, for instance, when a consortium of property developers led by Stuart Lipton set up a closed competition for the redevelopment of Paternoster Square, the royal invited a group of architects, including John Simpson, to formulate a response to the winning scheme by Arup Associates. Supported by the Prince and published in the *Evening Standard*, Simpson’s counter-project garnered much attention. Architectural critics were particularly confounded by Carl Laubin’s painting of the scheme that steeped the British capital in a medieval atmosphere, replete with a procession of priests wearing white vestments.

Laubin also painted the imagery for Poundbury, the urban extension to Dorchester, which was initiated by Prince Charles. In the late 1980s, no longer content to exercise his stewardship of the Duchy of Cornwall in the traditional way, the Prince began acting as a developer — he allegedly often said that “I’m not against development” — and engaged Léon Krier to draw up a masterplan. Krier, who had long proclaimed that “a resistance movement cannot be organised on the battlefield” and therefore preferred to limit himself to theoretical treatises and paper projects, was now forced to translate his theories into built form. One of the key design instruments that he applied in Poundbury was the ‘urban code.’ Setting out requirements for building materials and proportions, and going as far as to stipulate that elements such as clothes dryers, meter boxes, air extractors, dustbins and soil pipes “shall not be located such that they will be visible from the streets,” this urban code achieved the desired aesthetic effect, but seemed far removed from the revolutionary political ideas that had kick-started the movement. However, Krier’s uncoupling of politics and aesthetics had arguably already reached an apex a few years earlier; when

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27 This was a sensitive area in the old part of London, close to St Paul’s Cathedral.
28 Other architects that were invited to formulate a counter-project for Paternoster Square were Léon Krier and Dan Cuickshank. Ferrari, ‘Charles d’Angleterre’, 136.
in 1985 he published a book on Albert Speer that praised the architect’s plans for Germania for their aesthetic appeal.\textsuperscript{34}

Together with this shift in tools, also the role of the architects involved in the Movement for the Reconstruction of the European City changed. Along with Krier and Bofill, who affiliated themselves with Prince Charles and Giscard d’Estaing respectively, and like Culot, who added built work to his activist paper projects,\textsuperscript{35} many of those who were once drawn to the radical, activist potential of this movement, became part and parcel of the very establishment that they had originally eschewed. British architect Rod Hackney, for instance, who rose to fame in the 1970s for his grassroots community activism,\textsuperscript{36} was appointed President of the RIBA in 1987, where he — perhaps not surprisingly — found an ally in Prince Charles.

**CONCLUDING REMARKS**

This paper shows how from the very beginning, the urban politics of the Movement for the Reconstruction of the European City were imbued with concepts of liberalism. However, over time, emphasis shifted from a broad understanding of liberalism towards economic liberalism, as aesthetics displaced politics. This shift was paralleled by an evolution in the tools that those involved in the movement used, as well as in the roles that they adopted. From the 1980s, in an attempt to charge their — by then economically-driven — urban imaginaries with cultural value, many traded political resistance for cultural activism. During the 1980s and 1990s, the AAM, for instance, was involved in the publication of design manuals that carefully analysed historical urban types to facilitate their reconstruction. At the same time, influential think tanks and foundations emerged, whose stated aims included promoting the genius locus of the European city and stimulating a dialogue with the past in urban design.\textsuperscript{37}

Although today’s historicist urban design has become both an asset for global real-estate industries and an instrument for reactionary populist politics — as exemplified by the debates on *Rechte Räume* in the recent *ARCH+* issue — the early counter-projects of the ARAU, and the 1970s

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\textsuperscript{35} Culot’s architectural practice is called ‘Arcas Architect’ and is, according to its website, ‘… an office for architecture and urbanisation … [w]ith over 25 years of experience in architecture and urban planning and … an international reputation in residential real estate projects and hotels. The realisations range from villa apartments to residential towers, from beach resorts and hotels to residential care centers and from residential neighborhoods to multifunctional city centers.’ Source: https://www.arcas.be/about/, accessed on 11 October 2019.

\textsuperscript{36} Nick Wates and Charles Knevitt, *Community Architecture: How people are creating their own environment* (London: Routledge, 2014).

\textsuperscript{37} Prominent examples include the Philippe Rotthier Foundation, which was established in 1982 by the architect Philippe Rotthier, and the Council of European Urbanism. The former awards a triennial European Prize of Architecture rewarding works of collective and cultural value with regional roots and using natural and sustainable materials that draw on the genius of the European town and a dialogue with the past and with history, while the latter was founded in 2003 to attempt to revise and reorganise the American Congress for the New Urbanism Charter to relate better to European conditions.
drawings of Taller de Arquitectura held a radically different political promise. They sought to safeguard differences, provoke desires, and embrace contradictions. We therefore believe that untangling the complex past of the Movement for the Reconstruction of the European City — along with the political ambiguities embedded in the projects that it produced — might offer clues for how to re-think the capacity of urban design to assemble difference in the present.
CEDLA, Project for Santiago Poniente (1977) (Cristian Boza’s Drawings)
When discussing the question of democracy and architecture between 1965 and 1989, one needs to account for the central role of postmodernism; a current that voiced the need for inclusive, egalitarian, and pluralist spaces. With rhetoric glorifying aesthetic and ideological populism, postmodern architecture is seen as flourishing under liberal democracies and thus almost exclusively known from Western European and North American examples. In scholarship, it is also conventionally presented as “the new corporate style” of neoliberalism (Mary McLeod), following the “cultural logic of late capitalism” (Fredric Jameson) that refused to take a political stance and formed — deliberately or not — a socially and politically conservative project (Jürgen Habermas). However, this view becomes complicated if we decide to consider examples of postmodern architecture that emerged under locations and conditions that were radically different than Western democracies. One such example is Chilean postmodernism during the neoliberal dictatorship of Augusto Pinochet (1973–1989). In this paper, I consider Chilean postmodernism as a political project, engaged both with the government’s agenda and efforts oppositional to Pinochet’s dictatorship. In projects such as Plaza de la Constitución in Santiago de Chile (1980) and the Congreso de Chile in Valparaíso (1987), realized in times of intense protests against Pinochet, postmodernism was used as propaganda by the regime; to project a false image of an open democratic country. At the same time, postmodernism in Chile was utilized by architects who considered themselves as oppositional to the regime in power. An example of such uses of postmodernism is Centro de Estudios de Arquitectura (CEDLA, Center for Architectural Studies), an independent collective of Chilean architects established in 1977 in Santiago de Chile by Humberto Eliash, Cristián Boza, and Pedro Murtinho. CEDLA, through their projects, magazines, organized


2 The major platform that expressed the importance of postmodern theories for CEDLA — and more generally the major platform for communicating all ideas and projects developed by members of the group — was a magazine released approximately once a year. Its first issue appeared under the name of CEDLA in 1977, and the following were published as ARS: revista latinoamericana de arquitectura Chilena. ARS had eleven issues, published between 1978 and 1990. The magazine was distributed among architectural circles in Chile and other South American countries, and was financed from the resources of CEDLA members as well as from advertisements of companies operating in the Chilean architecture industry. ARS published articles written by CEDLA members as well as invited contributors. The scope of texts included general reflections on theory of architecture and urban planning, but held an especially strong focus on postmodern theories, discussions of recent realizations and projects in Chile, as well as analyses and critiques of the government’s approach to urban space.
conferences and symposia, interpreted postmodernism in a subversive way and used postmodern concepts — such as the revival of traditional urban forms — as tools to foster community and social bonds that would eventually contribute to overturning the regime and the return of democracy.

PINOCCHET’S DICTATORSHIP, URBAN SPACE, AND PROPAGANDA

After Pinochet replaced the socialist government of Salvador Allende as a result of a coup d’état on September 11, 1973, Chile implemented harsh neoliberal reforms. This radical shift of approach influenced Chilean architecture and urban space. Pinochet eliminated state agencies responsible for urban planning and social housing and, in 1979, adopted a law with its principle being “urban land is a resource which can be traded freely,” and as a consequence zoning laws should be shaped by the demands of the market. Another crucial aspect of the privatization of architecture and the city under Pinochet’s dictatorship was its approach to housing, which contributed greatly to increasing social inequalities. Under Pinochet, the urban poor were resettled away from people with higher incomes, and social housing settlements were located in remote neighborhoods on the outskirts of cities, often lacking access to basic infrastructure. Housing ceased to be considered as a universal human right protected by the state and instead it was ruled by the principles of supply and demand.

Pinochet’s administration’s regulations and policies had a significant effect on urban planning and architecture, but the government’s relationship with architecture can be described as hands-off, based on the philosophy of laissez-faire and showing no official interest in architecture. However, at the same time, the government used architecture to signal its political aspirations and goals. New architectural realizations commissioned by the government — the Plaza de la Constitución and the Congreso de Chile — marked two of the most significant political events in the post-coup history of Chile. Both were postmodern designs.

The Plaza de la Constitución (Constitution Square) occupies one hectare north of the presidential palace, Palacio de la Moneda, in the heart of Santiago de Chile. Before the coup, Plaza de la Constitución was used as a space for social and political manifestations, and on a day-to-day basis served as a parking lot for cars. From 1973 onwards, Plaza de la Constitución increasingly took on new meanings. During the coup, the Palacio de la Moneda was bombarded by the Chilean air force. After the

coup, La Moneda no longer served as a presidential seat, and its basements were used to detain and torture political opponents. In 1980, the Municipality of Santiago announced a national, public competition for the renovation of the Plaza de la Constitución to celebrate the new constitution, introduced in September 11, 1980. The legitimacy of the document was widely questioned, as it was approved through a government-controlled plebiscite. The competition can be thus seen as a “part of the military regime’s institutionalization project,” a symbolic gesture intended to validate Pinochet’s state and its constitution.

The competition was won by the architecture office of Cristián Undurraga and Ana Luisa Devés. Their project was based on a simple layout with a clear reference to traditional urban forms. The utterly traditional form of the Plaza de la Constitución — bringing to mind an array of historical associations, from the idealized Italian renaissance urban designs to the regularity of French baroque formal gardens — corresponds with the neoclassical form of the palace. The simplicity of the design exposes traditional typologies — the path, plaza and court — and presents them in a distilled, purified form. For these reasons, the Plaza de la Constitución is often described as one of the most consequently postmodern realizations in Chile.

Undurraga’s and Devés’s design effectively erased the democratic character of the previous space. Unruly and unregulated, the pre-1973 Plaza de la Constitución responded to the citizens’ needs; from manifesting dissent and opinions on current political events to performing the mundane function of providing parking spaces. The new design did not maintain any connection with the people; its ceremonial and official character resembles more of a baroque cour d’honneur than a civic space. More importantly, the historicizing design of Undurraga and Devés erases memory, covering up the darkest history of the space with clean, elegant forms; a gesture that was noted by many commenters of the time.

5 For years after the coup, the regime used spaces underneath Plaza de la Constitución as a secret torture chamber known as “El Hoyo” (“The Hole”). Julia Talarn Rabascall, “Chile’s presidential palace basement was Pinochet’s torture chamber,” Agencia EFE, October 16 2016, https://www.efe.com/efe/english/world/chile-s-presidential-palace-basement-was-pinochet-torture-chamber/50000262-3069436.


8 Francisco Díaz et al., Docoposmo: Documentacion y Conversaciones Sobre el Posmoderno (guide in the form of leaflet), Santiago 2008. Undurraga & Devés was one of the most successful architectural firms in Pinochet’s Chile, well connected with Pinochet’s administration. In addition to Plaza de la Constitución, the architects received a prestigious and lucrative government commission for urban furniture and small architecture in major Chilean cities.

9 The significance of the new design for the Plaza de la Constitución was well captured by a representative of the Human Rights Watch who in 1988 was delegated to report on the human rights situation in Chile: “I looked down on Santiago’s famous Plaza de la Constitución, where citizens historically gathered to praise or protest the actions of their government. At first the expanse of grass in the plaza was pleasing, it was so green and neat. Then I remembered that it was Pinochet’s poorly paid minimum-work program for Chile’s large unemployed population that kept the parks so clean, indeed among the cleanest in the world. Pinochet had changed the layout of the plaza. More than two thirds of the traditional cobblestone public space was now subdivided into a series of well-kept elevated grassy sections. Citizens could walk along the guarded pathways but not congregate in the plaza — discouraging to protest.” See: Alfred Stepan, “The Last Days of Pinochet?,” The New York Review, June 2 1988, http://www.nybooks.com/articles/1988/06/02/the-last-days-of-pinochet/.
The Plaza de la Constitución’s postmodern character then differs dramatically from the forms of postmodernism as normally studied in Western Europe and North America. Its classical references to the Italian renaissance and the French baroque serve to destroy the democratic character of the original site, literally covering up the murders and torture that had taken place beneath its ground and boost a specific political image of grandiosity and civilization. Rather than a postmodern, playful use of historical references, the references here are used as conscious indications of authority and power utterly without irony.

If the establishment of the new constitution in 1980 was one significant political event that Pinochet’s administration symbolically signaled through a work of postmodern architecture, the Chilean national plebiscite in 1988 was another, as it would be accompanied by the new building for the Chilean Congress. The constitution had established the 1988 plebiscite eight years in advance, which could result in two scenarios: if Pinochet were to be approved for another eight years, parliamentary elections would take place nine months after he is sworn into office. Alternatively, if Pinochet were to lose, both presidential and parliamentary elections would follow. The return of democracy assumed reinstating the Chilean National Congress, which had been dissolved by Pinochet in 1973. This announced transition of the country was marked by an architectural competition for a new Congress Building, located in a decaying port city, Valparaíso.

The winning entry, announced on June 30 1988 — just three months before the plebiscite’s results — was a collaborative design of architects Juan Cárdenas, José Covacevic, and Raúl Farrú. The postmodern edifice juxtaposing various historical references from ancient Egypt to Art Deco and freely mixing different colors and materials pleased not only the jury, but also, according to architect Pablo Allard, Pinochet himself, who said, “when I saw the models, I knew this was the winner.”

Architecture historian Francisco Díaz describes the propagandistic function of the new building of the Chilean Congress as an effort to signal “a new beginning for Chilean political history” and an attempt to “clean up the past by merging it with the future.” This way, the Congress building is analogous to the Plaza de la Constitución in its effort to “clean up the past” through its classicizing design. Pinochet’s efforts to improve his image with a spectacular, architectural symbol of his new, pro-democratic orientation proved to be unsuccessful, and in March 1990, Patricio Aylwin replaced Pinochet as the newly elected president.

10 In the years following the new constitution, Pinochet’s administration introduced legislative changes in preparation for future democratic elections. Most importantly, two laws, one which allowed the creation of (non-leftist) political parties, and another, which opened national registers to voters, both passed in 1987.

11 As a result of Law N°18.678 signed in December 24th of 1987. See: https://www.leychile.cl/Navegar?idNorma=30064&idParte=. The official reasons for the move were the intention to decentralize power in Chile and to initiate urban renewal of Valparaíso.


During this same period, some Chilean architects used postmodernism as a means of opposing Pinochet’s politics. One such example was CEDLA, an independent collective of Chilean architects established in 1977 in Santiago. Humberto Eliash, one of CEDLA’s founding members, described CEDLA as “a political project,” where architecture was “treated as a social agent, […] a social and political statement.”

For CEDLA, postmodernism was a tool to create socially conscious and politically engaged architecture. This approach to postmodernism can be seen in CEDLA’s first project and a manifesto of their philosophy; a design proposal for the Santiago Poniente area in Santiago de Chile presented in 1977. However, Santiago Poniente was more of an ideological statement than a pragmatic design solution ready to be implemented, given that it was unlikely to be built under the conditions of privatized urban space under Pinochet.

Santiago Poniente is situated west of central Santiago. It consists of roughly sixteen blocks and is characterized by predominantly nineteenth-century architecture. In the second half of the twentieth century, Santiago Poniente had experienced a gradual disappearance of its population and the neighborhood was quickly deteriorating. CEDLA’s project was an attempt to revitalize the neighborhood using methodologies taken from the canon of critical texts on postmodernism, such as *Learning from Las Vegas* and *The Architecture of the City*, deploying the postmodern revival of traditional typologies and spatial solutions. The first step was a careful study of the site in the form of drawings, photographs, and descriptions. Subsequently, CEDLA discerned basic typologies for Santiago Poniente; *manzana* (block), *plaza* (square), *cité* (housing unit with continuous façade), *plazuela* (little piazza), *edificio patio* (courtyard building), *rambla* (boulevard) and *pasaje* (passage). Each of the types was documented and described in terms of its history, its place in the development of Santiago and other Latin American cities, and the role it played for the community on different scales; for example, plazas and plazuelas as spaces of meeting and exchange between inhabitants from different parts of the city, or courtyards of *edificios patios* as spaces guarding the privacy of families dwelling in them. The broad characterizations of spatial types essential to Santiago Poniente were supplemented with detailed studies of their elements, such as crossings of the passages or connectors between buildings and streets.

On the formal level, the main idea behind the project was to create continuity with the existing architecture of the site by relying on traditional Chilean spatial typologies and using historical architectural forms and materials. At the same time, CEDLA emphasized the social potential of these postmodern techniques, and saw the role of historical forms not...
only as respecting the context and history of the neighborhood, but above all as enabling community building and the identification of inhabitants with the space they lived in. For CEDLA, traditional typologies known from historical cities, revived by the postmodern movement, were means of opposing Pinochet’s agenda and fostering a more egalitarian society. In CEDLA’s words:

Our position was: no to segregation, yes to the interchange of people. We tried to achieve this by creating public spaces based on traditional typologies, like streets or squares, and ensuring mixed-use spaces that encouraged people to […] meet, discuss, integrate and mingle. […] Our goal was to defend the old tissue and to foster integration of the people in the city, we were against the segregation and against the fact that poor people were pushed to the peripheries of Santiago. We wanted to mix people with different incomes.¹⁵

The spine of CEDLA’s plan for Santiago Poniente is La Rambla — a commercial boulevard interrupted by plazas and squares. In the plan, La Rambla consists of both (1) existing buildings, renovated and adapted to commercial and residential purposes, and (2) newly constructed five-story buildings, the lowest level of which houses stores, offices, and services. Streets parallel to La Rambla lead to blocks occupied by existing and new buildings based on traditional Chilean typologies, as well as small urban parks, piazzas, and interior passages connecting housing and services with squares and piazzas. A crucial element in the typology used by CEDLA was the street. As the CEDLA members say, one of the major goals of Santiago Poniente was to “recuperate the concept of the street as a channel […] of activity more than just a simple connector.”¹⁶

In the time of Pinochet’s dictatorship when the government imposed means to control meetings and gathering and ordered curfew in major cities to control social unrest and tame the opposition, creating spaces for social interactions was a political gesture.

For some Chilean architects, the postmodern turn in architecture brought a promise of a socially engaged architecture that is able to contradict and reverse the destructive policies of Pinochet’s regime in Chile. At the same time, despite the declared intentions of its members, CEDLA cannot be labeled simply as ‘oppositional architecture.’ In times of heavily controlled public discourse, limits on gathering, and an official ban for opposition, CEDLA maintained its existence as an independent organization. It did so not only because the government did not consider architecture as a potentially dangerous field — and hence never put much effort into monitoring architectural discourse — but also because some of the CEDLA members had extensive government connections and used them to support the activities of the group. One of them was Cristián Boza, one of the co-

¹⁵ Interview with Cristián Boza, Santiago de Chile, 09/05/2016.
¹⁶ Ibid.
founders of CEDLA and main organizers within the group — also the one who made declarations regarding CEDLA’s mission:

postmodernism was not only about columns and friezes. It was about regaining our identity. […] We did not agree with the military government. We were talking about liberation, about bringing our country and its respective architecture back.\textsuperscript{17}

Boza was also owner at one of the most successful architectural studios during Pinochet’s regime. His office realized many commissions for commercial projects, which use fashionable postmodern forms or elements such as local, artisanal materials in a strictly formal way. They not only adopt the most superficial, formal inspirations from postmodernism, but also contribute to the vision of urban space and society endorsed by the dictatorship. Moreover, in 1987, Boza took part in the competition for the Chilean Congress organized by Pinochet’s administration. Boza’s practice was critically discussed within CEDLA and faced objections from many of its members. Nevertheless, Boza remained one of CEDLA’s crucial figures until it ceased to exist. CEDLA’s practice, given the professional trajectories of its members, offers an opportunity to reflect on broader questions, relevant to today’s reality; Can the ideal of a truly democratic architecture be pursued under neoliberal conditions? What is the extent of necessary compromises that can be made to promote progressive spatial ideas under an adverse political situation? Can architectural practice — an enterprise that is always an expression of authority structures, as its manifestation or realization depend on state approval or support — be a form of dissent?

\textsuperscript{17} Cristián Boza, interview by Joaquín Serrano in \textit{Editar para transformar: publicaciones de arquitectura y diseño en Chile durante los años 60s y 70s, en el marco de la exposición Clip/Stamp/Fold}, edited by Pablo Brugnoli and Fernando Portal (Santiago: Capital Books, 2015), 165.
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The decommissioned nineteenth-century slaughterhouse at Testaccio, after the rock concerts of the Estate romana. Late September 1979. The structures and layout that transformed the cattle precinct into an open-air concert venue were devised by Franco Purini, Laura Thermes, Duccio Staderini, Giuseppe De Boni, and Ugo Colombari. What remained of the stage after the events can be seen in the middle distance. Box 59 "Estate romana — Parco Centrale 1979," Folder "diapositive," Document sg0027; Purini-Thermes Archive, Rome. Photograph courtesy of Studio Purini-Thermes.
Almost unheard of in architectural history and undertheorized in political philosophy, *compromise* sits nevertheless at the core of democratic practice. Compromise is both a method of governance and its outcome; a process aimed at excluding violence from the resolution of conflict that brings contending parties to willingly meet halfway. Though compromise is often discussed as a function of parliamentary arithmetic or ruling coalitions, this paper posits that cultural products intervene in its actualization, notably architecture.

How may architecture catalyze compromise? How does it codify it? How is a happy medium reached when the object in dispute is architectural? My paper addresses these questions through a study of the *Estate Romana* (Roman Summer) festival (1977–1985), the most celebrated episode among the municipal policies that the Italian Communist Party (PCI) launched in Rome under the aegis of the so-called *Compromesso storico* (Historic Compromise).

The Historic Compromise was the PCI’s official strategy between 1973 and 1979, of consociation with centrist constituencies and parties, mainly Democrazia Cristiana (DC), and of social transformation via democratic means. It aimed to prevent a mass reactionary movement, likely to be triggered by the potentially explosive conjunction of ailments that afflicted Italy: economic crisis, daily terrorist activity, and widespread workers’ and neighbors’ dissatisfaction, especially with housing deficits and disorderly planning.¹ The strategy proved effective: civil war was

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¹ The PCI secretary-general Enrico Berlinguer (1922–1984) called for a rapprochement between his party and DC in 1973. The overthrow of Salvador Allendes’s democratically elected socialist government in Chile that year accentuated fears that a similar right-wing putsch could occur in Italy if political polarization continued to deepen and the Communists’ chances to reach power kept growing. However, even before the coup in Chile, the Party had been moving in the direction of a wide national alliance. Only such configuration, the Communist leaders believed, could implement the reforms needed to halt the country’s economic and social crisis. The Historic Compromise materialized in an increasing parliamentary cooperation that culminated in 1978, when the PCI joined the coalition that supported the DC government without however going as far as entering cabinet. That day, the extreme Left terrorist Red Brigades kidnapped former DC secretary Aldo Moro, the man largely responsible for securing acceptance of the Historic Compromise on the Catholic side. After his assassination, DC grew skeptical of the experiment in consociation, which dissolved a year later. Peter Lange, “Crisis and Consent, Change and Compromise: Dilemmas of Italian Communism in the 1970s,” in *Italy in Transition: Conflict and Consensus*, eds. Peter Lange and Sidney Tarrow (London: Frank Cass, 1980), 110, 127, 129.
avoided, welfare and urban policies veered left, and the PCI won unprecedented support at the ballot box.\(^2\)

In 1976 and for the first time ever, the Communists took hold of Rome’s city government, with DC abstaining.\(^3\) Renato Nicolini (1942–2012), a young architect and cultural agitator, was appointed Councillor for Cultural Affairs.\(^4\) The centerpiece of his unorthodox initiatives was the summer festival Estate Romana. It offered a wide variety of street performances and spectacles, ranging from experimental theatre to dance to movie nights set in multiple locales. Nicolini convened architects such as Franco Purini (b. 1941) and Laura Thermes (b. 1943), and Ugo Colombo (b. 1950) and Giuseppe De Boni (b. 1951) to raise the ephemeral stages and pavilions that, year after year and spread throughout the metropolis, rendered this lively transformation of places possible. The festival concretized the Party’s larger strategy: against the aggressive practices of speculators and terrorists, it sought to lessen class and ideological rifts by synthesizing a civic space open to all in fraternal cohabitation. While urban discontent was intense to the point of threatening the nation’s peace, the Estate contributed an architectural inflection to the preservation of Italian democracy.

DEMOCRACY’S FOES DWELT IN THE CITY

It would be difficult to overestimate the degree to which Italian democracy was endangered. The 1970s sealed the period of unprecedented growth and concomitant optimism that had followed the war. In just thirty years Italy had become an industrial power, while a resilient multi-party system had tamed its traditionally polarized politics. However, from the late 1960s

\(^2\) The PCI reached its electoral ceiling in the mid-1970s, as evidenced by its share of the vote in successive elections to the lower chamber of the Italian parliament: 26.90% (1968), 27.15% (1972), 34.37% (1976), 30.38% (1979), 29.89% (1983). In comparison, the results for DC were: 39.12% (1968), 38.66% (1972), 38.71% (1976), 38.30% (1979), 32.93% (1983). The growth in PCI support did not occur at the expense of other leftist parties, but thanks to a net growth of that political bloc. Figures taken from the Italian elections online historical archive kept by Italy’s Ministry of the Interior, accessed March 2, 2019, https://elezionistorico.interno.gov.it/index.php.

\(^3\) The mayor elected was art historian Giulio Carlo Argan (1909–1992). Though not a member of the Party yet, he headed the Communist ticket. Nominating prestigious figures of leftist sensitivities who however did not hold PCI affiliation was a typical Historic Compromise practice. The elections took place on June 20, 1976 and the investiture vote on August 9. In a gesture of goodwill consistent with the times, the Democrazia Cristiana group at Rome’s city council abstained when Argan was voted mayor, even though he did not need that abstention to secure a majority, since the support of the Socialist and Social-Democratic parties, complemented by the abstention of the Republicans, sufficed.

\(^4\) Renato Nicolini trained as an architect in Rome between 1960 and 1970. He was a leader of the student movement during the roaring 60s. He practiced little and devoted most of his professional efforts to teaching and research during the late 1960s and early 1970s under Ludovico Quaroni and Mario Fiorentino. He conducted some of his architectural work within Franco Purini and Laura Thermes’s team. He was editor and then head editor of the highly influential architecture journal Controspazio between 1969 and 1976. An active member of the PCI in Rome during the 1970s, he organized Feste dell’Unità, which were the Party’s yearly festival, the most important social event in the life of the organization. He was a Communist representative at Rome’s city center district before being appointed Councillor for Cultural Affairs. He left office after his party’s defeat at the 1985 local elections, though he remained a councillor. He then entered Parliament and resumed his university teaching. My propositions rely to a large extent on materials from the hitherto inaccessible Nicolini fonds at the Capitoline Archives in Rome. I would like to thank Dr. Patrizia Gori for kindly allowing me to consult them even as cataloguing was still ongoing. Biographical notes in Box 2, Folder 2; Renato Nicolini fonds; Capitoline Archives, Rome.
the postwar consensus decayed quickly, as the discontents brought by an accelerated modernization surfaced. Emerging demands focused largely on the built environment because the social and physical fabrics of cities had been the prime bearers of the country's transformation. They were at a time the source of malaise and the stage for its expression. Italian institutions had shown themselves unable to control urban explosion and provide the services expected from any welfare regime — affordable housing, amenities, green areas, heritage preservation. Land speculation, illegal constructions, lack of public infrastructure — from sanitation to schools — rendered ever-growing cities hardly habitable.

Democracy failed to satisfy those basic demands at its own peril. Its impotence nourished skepticism toward its functionality and, ultimately, toward its validity, pushing many to embrace increasingly subversive alternatives left and right. Deficits in urban governance became a factor of social destabilization. The predatory exploitation of the territory was one of several root causes behind the emergence of violent groups, one that functioned via frustration. Some of those groups ended up embracing terror and made of cities their theatre of operations, further poisoning citizens' rapport to their environment. Adding to the alienation from their neighborhoods many Romans felt, terrorists instilled fear of public spaces and large assemblies, thereby rendering people reluctant to engage in the civic practices that made their citizenship whole.

By mid-1975, illegal developments in Rome covered more than 22,000 ha — an area bigger than Milan's entire municipal territory — 6,000 of which the city's 1962 masterplan had demarcated for services, parks, affordable housing, and agricultural uses, to no avail. The 400,000 rooms speculators had unlawfully built lodged some 830,000 Romans.\textsuperscript{5} Nowhere was urban decay direr than in Rome; nowhere was violence more widespread. The capital city endured a third of the 13,227 acts of political brutality perpetrated in Italy between 1969 and 1982. They affected disproportionately the first five years of Communist rule (1976–1980); with the Estate's early editions unfolding, terrorists committed close to two thirds of their crimes.\textsuperscript{6}

By the mid-1970s, speculators and terrorists were Italian democracy's most serious enemies. Both attempted to divest the state of authority over public


\textsuperscript{6} The fact that Rome was the country's capital city, there where the State institutions, including the national parties, had most of their seats, explains to a large extent the concentration of terrorist action. However, the place of birth and residence of the terrorists arrested between 1970 and 1984 evidences the overrepresentation of Roman denizens: 17\% and 24\% of the total for Italy respectively, whereas Rome accounted only for 5\% of the country's population, in average for the period between the 1971 and the 1981 censuses. There where frustration with public powers' incapacity to satisfy urban demands was more intense, extreme forms of protest found propitious ground. Figures on terrorist activity taken from Leonard Weinberg, and William Lee Eubank, The Rise and Fall of Italian Terrorism (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1987), 80, 106, 108.
space. The PCI formulated its Historic Compromise as a remedy to these extraordinary challenges. Italian society had to be brought together around renewed modes of administration responsive to egalitarian demands. There was no other way to preserve democratic institutions; people could be asked to abandon virulence and embrace compromise again only if their cities were handed back to them. Within this context, the Estate emerged as an aesthetic endeavor aimed to assert democratic power over the city against those who, whether with bulldozers or bombs, wanted to usurp it. How could architectural interventions attempt to reconstitute the corroded social compact? To answer this, we need to examine the activation of architecture as a compromise-yielding device during the Estate. Architecture’s aesthetic enablement of concord unfolded between two fora: the body politic and public institutions.

SELF-REPRESENTATION OF THE BODY POLITIC THROUGH ARCHITECTURE

Compromise is a willful act requiring acceptance of the possibility to have one’s self-comprehension changed in the encounter with others. The activation of such dynamic perception of the polity’s own identity constitutes an a priori for the architectural opening of the political self to accommodation. Architecture acts upon the inner self via the self’s intense investment in pregnant objects to construct representations of the civitas that welcome conciliation. In 1970s Rome, fights for urban justice and terrorist scares heightened that emotional projection onto the built environment.

Nicolini and his colleagues used that tense attachment to their advantage. Since urban space was at the core of disputes, architecture could play a healing role. Through the Estate interventions, the city’s negative hold on people’s psyche could be reversed. For that to occur, those interventions had to stimulate citizens’ imagination, invite them to replace the city of fears to which they had been dragged, with an alternative one they could make their own. Nicolini and fellow travelers baptized their strategy Il meraviglioso urbano (The Urban Wonder). They aimed to reinfuse daily life with a sense of the fantastic. For nine consecutive years, gigantic projection screens were raised, sometimes several of them at a time, in

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7 Needless to say, there is no moral equivalency between owners or real estate companies extracting massive rent from the land on the one hand, and politically motivated murderers on the other. But that does not mean we should be blind to the analogous character of some of their actions in the city, regarding both their modalities and their consequences.

8 The willingness to compromise even on matters of principle is premised, if we follow Martin Benjamin, on the fact that most of us, fanatics of any persuasion aside, recognize that our self-defining core of values and interests is filled with contradictions. This cool self-assessment renders us more tolerant of discrepant positions and moves us to engage positively with others to achieve mutual accommodation. See his discussion of “integrity-preserving compromise” in Martin Benjamin, Splitting the Difference: Compromise and Integrity in Ethics and Politics (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1990), 32–38.

historic enclaves, in monuments such as the Basilica of Maxentius or the Circus Maximus. As many as 50,000 spectators experienced the dreamy worlds of celluloid blend with those of lost civilizations, fleeting images superimposed to standing stones, the material city and immaterial stories collapse, fiction and reality blur.¹⁰

For the Estate's third edition in 1979, Franco Purini and Laura Thermes designed a dancing floor near the Appia Antica, a sixty meter-long platform, ornated with pieces of scenography borrowed from nearby Cinecittà studios, recognizable icons of popular peplum movies — a huge sandaled foot, a row of papier-mâché Corinthian columns — around which Romans frolicked well into the night. Whether with their moving bodies or during the populous occupation of the old city to watch movies, Romans intensely felt a new collectivity awakening from its accustomed gloom. The ephemeral quality of the architecture that hosted them only honed the pervasiveness of Nicolini's strategy on the inner self. The pavilions and follies vanished soon after the events. Because only memories remained, the civic life they professed was immune to wear and could grow deep roots at the heart of the civitas.

A vivacious expression, the Estate's effects on the traumatized public mood were soothing. Since destruction and construction put the body politic in full at the center of conflict — the city's body as much as citizens' bodies — they could not but instigate strong attachments to the environment's material and visual standing. The Estate sites performed a mediating task in reshaping the self of a citizenry under pressure. The PCI's conciliatory policies tested the power of urban joviality over that definition. In the face of adversity, the festive events were cathartic, yielding a new sense of collective emancipation and hopeful ownership over the urban, both against the practices of rapacious speculation and against the culture of self-denial that terrorists espoused. Central to such transformation of mentalities was Rome's municipal administration, exercising an imaginative mode of conflict arbitration Italians had never known.

**THE INSTITUTIONAL-ARCHITECTURAL ARBITRATION OF CONFLICT**

Public administrations are the second forum within which political compromise is synthesized. Architecture is an institutional fact, so is compromise. What happens when they share quarters? Compromise brings conflict to public light and resolves it through institutional arrangements.

That is the milieu where the architectural transposition of adversarial stances is administered. At play during the Estate was an operation of institutional-architectural arbitration characterized by the dispersion of institutional agency in space and time, an architectural atomization of the institution.

The Historic Compromise was an expressly institutionalist project. The PCI acknowledged that no revolution could unfold in Italy. Instead, work from within the institutions of representative democracy was the only way to bring about changes along socialist lines, including, notably, the salvaging of cities from speculation. Moreover, administrations had the means to deploy cultural policies that, if properly designed, could shape public consciousness toward collectivist values. Crucially, within institutions the Party could gain legitimacy against and above the extra-parliamentary Left and associated violent fringe groups. The Estate was uniquely suited to mark such contrast. As public policy, it displayed a distinctively unregimented character; it disseminated a collection of occurrences across the metropolis. Rome’s city hall launched it, the better to counter the equally fragmented character of its adversaries’ tactics.

Bombings and speculative ventures followed no overarching plan, only opportunity. They constituted a collection of one-off events that nevertheless signaled underlying structural dysfunctions. Analogously, city hall responded by atomizing its spatial presence, scattering its redressing measures across neighborhoods. As if they were those attacks’ symmetric opposites, positive mirror images, the Estate venues assuaged urban malaise, through acupuncture as it were. In 1979, the Estate unfolded in

11 The PCI awakened to urban issues later than other parties, the Socialist Party for instance. Union protests in 1969, during the so-called Hot Autumn of labor unrest, focused on claims beyond working conditions such as housing, transportation, and public amenities. As a result, city management took on a new significance for the Party. The 1970s saw Bologna, the most emblematic of Communist local governments, engage in a novel experiment in planning that rendered all policies a function of the preservation of the old city. The PCI made recurrent use of Bologna’s success to showcase its governing capacity. Its victories in local and regional elections during the 1970s attest to the widespread perception among Italian voters of its responsiveness to people’s quotidian needs. Crucially, to the centrist electorate it demonstrated that the Communists could be entrusted with democratic power as they did not turn public institutions into bastions of a Leninist avant-garde. To workers, and against claims from those in the farther Left, it showed that change could be effected within capitalism, peacefully marching toward the horizon of an egalitarian society. An overview of the debates on urban policies taking place within the Party in those years can be obtained from Partito Comunista Italiano, Casa, esodo, occupazione: Atti del Convegno del PCI tenuto a Venezia il 18–19 giugno 1973 (Rome: Editori Riuniti, 1974); and Guido Alborghetti, ed., Casa, urbanistica: Le proposte dei comunisti (Rome: Edizioni delle Autonomie, 1981).

12 In a pluralist society such as Italy’s, so the Communists’ reasoning went, policies that significantly altered the status quo needed to count on support from beyond the strict bounds of the PCI electorate or of the working class; they would not otherwise be tolerated. Consent could only be secured through the articulation of majorities and the negotiation of compromise that representative bodies enabled. The PCI’s interest in pacifically conquering the instruments needed to shape cultural values stood on Gramscian foundations: Antonio Gramsci (1891–1937), prewar Communist leader, martyr, and towering intellectual referent for postwar socialists in Italy and beyond, was convinced that a long work of cultural transformation had to occur to move the Italian working class toward revolutionary convictions. That required occupying the institutions, public and private, that shaped consciousness — the school, the universities, the press — and to render the party a culture-producing machine. Stephen Gundie, Between Hollywood and Moscow: The Italian Communists and the Challenge of Mass Culture, 1943–1991 (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2000), 147–149, 151, 154–155; and I Quaderni del carcere di Antonio Gramsci: Un’antologia, eds. Lelio La Porta and Giuseppe Prestipino (Rome: Carocci, 2014), 15, 27.
five different spots located in as many districts. They were selected for the capacity each harbored to signal a disorder. At Sabotino street, for instance, the experimental theatres raised for the occasion evidenced the lack of amenities from which the neighborhood suffered while defying the cultural conservatism of the mostly bourgeois residents. The rock concerts at the decommissioned nineteenth-century Testaccio slaughterhouse at a time catered for urban subcultures official policies had hitherto ignored and breathed new life into a major local marker of working-class history.

Villa Torlonia, another knob in the 1979 Estate’s polygon, stood for the many derelict aristocratic estates in need of heritage protection that, if expropriated rather than developed, would offer much-needed greenery. Even more meaningful than that, to the effects of grasping the aesthetic powers of urban scenography over the body politic, was the setup Purini, Thermes, and their associates devised. It exposed visitors to a self-reflective multimedia experience. Along an elevated walkway, TV sets were lined up, each broadcasting images videotaped the day before at any of the other four spots. It was an awareness-raising occasion; people comprehended the fragmentary character of that year’s festival, the atomization of public action. At the same time, by seeing others and maybe even themselves on the screens, they awakened to the communality of the events. This architectural integration of the latest media supports sublated atomization, thereby helping in the consolidation of the social bloc, as Nicolini and more generally the PCI wanted.

It was through the abruptness and intensity of experiences such as these that the Estate architectures occasioned concentrated expansions of the insufficient civic agency Romans had been enduring. The follies and platforms materialized a distinctive mode of public arbitration; outbursts of innovative institutional action brought forth the motivations of conflict while altering their trajectory, rerouting them toward social cohesion.

CONCLUSION

In late 1970s Rome, official interventions struggled to assuage urban unrest as the country’s constitutional arrangements crumbled. To many, the Communists’ conciliatory positions under the Historic Compromise...
amounted to betrayal, a glaring case of rotten compromise inimical to the working class. In view of the impossibility to combat inequality, through the Estate the PCI would have allegedly effectuated a deceitful architectural reduction of conflict amounting to mere simulacrum. Alternatively, the Estate, with its stages dotting the metropolitan territory, could be read as a consensus-building strategy to protect the communal realm. By convening all Romans to a populist arrogation of streets and squares, it countered those who claimed a monopoly over them, whether exploitative, from speculators, or bloody, in the case of murderous extremists. Architecture would have thus emerged as the last line of defense, however equivocal, to preserve in Italy the post-1945 European sociopolitical covenant, that most consequential of compromises.

Radicals made of this a major casus belli against the PCI. The question pierced however the confines of partisan fight for control over workers’ allegiances in Italy. In the latter years of the Cold War, the PCI’s growing influence attracted much attention from Anglo-American intellectuals — and from the US State Department. In 1976, in Houston, Texas, the American Society for Political and Legal Philosophy met with the American Association of Law Teachers to discuss the concept of “compromise”. The book of proceedings was published three years later. It included a contribution on the conformity to Marxism of the PCI’s irenic strategy. The author concluded that it was not heretic. Paul Thomas, “Marxism and Compromise: A Speculation,” in Compromise in Ethics, Law, and Politics, eds. J. Roland Penock and John W. Chapman (New York: New York University Press, 1979), 104–120. On corrupt compromises more generally, see Avishai Margalit, On Compromise and Rotten Compromise (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010). His discussion of uncompromising sectarianism in chapter 6 provides a blueprint to understand the extreme Left’s hostility toward conciliatory politics.
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Figure 1. Yale President Kingman Brewster (center) meeting with activist students at the School of Art and Architecture on May 12, 1969. Students adapted the familiar closed fist motif for their own radical campaigns, portraying it holding a paintbrush and a T-square. Source: Yale Daily News, May 16, 1969. Photograph by Steven Koch.
From Harlem to New Haven. The emergence of the advocacy planning movement in the late 1960s

In the United States of America, the term ‘urban renewal’ refers to a federal government program that began in 1954 with the purpose of replacing blighted urban areas with new urban projects. In contrast to the connotation of ‘urban renewal’ in North-Western European cities — where the term was linked with a democratisation movement and the establishment of new forms of participatory governance — within the American context ‘urban renewal’ was related to the implementation of top-down strategies that “decimated older black neighbourhoods, forcing relocation in rapidly ghettoising areas, or in some cases creating physical barriers that confined African Americans to certain areas.”

The paper examines certain democratic practices in such a charged environment, shedding light on the ways in which top down urban renewal projects were often aimed against black communities, exemplified with two case studies that are closely connected to the critique of urban renewal in the United States: the founding in 1964 of the Architect’s Renewal Committee in Harlem (ARCH) as the first organization solely devoted to advocacy planning in the United States, and the establishment in 1969 of the City Planning Forum at Yale School of Art and Architecture, an independent governing body which consisted of all full-time faculty members and students and — in dialogue with the civil rights movement — sought to bring greater diversity to the department.

The 1949 Renewal Program defined urban renewal as “the diversified efforts by localities, with the assistance of the Federal Government, for the elimination and prevention of slums and blight, whether residential or non-residential, and the removal of the factors that created slums and blighting conditions.” Before its revisions in 1954, the official term used was ‘urban redevelopment’ instead of ‘urban renewal’. After revising the program, urban renewal became more attractive to private investors. Between 1945 and 1965, federal funds were used to construct hundreds of thousands of public housing units in many American cities as part of the program. The two cities that used most of the program’s funds were New York City and Chicago. By 1960, New York City received the highest percentage of urban renewal

1 Kenneth L. Kusmer cited in Mary E. Triece. Urban Renewal and Resistance: Race, Space, and the City in the Late Twentieth to the Early Twenty-First Century (Lanham, Maryland: Lexington Books, 2016), 90.
funding to replace ‘slums’ with modern public housing. Holcomb and Beauregard explained the reasons for which the Urban Renewal Program was largely criticized, while Martin Anderson tried to distinguish the reasons for those critiques among which is the replacement of low-rent with high-rent dwellings.

Advocacy planning approaches have often considered urban renewal to be incompatible with socially effective approaches to urban planning. Among them, the Architects Renewal Committee of Harlem (ARCH), founded in 1964, stands out as one of the first Community Design Centers (CDCs). ARCH emerged in the context of the civil rights movement in the United States and intended to provide technical and design advice to communities that could otherwise not afford it. ARCH was founded by Richard Hatcher, who became the executive director. Hatcher was joined by John Bailey in 1967, and in 1968 by Max Bond. Among ARCH’S most important realizations is “Architecture in the Neighborhoods” (1970), which aimed to recruit local black youth to become architects. Key figures of the Advocacy Planning Movement in the late 1960s in the United States were C. Richard Hatch and Christopher Tunnard, Chairmen of the Department of City Planning of Yale between 1966 and 1969. The Advocacy Planning Movement rejected the methods of urban renewal, which had contributed significantly to the transformation of the urban fabric of New York City and other American cities like Chicago during the years that preceded 1968. Paul Davidoff, who taught city planning at the University of Pennsylvania, Hunter College, and Queens College, was one of the major contributors to Advocacy Planning. Among his efforts to increase the opportunities of participation in city planning for the excluded groups, he established the Suburban Action Institute for research and litigation; to provide access to suburban housing for low-income citizens. The main concern of advocacy planning was the conviction that “[p]lanners should be able to engage in the political process as advocates of the interests both of government and of such other groups, organisations, or individuals who are concerned with proposing policies for the future development of the community.”

Davidoff’s article entitled “Advocacy and Pluralism in Planning”, played an important role in the dissemination of advocacy planning. It paid special attention to advocacy planning’s aim to establish “the bases for a society affording equal opportunity to all citizens,” and encouraged the replacement of models based on land-use by socio-economic planning strategies. Thomas L. Blair expressed his doubts regarding the capacity of “advocacy planning really [to establish] […] a participatory democracy,” maintaining that in certain cases it had been “a pretext for public manipulation.” The Advocacy Planning Movement aspired to respond to the fulfilment of needs, related to the welfare of society as a whole, and the responsibility to provide equal

6 Ibid., 331.
housing opportunities and equal access to public amenities regardless of race, religion, or nationality.

The New York Urban League, an organization committed to improve social and economic conditions and opportunities for African-Americans, organized the Street Academies program. This program, funded by the Ford Foundation, educated high school dropouts in the prep school ‘Harlem Prep’, to ultimately get them accepted in a college or university. In 1968, the Institute for Architecture and Urban Studies (IAUS) proposed a pilot study in Harlem to the New York Urban League, which equated black America with urban America, and concluded that “if ‘black’ and ‘white’ are truly symbiotic, then modern technology could be as much a symbol of black America and the modern city as it is of white America.”

In order to grasp how the early activities of the IAUS are related to the debates around urban renewal, one should be reminded that the formation of the IAUS was related to the Urban Design Group, a department within the New York City Planning Commission of the Mayor Lindsay’s administration, formed with the Columbia team that participated in the projects that were included in the exhibition “The New City: Architecture and Urban Renewal” held at the Museum of Modern Art in New York (MoMA) in 1967. One of the early projects of the IAUS was a project aiming to ‘develop a new form of educational mechanism in Harlem.’ This project had as objective to ‘translate community desires into programs.’ In its description, there is a reference to the need for “community planners” and “urbanologists”, who were differentiated from the “university-trained urban sociologist[s]”. It was based on the conviction that “community planners” were capable of providing “living documentation of the experience of the ghetto”, and intended to shape “physical and social design” tools aiming to provide “economic and political stability.”

During the 1950s and 1960s, in reaction against top-down redevelopment in New Haven, students of the Department of City Planning at Yale expressed their disapproval of the urban renewal politics. The phase of the Department that started with the appointment of Tunnard is associated with the intensification of critiques against Yale’s involvement in urban renewal projects in New Haven. It was during that same period that the famous advocacy planner C. Richard Hatch taught a course entitled “Planners and Clients” at the Department. Before Tunnard’s appointment, Yale “had acted as a principal partner and consultant in the city’s urban renewal efforts.”

Arthur Row believed in the potential of top-down strategies, was responsible for Philadelphia’s Physical Development Plan, completed in 1960.

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8 A proposal from the IAUS to the New York Urban League urging them to incorporate a model study of Harlem city blocks into their program. 19 September 1968. Institute of Architecture and Urban Studies fonds, Canadian Centre for Architecture, Gift of Eisenman Architects. AP057.S2.SS2.ARCH272386.
9 Another project proposal from the IAUS to the New York Urban League arguing for a new form of educational mechanism, based on the success of the Street Academies program, to break down racial barriers in architecture and encourage minorities to lead local planning projects. 1968. Institute of Architecture and Urban Studies fonds, Canadian Centre for Architecture, Gift of Eisenman Architects. AP057.S2.SS2.ARCH272388.
The concern about involving citizens in the planning of their own housing became a central issue in the Department of City Planning at Yale after the appointment of Tunnard as Chairman in 1966. On 12 May 1969, Kingman Brewster, President of Yale at the time, met with activist students at the School of Art and Architecture (fig. 1). A few days later, on 27 May 1969, Brewster announced the dissolution of the Department of City Planning, and invited Tunnard, and Louis DeLuca, his assistant dean, to leave their positions.

In 1969, a group of students from the Department of City Planning of Yale, who marshalled a critique against the university’s leading role in the top-down urban renewal strategies, founded a new governance committee named City Planning Forum. City Planning Forum, which joined the Black Workshop, an activist group formed by ten African American design students in late 1968, aimed to democratise the decision-making process in their department. Its chair was Professor Henry Wexler, who, in spring 1968, issued an official recognition of both the Black Forum and the City Planning Forum. The Black Environmental Studies Team (BEST), which would later be renamed as Black Workshop, was founded in 1968 by ten students from architecture, urban planning and environmental design, who submitted a proposal for a new course study that would fight against the racial barrier between academy and inner city. The workshop aimed to link the ‘urban crisis’ to the ‘black experience’, and collaborated closely with the architects Don Stull, Max Bond, and Art Symes. During the first year, Richard Dozier was its director. The students that participated to the Black Workshop selected and hired their instructors themselves and set their own educational agendas.11 The formation of the City Planning Forum and its collaboration with the Black Workshop played an important role in challenging the top-down strategies related to urban renewal and establishing advocacy planning strategies.

The keynote address that Whitney M. Young, Jr., executive director of the National Urban League at the time, delivered on 25 June 1968 at the National Convention of the American Institute of Architects (AIA) in Portland, Oregon had an important impact on the opening of the profession towards diversity. This address triggered the emerging concerns about the civic rights of African-Americans. An important instance of the generalized critique against urban renewal during the 1960s and especially during the period that followed the 1968 student protests was the opposition of a group of students from Yale, Columbia, UPenn, the MIT, and Harvard at the New England regional conference of the American Institute of Architects (AIA) on 8 November 1968.12 During the late 1960s, pressures to reshape the methods of urban planning in a way that would take distance from urban renewal models pushed local chapters of the AIA to establish the so-called Community Design Centers (CDC), which, in many cases, collaborated with universities, and aimed to support low income groups.

The Architects’ Resistance (TAR) was formed in 1968 by architecture students from Columbia University’s GSAPP, MIT, and Yale. TAR described itself as “a communications network, a research group, and an action group … concerned about the social responsibility of architects and the framework within which architecture is practiced.”

TAR’s engagement with contemporary architecture provided the basis for a radical critique of professional culture and the role of the architect within society. TAR published position papers such as “Architecture and Racism”, “Architects and the Nuclear Arms Race”, and “Architecture: Whom Does It Serve?”, and organized counter-conferences. TAR declared in one of its position papers: “Architecture is not an end in itself but part of an economic, political and social process. The Architects Resistance hopes to bring social and moral conscience to the practice of architecture.”

TAR’s “alternative meeting” entitled “Design for Nuclear Protection” held in March 1969 was conceived as a counter-event to an AIA-OCD workshop held in Boston, and had an important impact on academia. Symptomatic of its popularity is the fact that, it attracted 150 attendants, while the official venue only convoked 12 people. Another organization that played a major role for the struggle over civil rights for African Americans in the United States was the National Organization of Minority Architecture Students (NOMAS) founded by the African-American architects Wendell Campbell, Nelson Harris, William Brown, Robert Wilson, Robert Nash, Leroy Campbell, John S. Chase, Harold Williams, Kenneth Groggs, Jeh Johnson, D. Dodd, and E.H. McDowell in Detroit, Michigan, in 1971 during the AIA National Convention. The main purpose of this organisation was to defend the rights of minority design professionals and fight for policies that condoned discrimination.

ARCH, TAR, Black Workshop, City Planning Forum, and NOMAS’s aspirations to democratize urban planning should be understood within the context of African Americans’ struggles for civil rights in the United States in the 1960s. ARCH and City Planning Forum’s strategies were aligned with the ambition of President Johnson’s Great Society to renew citizens’ role. A paradox underlying their efforts is the fact that, despite their intention to broaden opportunities in participation, they were based on policies that maintained the centrality of federal aid and the prominence of professional expertise. President Johnson launched a ‘War on Poverty’ in pursuit of his ‘Great Society’. ARCH and City Planning Forum’s strategies were characterized by a tension between the intention of advocacy planning approaches to bring equality into the planning process and the risk of being co-opted by a local bureaucracy or a more powerful interest group. However, Davidoff’s intention to support both “the welfare of all and the welfare of minorities” shows that advocacy planning was trapped between the non-flexibility of bureaucracy and the idealistic vision of equality. It becomes evident that the debates on urban renewal and advocacy planning
challenged the conventional methods not only of the profession, but also of academia on the East Coast, putting into question their privileged position. The fact that several organisations and groups emerged within the contexts of prestigious universities and their aspiration to bridge the profession and the education shows that the emergence of counter-events, counter-publications and new modes of collectivities influenced significantly the institutional status of academia. It also invites us to reflect upon the necessity to reshape the urban planning models in order to respond to the call for a more democratic society. Even if certain of the struggles for civil rights of the aforementioned groups and organisations did not meet with much success, a systematic study of their modes of disseminating knowledge and of reinventing the professional and academic agendas would be revealing regarding the way activism can reinvent the relationship between architecture and democracy.


Triece, Mary E., *Urban Renewal and Resistance: Race, Space, and the City in the Late Twentieth to the Early Twenty-First Century* (Lanham, Maryland: Lexington Books, 2016).

Community Actions. Protest, negotiations and lived experience
Cité de l’Abreuvoir, Partial view of the Serpentine, Photo by Pari Riani, Bobigny, 2018
From Vision to Reality. Emille Aillaud’s untenable arrangements at Cité de l’Abreuvoir and Cité Aillaud

... Once the hygienic and economic benefits of a certain urbanism have been acquired, one must take poetic possession of a place...
— Emille Aillaud

THE SETTING

In the suburbs of Paris lie the Grand Ensembles, the public housing projects that accommodate a large population which gravitate around the city. Recently, these projects have — once again — become a cause for scrutiny, as they will be subjected to transformations due to the Grand Paris initiative. As a platform addressing the challenges of a 21st century metropolis, the initiative focuses on “marketing the city, creating transit-connected hubs of economic activity, and installing project based governance,” according to Theresa Enright. Mostly built in the aftermath of World War II, these projects aimed to provide shelter, afford hygiene, and elevate living standards for the large population in need of housing. While they initially represented a fast-paced outlet to provide housing, they became challenging environments due to their scale and their inability to straddle the spheres of public and private. Kenny Cupers observes that these projects reveal the clashes between the “bottom up” and “top down,” between “architectural form making and social engagement,” while also pointing to complex chain of events, protagonists, and preconditions that shaped the context of these projects. Despite their complexities, these often-vilified projects possess architectonic, urban, and landscape qualities. Understanding their strengths and weaknesses is critical at

5 As an indication of the type of problems associated with the Parisian suburbs and their echoes, see (as a sample only): https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2015/08/31/the-other-france and
the onset of transformations that will preserve them as 20th century architectural heritage and integrate them into the 21st century Paris.

This paper discusses two projects by the architect Emille Aillaud (1902–1988), a major protagonist of social housing in post war France; the Cité de l’Abreuvoir in Bobigny, built in the early seventies, and the Tours Aillaud, built at the edge of La Défense in the late eighties. While these projects share commonalities, their diverging typology — mid-rise versus high-rise — as well as their location — suburban setting of Bobigny versus the periphery of La Defense — creates marking contrasts. The visual component of this work comprises collages by the author of this paper from a collection, titled Rising Measures. In addition, the photographs of Laurent Kronental, Les Yeux des Tours, have been studied. The paper compares the early and late works of Aillaud which share the monumental scale, the variance in forms and the use of landscape and art as integrated components of design, and subsequently portray the architect’s challenge to be egalitarian and democratic. While the contrast between Aillaud’s aspirations for these projects and their current state is rooted in a complex set of socio-economic and cultural factors — as the architecture continues to contain the residents and their problems which extend beyond the building — reassessing these projects architecturally is critical.

THE SITUATION

Cité de l’Abreuvoir, holding different typologies and an integrated landscape to house 1,500 units, is spread over a territory of 20 acres. Three types of distinct housing outlets include the towers in the form of the stars (R+10), mid-rises in the form of cylinders (R+10) and the serpentine and circular buildings (R+3 and R+4). Other typologies include indented low-rises (R+3), low-rise star shaped buildings, (grouped and individual) (R+2), right angle buildings (R+3) and open walkways (located at the R+1 level). In addition, a central planted pathway, a series of secondary footpaths, sitting areas, and arches collectively define and structure the project. Fabio Rieti designed the buildings’ facades in polychromic schemes.

The project of the Tours Aillaud was completed in Aillaud’s mature years in between 1973 and 1981, and is comprised of 18 towers of 7 to 38 floors, scattered in a large public park. The patterned windows, as well as the glazed covering of the façade, designed by Fabio Rieti, aimed at making the work more playful and individual. Aillaud’s daughter, Laurence Rieti, designed the playground, adorned with a serpent sculpture as the unifying space that holds the project together. Over 1,600 trees were planted in


6 In the past two years I have taken over 400 photographs, a selection of which have been reworked into collages and exhibited along with a series of drawings under the title: Rising Measures in two solo exhibitions.

the park, one for each of the apartments. A large renovation is currently planned for these towers to attract a more mixed population, implement diverse activities and restore the facades.\(^8\)

**THE EXPERIMENT**

Both projects were experimental, as Aillaud intended to distance himself from Modernism — in particular Le Corbusier — and argued for a poetic approach that would allow him to create a town for which the architect has a “precise idea,” while simultaneously erasing its trace.\(^9\) The forms, whether in developing various typologies in Cité de l’Abrevoir or the patterns of the clouds, sky and greenery on the facades of Tours Aillaud, create variation as both projects are deployed at a large scale. This is apparent in Cité de l’Abreuvoir, in which Aillaud creates diversity as the buildings vary in height, configuration, and color. The Cité Aillaud is organized as a series of towers with ever-changing elevations and appears monotonous in comparison.

In both projects, the architect equates a tree to each unit, provides windows of multiple shapes, and creates various forms of entry; porch, canopy and garden level access to the ground floor units of the Cité de l’Abreuvoir. Additionally, large art pieces and artistic treatments of the architectural elements are integrated in both projects, as a step taken further in curating the atmosphere for their inhabitants. Aillaud articulates his intention in understanding and giving voice to every inhabitant.\(^10\) Yet, the projects problematize how such intentions may turn out to be misconstrued. An architecture that fosters human relations proved to be not enough to remedy more profound sources of crises in the suburbs. While Aillaud himself limits his aspirations to sustain the inhabitants’ “latent affectivity,” the deterioration, disrepair and delinquency that reign over these projects proved to defy such intentions from the onset.\(^11\) The repetition of the window patterns, the floating common grounds and the relentless architectural forms bear witness to the challenge of building at such scale. The most striking facet of Aillaud’s practice, the interdependence of architecture of the landscape and art seem to fail when deployed at such scale. The range of subjective reactions to both projects — from their initial reception to their current disrepair — is an indication of the predicaments of conceiving such vast built environments at once.

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9 Aillaud, Désordre. Aillaud repeatedly discusses the idea of the city as a repository of past memories, multi-layered and not purely rational. He referred to the modern cities by Le Corbusier and his disciples as places that will “never grow old,” where big mistakes were made, and where social housing would always remain social housing, pp 34–37.
10 Aillaud discusses how the intersection between the inhabitants’ appreciations of these large-scale art interventions may or may not be aligned with his original ideas, sense of poetry or even the common understanding of the same symbolic, cultural or artistic references. However, he insists that these interventions will at any rate contribute to making memories of the place, even in cases where misunderstandings have a place of their own in shaping the inhabitants’ experience and memory of their residences. He points to a particular moment in which a child mistakes the portrait of Rimbaud in the Grande-Borne in Girgny, for Alain Delon, Aillaud, Désordre, p.36.
11 Ibid, p. 51.
Cité de l'Abrevoir’s reinterprets the notion of *cite-jardin* and establishes a case for orchestrating different types of interactions for its inhabitants. This project is focused on the relation between the individual and a larger environment beyond the housing unit. It epitomizes a bigger agenda that thinks collectively and imagines along the lines of a large ensemble. Aillaud insists that “[to think] of such urbanism, one must practice a sort of functionalism that is not only concerned with the quantitative […] but [also] with the complexity of the mental and affective life, to the human history that will unfold in that place.” One cannot help but think of Cité de l’Abrevoir as such a practice. Aillaud’s insistence on the choice of curvilinear forms takes possession of leading the inhabitants and passersby alike along the path under the trees. His interest in trees and his projection that they will overtake the site is indicative of his reliance on the landscape as an active agent of change:

Three or four years from now, the linden and chestnut would have grown, and one can only see from their window an immense umbrella of foliage, under which one can meander, read a journal or […] do nothing.

The two major arches that frame the strategic entrance and exit moments into the project as it intersects with the existing fabric, frame the approach from and to the project, orienting one within a larger setting. The now blocked doors at the ground floor units to the gardens from the serpentine buildings and the now removed benches facilitated the immediate access to the open space and invited lingering in the public and communal spaces. There is a cinematic procession imagined between the two major squares of Place de L’Europe and Place des Nations Unies. Here the difference between the parts to the whole is more variegated, nuanced and episodic. While the large prairie becomes the main axis of the projects, smaller paths enable deviation and the interplay of light and shade on the serpentine volumes as well as the proportion of green space — which is both structured and flexible — allows one to partake in the scene at will. While socio-economics factors such as “single parent households, unemployment, school failure and delinquency” have affected the Cité’s vibrancy, the armature for a collective life is still persisting through years of ever-crumbling facades, against the odds of vandalism and derelictions that have affected the ensemble.

One’s experience of the Tours Aillaud is significantly different from that of meandering through Cité de l’Abrevoir. Approaching the complex through La Défense, the towers punctuate the landscape and dominate the scene. The *pate de verre* covering of the towers brings to mind a

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12 Aillaud, Désordre, Préface, p. III.
13 Ibid, p. 44.
pixelated constellation of clouds, though they are in better shape than the crumbling walls of l’Abrevoir. As Alex McLean observes in this project, the repetitiveness of the complex is both indicative of a sense of “disorientation […] while at the same time [offers] an impression of the egalitarianism […] and yet their relentlessness and the sheer scale tips the balance towards monotony.”15 Here, it is more challenging to experience the environment as the towers and the largely empty central space — designated for play and gatherings — haunt one’s experience. Smaller areas, such as groves of trees offering shaded canopies, and gently undulating mounds close to the entrance of the towers juxtapose are reminiscence of Aillaud’s poetic sense of space. Overall, the punctuated rhythm of the towers amid the floating sea of shifting grounds makes the environment inescapable.

In Kronental’s Les Yeux des Tours, the viewer is completely removed from the outside but is positioned within the dwellings. Once inside, the focus is back on the outside as the gaze is directed to the towers, in search of but not finding an escape from the sea of towers. Here, as each inhabitant is grappling with appropriating their living space, the duality of Aillaud’s work is manifested as the windows both resist and offer an individualized opening to a scene that appears so ubiquitous. Unlike the Cité de l’Abrevoir, here the passerby and the residents are cut off from the ground. In its large and largely undefined form, the main public space is obsolete and unlivable and the smaller groves, mounds and entrances, are unable to counteract its vast emptiness.

While architectural typologies and settings are different in these projects, two democratic factors seem to persist in both as Aillaud’s clear signatures. He insists on understanding these projects as experiences and these environments as those of “events, architectural situations,” which lead to the creation of places that are “contrary to habits, an apt space, […] to surprise the gaze, and to attract the imagination.”16 Yet, Aillaud’s preference for what he qualified as a “psychological approach” which leads to “creating events and architectural situations” falls short of delivering on the promise of a democratic design.17 While he uses architectural elements — walls, windows, roofs — he also molds the non-built — trees, exterior pathways, benches, undulating mounds — which together build the experience. By situating his users within this fully choreographed scene — which is deliberately defined and characterized in his words — one still wonders whether such a fully projected image can absorb and make place for the multitude of conditions and forces that form the alterity of its inhabitants. Aillaud’s work weaves landscape and art like connective tissues to the body of architecture to create experiences of the city that are, if different, then equally remarkable in their ability to accompany, astound, support or oppose one’s experience of the built environment. Virgine Picon-Lefebvre suggests that Aillaud’s contribution in “inventing new forms of relationship

16 Aillaud, Desrodre, p. 43.
17 Ibid. p. 38.
between the buildings and open spaces is quite unique." This particular feature of Aillaud's work underlines the embedded weakness of the architect's dominating voice, conceiving a fully formed environment, from which there is little respite. In these projects, the architect's authority — tempered in other processes of architectural design where the clients or inhabitants have more of a say — takes a space where dialogues, differences in opinions and the multiplicities of voices could enrich such project. It is the undemocratic nature of such processes that automatically undermines some of the architect's intentions from the onset.

In its experimental spirit, Aillaud's works provide complete visions of life in newly conceived environments. While Cité de l'Abrevoir establishes a connection with existing entities, the Aillaud Towers are less grounded to their site. The question that remains is, if one imagines a more diverse set of activities and functions to migrate to both of these sites, turning them into various programs and allocating to them different types of ownership, would they turn into better environments? Is there enough potential in these projects so that strategic scenarios of adaptive reuse can transform them? As Cité de l'Abrevoir converses with its surrounding fabric, one imagines that adding diverse forms of housing and public institutions may enrich an environment that might otherwise seem too repetitive, prescribed and most of all empty. This is harder to imagine for Cité Aillaud, where the severity of the built environment, though resonant with its context, resists such changes with more inertia. As their architect imagined these projects, they were to provide not a merely functional but also poetic space to dwell in. The future will reveal their resilience in surviving the test of time and the changes it brings with it.

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An Epic Silent Film. Alexandra Road and the shifting grounds of welfare state housing in Britain

This paper presents the 1950s and 1960s regulations and subsidy of public housing as a tipping point in the strained balance between private-property and the welfare state’s provision for all. Through the rise of municipal planning, housing cost yardsticks and subsidy, the scales were tipped in favour of the state, rendering a previously buoyant private housing-market unviable with serious consequences over the coming decades.

This strained balance is explored through Neave Brown’s Alexandra Road (1968–78), one of the numerous late sixties projects where boroughs took over struggling private projects, and is contextualised by examples from Scandinavia to demonstrate how things might otherwise have been. Alexandra Road’s outward appearance, urban and formal strategies reinforce an interpretation of the project as a typical late welfare state project.¹ This is exemplified by its material language — concrete, expressive repetitive structure — which absorbs a range of different unit types and program elements such as community centre, shop, school, building department depot, play centre. This is supported by Brown’s assertions that it was conceived as a “seamless piece of the city,” a project possible only in its specific socio-political context. However, beneath its highly controlled formal and spatial language, the conditions of its making and subsequent lived experience exposed it as a project “released into a different world to that in which it was conceived[,] set on the very cusp of the change from socialism to the me-generation.”²

Designed at the end of the 1960s, the project reflected and relied on a strong state system to maintain a ‘piece of the city’; Brown’s phrase for the project. Its construction and occupation, however, bridged the energy and economic crises of the seventies, leaving the project without the necessary administrative and financial support required. The lack of support led its tenants to organise in response to its neglect and degradation, and ultimately led to its listing. As such, the project shifts from a top-down and paternalistic model to a bottom-up community-led one. The following will uncover some of the complexity and underlying aspects of the project’s trajectory.

The premise that the mid-1960s regulation represented a victory of state over the private-builder can be usefully contextualised by the UK’s estate model, which originated in the 13th century with tenants earning their right to live and work by paying the fee simple. This was the beginning of freehold and leasehold arrangements under which leaseholders are assured ownership of property for a fixed term. The current system of long leases was introduced under the Law of Property Act (1925), responding to a need for improved conditions for leaseholders highlighted in 1884 by the Royal Commission for the Housing of the Working Classes as “legislation favourable to the leaseholder would conduce greatly to the improvement of the dwellings of the people of this country.”\(^3\) This move towards protecting leaseholders developed into a legislative tug of war between the Conservative’s market liberalism and Labour’s municipal provision, culminating with the 1966 White Paper on Leasehold Reform and the 1967 Leasehold Reform Act.\(^4\) These acts established the right of the leaseholder to obtain the freehold referred to as ‘enfranchisement,’ consolidating the power of the leaseholder over the freeholder. On different accounts, the 1967 Act responded to abrupt terminations of leaseholds in ‘slum-housing’ and to the 1964 Labour government’s efforts to win the contest between housing models and the turfing-out of Welsh miners from their cottages following the transference of freeholds from coal companies to remote investors.\(^5\)

As part of any mid-1960s tipping point, the 1967 Act represents one of several stages in reducing the UK’s estates by transferring property and rights to the leaseholder and tenant. This was done by conferring on the leaseholder the right to a 50-year extension free of charge, requiring the landlord “to sell or significantly diminish its interest at a time not of its choosing and at a price which (if determined by a tribunal) it must accept.”\(^6\) In the thriving private property market of the inter- and early post-war years, this represents transaction and transfer from one private owner to another, albeit smaller owner; but when reconsidered in the spirit of post-war housing provision, which through regulation and subsidy focused on large-scale housing projects, a clear schism emerges.

Neave Brown’s Alexandra Road has its origins in 1966 when the newly created London Borough of Camden entered negotiations with the Eyre Estate to acquire land at Alexandra Road which had already been subject to a private redevelopment plan between the Eyre Estate and South Bank Properties (1964) and had received outline consent from London County Council. This plan, comprising of seven tall-blocks, was submitted to Hampstead and was widely opposed by local residents, that in May 1966, requested for Camden’s compulsory purchase of the land.\(^7\)

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\(^6\) Stephenson, “Leaseholder’s Reform.”

\(^7\) B. Gregory, “Concrete Good Things? Camden’s Alexandra Road Estate 1966 to 1996” (School of Combined Studies Kingston, 1996/97).
the housing cost yardstick, which set the parameters for subsidy, made this private scheme untenable whilst at the same time created the favourable conditions needed for Camden to act on behalf of the residents and purchase the land. Relating this back to the developments which led up to the 1967 Act, the shift in the balance of power this represents constituted a real threat to private development. The internal space standards recommended by the Parker Morris Report (1961) became mandatory in 1967, which added to Camden’s rejection of tall-buildings favoured by policy and resulted in high quality housing that was increasingly expensive.8

Sam Webb addresses in Architectural Design (1972) the exorbitant costs of Camden's late 1960s housing and the need for heavy subsidy to bring tenancy costs down to an affordable level and prevent the rout of residents from central London.9 Webb also describes the ‘perpetual threat’ of compulsory purchase hanging over leaseholders in London which discouraged investment, increasing the likelihood of them being perceived as requiring redevelopment. This resulted in a “rapid municipalisation of housing in the borough” in which “the Planning Department was having to resort to residential areas where development costs were higher, and rate-payers and council tenants were footing the bill.”10 These subsidies were made upfront, possibly hiding them from tenants, but not from politicians and land-owners who found their options for private development ever diminishing. Whilst Webb’s views, given shortly after his departure from Camden, suggest a possible private agenda, Sullivan’s (1996) description of Bevan’s goal of housing for all, setting the tone for Labour, created “an ideological gap between the Government and the Conservative opposition” which is borne out here.11

Whilst the boroughs, supported by residents of Alexandra Road and elsewhere, thought they were acting in everybody’s best interests, those in support of private development sought to reverse matters.12 What unfolded after this effectively recasts the welfare state as a victim of its own success. Only a few examples implicitly demonstrate the affront and offence better than Highgate New Town, which was seen as an “invasion of the sanctuary of North London’s real estate.”13 This casts Neave Brown’s assertion that he and others were about making housing, not social housing, in a different light by suggesting that the municipal remit extends to all housing, including those projects previously in the realm of private developers.

Public housing schemes such as Alexandra Road transferred sizable portions of land into state ownership, presenting a challenge to the status

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10 Freear, “Alexandra Road,” 45.
11 Jamileh Manoochehri, “Social Policy and Housing: Reflections on Social Values” (PhD Dissertation, University College London, 2009), 44.
12 Swenarton, “Politics, Property and Planning.”
quo, which in time became their weakness. Regulation during the 1970s and 1980s attempted to redress the various aspects of this imbalance, deregulating limits on property value and, in the 1977 Planning Act, reordering priorities for housing allocation by needs for those with children, dependents, and those “vulnerable as a result of old age, mental illness or handicap or physical disability.” While home-ownership was promoted by both political parties since the late 1960s — transforming homes into financial commodities — the 1977 Act redefined the role of public housing readying the ground for extensive public housing sell-off under Right-to-Buy. It is easy to conflate promotion of home-ownership under the Right-to-Buy policies with efforts to redevelop and regenerate housing when it was principally concerned with shifting the duty of care from councils to leaseholders. At the same time the transfer of overall management from local authorities to housing associations, from the late 1980s, did not extend to the transfer of ownership and autonomy of the resident communities, effectively retaining the freehold and the option to sell and expropriate with the state.

Thus, it seems that rather than it being about home-ownership versus social-housing, this is actually about the right to profit from property through land-ownership, in which the rise of the owner-occupier through ‘enfranchisement’ represents a significant threat to land-owners. Two parallel developments, the drive to improve housing conditions through redevelopment, the rise of ‘enfranchisement’ and the rights of the owner-occupier, ultimately collided with the freehold/leasehold set-up producing a severe affront to the land-owners’ capacity to profit from property. Relating this back to a prevalent concern of 19th century philanthropy — elevating the culture of the working classes — it is possible to argue that this developed into a threat to the class-system, embodied in freehold and leasehold that restricts and reduces the scope for profit, as the focus shifted to prioritising the tenant.

For a brief period in the early 1990s, Alexandra Road was transferred to the South Hampstead Housing Cooperative following dissatisfaction from residents. This move had the intention of empowering tenants and a small minority of leaseholders in implementing works funded by the Department of Environment (DoE) Estate Action Money, whilst Camden retained overall control as client. This faltered when the committee sought to bring in Avanti Architects to undertake works, which Camden rejected in preference of their own building services team and shortly after control was returned to Camden. The importance of enfranchising residents is also present in Alice Coleman’s Utopia on Trial, which whilst being incredibly critical of estates,
underlines the importance of enfranchising residents. Catherine Croft’s writing on the listing of Alexandra Road tells us that “residents must be kept on board, not by offering grants but [by] offering them the autonomy of private house owners.”

Ostensibly the outrage over Alexandra Road following its completion formed a response to cost and subsidy, whilst it was actually symptomatic of the deep-seated frustration over the shift in the balance of power.

The importance of this brief episode at Alexandra Road becomes apparent when looked at in conjunction with other cooperative models, such as the residents’ collectives established in Scandinavia in the 1970s. One example from Rodeløkka, central Oslo, saw efforts to divide tenants and owners as part of clearance and redevelopment, which was successfully resisted by residents collectively renovating properties and a campaign demonstrating the exorbitant costs of new housing for residents, owners and authorities alike. The residents’ cooperatives which developed from this involve collective ownership managed through a residents’ committee. Cooperative legislation prevents multiple ownership — effectively ruling out the chances of anyone buying up the whole block — making redevelopment extremely unlikely and providing residents with the autonomy in making executive decisions over new building projects. Through this shared ownership model, the residents benefit from collective protection from external development pressures.

Back in London, two significant amendments to the 1967 Leasehold Reform Act are the 1993 extension of the 1967 Act to flat-owners and the introduction of the freehold ownership of flats with joint responsibility for the common parts, under the 2002 Commonhold and Leasehold Reform Act. Whilst the 1993 change seems minor, it was significant in moving flat tenants toward security of tenure. The 2002 Act, if implemented, would have produced indefinite freehold tenure of a part of a multi-occupancy building within shared ownership and responsibility for common areas and services. These would be managed by Commonhold Association through a Commonhold Community Statement (CCS), closely parallel to the set-up of the Oslo collectives. This could potentially have produced the autonomy and security as seen in Oslo by transferring land-ownership from the state to the residents on a permanent basis.

Returning to Alexandra Road, the lack of support and funding following its completion provided little support for its community. Despite this, a sense of community emerged, largely through a spirit of adversity evident at their Tenants and Residents Association meetings and, since listing (1993), through awareness and advocacy beyond the estate. The main narrative has

20 Croft, “Alexandra Road,” 57.
21 RLF, “Rehabiliter Hele Rodeløkka (Rehabilitate the Whole of Rodeløkka)” (Oslo, 1974).
23 HMSO, “Commonhold and Leasehold Reform Act.”
been one about the architectural and political history, but is increasingly becoming about its community developed through recent and ongoing project work. This community narrative is diverse, comprising numerous stories from different groups, helps build identity and raise the profile of the community with resultant benefits.

These benefits can collate the resources and cohesion needed to secure collective ownership transfer, both by applying pressure and potentially finding the means, including low interest loans. Whilst the support of the respective owner, housing agency, or council is key, this requires a change of mind-set to relinquish valuable land. Whilst this sounds problematic, if ownership and remuneration are considered separately — as the value of land is in a large part its scope for profit — it becomes feasible. That said, the push and pull of the owner/occupier relationship will likely remain a perennial challenge. This paper has sought to show how balance in that relationship is determined by efforts on either side, within which developing the autonomy of communities such as that of Alexandra Road is key to better positioning them to manage their homes and places of living.
Henney, Alex. “Camden: Last of the Big Spenders.” The RIBA Journal 87, no. 6 (June 1980): 43–45.
The term ‘renewal’ related to the built environment is loaded with different meanings. A cluster of terms sharing the ‘re-’ prefix cling to it. These include regeneration, restoration, remediation, resilience, and reparation, to name only a few. Each suggests repetition and undoing, taking something back to an original place and then making it new again. Each draws its own connotations based on its context and historical use. ‘Renewal’ in American politics and history relates to policies enacted in the postwar era. ‘Regeneration’ grapples with current debate on the state of the global environment and future generations. ‘Reconciliation’ touches on cultural injustice, social inequality and the need to address pervasive colonial structures. Collectively these terms cross politics, environment, sciences, spirituality, and economics. This paper advocates for sticking architecture in a mediating role between these terms to move beyond a narrow discussion of renewal. In doing so it may be possible to situate architecture in a political discourse.

The years between 1965 and 1989 were a time when approaches to renewal in the United States were narrow; dominated by a few heavy-hands, guiding future urban forms. The attitude towards renewal was defined in the Housing Act of 1949, the Housing Act of 1954, and the Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1956. Nationwide policies and federal funding supported demolition and large-scale clearance up until 1974. Cities such as Niagara Falls in New York, were reshaped according to new standards to clear major portions of the downtown for visionary projects, while suburban development expanded outwards with new infrastructure. This paper touches on how these plans materialized in an unexpected way in the urban landscape and their long-term consequences. Rather than looking at these as failures to the original plans, it considers how these plans have provoked new approaches to architecture rooted in a more connected agency of relevant actors; a ground up organization.

Clear evidence on the messy outcomes of visionary redevelopment schemes came with the declaration of a federal state of emergency in Niagara Falls by President Jimmy Carter on August 7, 1978. The emergency is now well-known as Love Canal and is opposite to the story of urban renewal that was pictured for the city. This was the first time in American history that emergency funds were allocated to a situation other than a natural disaster. The inhabitants of a quiet residential neighborhood located on top of the toxic landscape raised a collective voice to bring attention
to the devastating health impacts the area brought. Beyond using this case as a cautionary tale, this paper further questions how it can shape an approach to urban development that operates from the ground up through citizen organizations. The relationship of architecture, landscape, and democracy here is connected to the complex health issues, shifting conditions, regulations, bureaucracy, market logic, insufficient funding, and the urgent needs for care that surrounded this unprecedented public acknowledgment of human induced environmental harm. It is necessary today to consider the ‘sticky’ relationship between architecture and democracy in the face of current corporate agendas, global environmental threat, and citizen empowerment.

TOP DOWN

All over the country civic leaders and planners are preparing a series of redevelopment projects that will set the character of the center of our cities for generations to come.¹

The rebuilding of cities across the United States was criticized by activist and journalist Jane Jacobs as being out of step with the urban realities through the use of abstract concepts, scale models, and bird’s-eye views.² The role of architecture in relation to these accusations can be fairly well understood; the collaboration of architects with city officials, public presentations with large scale models and urban plans stretching vast territories. Architecture is represented as a commodity to sell a new image of the city before anyone knows how it will be used and how the public will respond.

The decision to demolish the original Niagara Falls downtown was taken in the 1960s. Several optimistic large-scale projects followed schemes to attract new attention to the city. This included the Rainbow Centre Factory Outlet, the Niagara Falls Convention and Civic Center designed by Philip Johnson and John Burgee, Fallsville Splash Park, and a new corporate office building for Hooker Chemical Company located on a 2.3-acre urban renewal site overlooking the Falls. Each of these projects have now been closed, demolished, or remain only partially occupied, leaving the public questioning the decision-making processes at play.

The Niagara Falls region has been commodified based on abstract optimism since the European arrival. Father Louis Hennepin, a French priest, was the first European to document and publish Niagara Falls based on his 1678 expedition.³ Although Niagara Falls is the largest waterfall in North America by volume and width, Hennepin grossly exaggerated the height in his book A New Discovery. These misrepresentations were the start of the build-up of a false optimism.

² Ibid.
As described by author Richard S. Newman, explorers and settlers treated the Niagara landscape “as a commodity to be dominated and developed,” whereas the Iroquois “defined themselves into the natural landscape.” The European view on the economic value of the landscape set up an unbalanced relationship that has persisted to present day. The promise of cheap and abundant renewable power attracted 18th and 19th century industrialists. Thousands of immigrants were drawn to work in chemical, steel, and manufacturing plants powered by large-scale hydroelectric generating stations, the first of which opened in 1895.

Repeating visions of environmental commodification played out at Love Canal for centuries before the declaration of an environmental emergency. French explorer René-Robert Cavelier La Salle arrived in the late 17th century and set his commercial dreams on the Love Canal site. In the early 1890s William T. Love shared his vision to build a model manufacturing city, powered by cheap energy supplied by “the world’s greatest hydroelectric power canal.” Love planned to excavate a new canal between the upper and lower Niagara rivers. Workers began digging in 1894. When this vision was hit by economic crisis and business plans faltered, Love’s grand plan was left as little more than a mile-long trench.

In the early 1940s, the trench inspired a different economic vision by Hooker Chemical Company. Originally established by Elon Huntington Hooker in 1903, the company became the national leader in bleaching powder and caustic soda production. As the company grew, Love’s excavation became an appealing space to dump Hooker’s chemical byproducts. Between 1942 and 1953 the company filled the canal with its hazardous waste.

That was not the final vision for Love Canal. The closure of the landfill coincided with a population surge and need for new housing, schools, and infrastructure. City planners and politicians had their eyes on Love Canal since the town of LaSalle was annexed in the 1920s. In April 1953, the Niagara Falls School Board purchased the site for one dollar from Hooker to anchor a new subdivision and elementary school. The Bill of Sale and Transfer of Property Deed was written to ensure Hooker would not be liable for future injury or death caused by the presence of industrial waste. The 99th Street Elementary School was built atop the dump site, and a residential neighborhood grew around. By 1978, 800 private single-family homes, and 240 low-income apartments surrounded the canal.

5 Ibid: 36.
6 Ibid: 54.
7 Ibid: 87.
9 Bill of Sale and Transfer of Property Deed between the Hooker Electrochemical Company and the Board of Education of Niagara Falls, New York, April 28, 1953.
This centuries-long transformation of the landscape set the stage for what happened on August 7, 1978. All of these plans clearly had serious oversights that are reflected in the numerous downfalls that would follow. By considering a deep transect of how Love Canal developed it becomes impossible to adopt a shallow view of renewal.

**GROUND UP**

Jane Jacobs advocated for the importance of understanding how projects operate at ground-level. “Walk,” she wrote, “and you will see that many of the assumptions on which the projects depend are visibly wrong.”\(^{11}\) This type of legwork is primarily done by the citizens. At Love Canal, the fluctuating water table of the Niagara River leached chemicals through underground swales and sewer systems into private yards and basements. To address a lack of acknowledgement by civic leaders, inventive counter movements were organized by citizens to investigate the threats by their own initiative.

In 1978, local mother and Love Canal homeowner Lois Gibbs organized the Love Canal Parents Movement, which quickly evolved into the Love Canal Homeowners Association (LCHA). Without previous involvement in community organizations, Gibbs was elected president and began interacting with governors, senators, mayors, bureaucrats, scientists, engineers, professors, lawyers, and the national media to voice citizen concerns.\(^{12}\) LCHA went house to house to speak with neighbors, asked about health problems, and documented illnesses, rates of birth defects and miscarriages.\(^{13}\) Locations were correlated with old aerial photographs, geological surveys and personal photographs. This type of collaboration between policy makers, professionals, researchers, and the public is often discussed today in academic programs and government agencies as being necessary to address the varied environmental challenges ahead.

After the New York State Department of Health (NYSDOH) issued a health order recommending the closure of the 99th Street School, the evacuation of pregnant women and children under the age of two, and limiting time spent in basements, New York officials agreed to purchase 239 homes closest to the canal. This federal relocation scheme excluded the majority of residents based on an arbitrarily defined area, spatialized with a 10-foot high fence. Citizens unable to sell and leave their homes felt trapped, motivating new protests to communicate the extended issues. A second evacuation order was issued in 1979.

As Love Canal gained international media attention, a fact-based 1979 documentary titled “The Killing Ground” aired on ABC. Lois Gibbs was

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13 Ibid: xv
invited to watch with Mayor O’Laughlin, the city manager, and other Niagara Falls officials.\textsuperscript{14} According to Gibbs, the convention center official expressed frustration that with the story on the national news, people would never want to visit the convention center which was completed as an urban renewal project in 1973.\textsuperscript{15} Gibbs responded, “your convention center is worth what our houses are worth—right now, zero.”\textsuperscript{16}

This brief interaction demonstrates how the plans of citizens, corporations, governments, media, and ecological systems are interwoven in the built environment. An idea that agency could be found in this landscape is interpreted from the following writing of Nik Heynen, Maria Kaika, and Erik Swyngedouw: “The interrelated web of socio-ecological relations that bring about highly uneven urban environments — have become pivotal terrains around which political action crystallizes and social mobilizations take place.”\textsuperscript{17}

The LCHA was able to make connections between their own health problems and the history of the landscape and reveal its complexity, generating enough political agitation to influence urban planning and city making. The momentum that was generated with national publicity pushed new legislation. This resulted in the 1980 Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act — commonly known as the Superfund program. Administered by the Environmental Protection Agency, Superfund investigates and cleans up hazardous waste sites throughout the country.\textsuperscript{18}

**STICKY ARCHITECTURE**

How can we consider the position of architecture as it relates to the sticky relationships between actors and the environment that have been formed over centuries? The case of Niagara Falls reveals the inability to isolate plans or simply overwrite issues. Perhaps it is not about undoing, taking something back to an original place, and making it new again at all, and more about working within the gluey and irreversible conditions we have set up for ourselves.

\textsuperscript{14} Ibid: 105.
\textsuperscript{15} Ibid: 105, 106.
\textsuperscript{16} Ibid: 105, 106.
\textsuperscript{17} Heynen, Nik, Maria Kaika and Erik Swyngedouw, eds. In the nature of cities: urban political ecology and the politics of urban metabolism. London; New York: Routledge, 2006: 6.
\textsuperscript{18} United States Environmental Protection Agency. This is Superfund: A Citizen’s Guide to EPA’s Superfund Program, Washington D.C.
Hans Borkent, streetscape of the Wagenaarstraat from the intersection with the Dapperstraat in the direction of the Pontanusstraat, northeastern part of Dapperbuurt, 1974–1982. Picture: March 1985, source: BEELDBANK AMSTERDAM.
Aimée Albers (Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, Municipality of Amsterdam)

Design by Direct Democracy. Citizens as architects of urban renewal in Amsterdam

INTRODUCTION

A city that excludes the creative potential and spontaneous initiatives of its residents and only reflects what people are doing in it and not what they are constantly doing about it; adding to it and changing it, extinguishes itself — dies.¹

Concerned about the impact of prevailing urban redevelopment agendas, architect Aldo van Eyck and his pupils proposed architecture and urbanism that would serve social relationships and that would use the creativity of citizen initiatives in their 1970 plan for Amsterdam’s Nieuwmarktbuurt. Yet, they could not have foreseen that from that moment on local residents would indeed evolve into urban designers. At the time of the Van Eyck-proposal, technocratically planned redevelopment schemes provoked citizen resistance as well as grassroots design initiatives. Redevelopment implied comprehensive demolition of the existing housing stock in Amsterdam’s central districts. Residents protested increasingly as a result, criticizing the municipal planning methods for lacking both advocacy and democracy. According to the protesters, spatial planning on behalf of locally elected officials was to be replaced with resident-led design processes, involving the population in all decision-making. By joining forces with a young generation of architects, residents were empowered to put their critique into practice, conceiving alternative plans that simultaneously introduced methods for participatory planning and urban renewal as a notion of livability and contextual design.²

As these alternative plans were implemented from the mid-1970s to the late 1980s, at the expense of the contested redevelopment schemes, grassroots design initiatives were crucial for the emergence of urban renewal. Despite its impact, Dutch historians have almost solely focused on the politics of the urban renewal order.³ As such, Dutch historiography on urban renewal has hitherto documented both the conflict over post-war urban redevelopment and the 1978 political turn for more participatory planning, mainly based on official government records. However, urban renewal has

¹ Van Eyck et al. 1970, p. 20. All translations by the author unless otherwise noted.
² In this paper, a distinction is made between urban redevelopment and urban renewal. Urban redevelopment generally refers to post-war planning strategies aimed at accommodating business, finance and consumerism, whereas urban renewal refers to the 1970s and 1980s planning for a compact mix-used cityscape with an emphasis on affordable housing.
largely been left unexamined from an architectural perspective, leaving its design process, its initiators, and its architectural meaning scarcely covered. Consequently, the authorship of urban renewal in Amsterdam has been attributed to city councilor Jan Schaefer (1940–1994), who took the office from 1978 to 1986. This interpretation follows the dominant view within historiography which assumes urban renewal to be the outcome of the political turn, while citizen protests are defined only as a catalyst to change the course of local policies.

This paper challenges these assumptions on the political authorship of urban renewal by examining the bottom-up nature that characterized the spatial design of urban renewal in Amsterdam during this period. In contrast to previous studies, this paper thus acknowledges urban renewal to be the outcome of alliances between groups of citizens and architects. To substantiate this argument, the Amsterdam neighborhood Dapperbuurt between the years 1972 and 1988 serves as an exemplary case study; its physical transformation at that time was a typical product of a resident-led design process. In doing so, this paper reconnects the spatial design of urban renewal with the social structure it originated from. Based on analyses of various types of hitherto unexamined minutes that reveal the dialogue between citizens and architects as well as the plans they jointly produced, the first section provides an insight into how and why these actors initiated such an innovative design process. The second section discusses their socio-spatial objectives and the spatial design that resulted from their initiatives in two separate parts of Dapperbuurt.

THE RISE OF RESIDENT-LED DESIGN

Best known for its daily market and its praising poem, Dapperbuurt was originally a typical late-nineteenth century district surrounding the historical inner city of Amsterdam.⁴ Developed and constructed from 1870 onwards, the neighborhood accommodated the rapid growth of an industrial labor force, densely built on a clear grid consisting of brick houses with two alcove tenements on each floor. After World War II, most families that could afford left for postwar estates in the outskirts of the city, leaving Dapperbuurt predominantly inhabited by the elderly, the unemployed, singles, students, and immigrants. By 1969, the existing housing stock was considered to be outdated and dilapidated, causing the municipality to push for comprehensive redevelopment. As a result, the municipal planning department submitted a redevelopment scheme in March 1972, in which the urban fabric would be replaced by a spacious residency for affluent users.⁵ Named after its creator, Plan-Duyff consisted of meandering bar-shaped flats, ignoring both the characteristic street plan and the then population of the neighborhood.

⁵ Stadsarchief Amsterdam (hereinafter: SAA), Archief Stadsdeel Oost (hereinafter: SDO), access no. 30666, inv.no. 1612, ontwerpbestemmingsplan voor reconstructie van de Dapperbuurt door ir. W.T. Duyff, 1972.
Although the planning department immediately announced the construction of the first part of Plan-Duyff, colloquially known as Roomtuintjes, critical responses proved to be more decisive for the future of Dapperbuurt. A number of residents founded the urban action group called De Sterke Arm to protest against the demolition of their living environment. But when they realized their protests failed their objectives, they felt the urge to broaden their modus operandi. In May 1972, activists addressed the city council directly by means of an appeal, including a literature study, an analysis of Plan-Duyff and suggestions for an alternative approach.\(^6\) They demanded local residents to be given decision-making rights, the permanence of the street plan, the daily market and the consideration of population present, as well as a phased implementation. In addition, they proposed a model with design teams, in which local residents, independent architects and civil servants would cooperate to redesign Dapperbuurt through what they considered as ‘direct democracy.’ All decision-making would be taken collectively.

Neither the protests nor appeal could prevent the construction of Roomtuintjes in early 1973, but in June 1973, the city council adopted a land-use plan, which implicitly embraced the action group’s proposal.\(^7\) Although this decision marked the first step towards the resident-led redesigning of Dapperbuurt, it also triggered further rivalry between the planning department and the resident population. As the civil servants charged with coordinating the involvement of residents in planning understood their task as allowing residents to choose between ready-made scenarios, De Sterke Arm disagreed with this approach for not meeting their standard of democratic decision-making.\(^8\) Hence, the action group responded with organizing a ground-breaking participatory process by establishing resident groups per street in the northeastern part, which was appointed to be the area with the highest priority. Per street, twelve to twenty residents gathered each week, making an inventory of the qualities and necessary improvements of their living environment. Biweekly, meetings were held in which all groups participated, attracting more than a hundred people.

Elaborating on the action group’s proposal, the resident groups produced a joint “community plan” (March 1974), aiming to both provide a starting point for redesigning the neighborhood and secure the resident-led control over the entire planning process; including being in charge of selecting the architects as well as the continuous involvement in shaping the architectural and urban design.\(^9\) Despite rejection by the planning department, the city council largely agreed with this plan, allowing the residents to select their

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\(^6\) International Institute for Social History (hereinafter: IISH), Documentatie Dapperbuurt (hereinafter: DDB), access no. ARCH01879, inv.no.: doos 08 map 8, bezwaarschrift tegen het ontwerpbestemmingsplan Dapperbuurt van De Sterke Arm, May 14, 1972.

\(^7\) IISH, DDB: ARCH01879, inv.no.: doos 03 map 6, bijzonder bepalingen deel uitmakend van het bestemmingsplan Dapperbuurt, door wethouder C.H. de Cloe, H. Riethof en W. Wessels, June 20, 1973.


\(^9\) SAA, Archief Hans Borkent (hereinafter: HB), access no. 30917, inv.no. 16, brief van Stadsontwikkeling aan de wethouder over het buurtplan, April 24, 1974; IISH, DDB: ARCH01879, inv.no.: doos 01 map 4, perscommunicatie gemeente Amsterdam, May 9, 1974.
architects from May 1974. As the selection committee visited building sites and held interviews, the architects were expected to bring expertise as well as know-how to acquire funding; but they were foremost judged by to which degree they accepted commissionership by local marginalized residents. After Hans Borkent (1938–2013) won the residents' trust, he was appointed as the neighborhood architect, and with assistance from Rob Blom van Assendelft and Hein de Haan, forged a creative pro-housing coalition with the resident groups.

Indeed, the appointed architects prioritized the interests of the people for whom they built instead of following instructions from the planning department or a housing association. As a result, planning and construction took on the character of collective private commissioning; a group of citizens appeared at the start of the building process as initiators and cocreators, instead of being consumers at the end. This gave them more autonomy, control and the freedom of choice; the design had to meet their needs and requirements and only involved a housing association for financial means. In order to meet said expectations, the architects held regular consultation hours and design meetings on site, additional to the resident meetings. Operating outside conventional mechanisms, they had to mediate between the socio-spatial agendas of residents, official regulations and governance power. Besides producing a multitude of minutes, this approach resulted in a cityscape that gave spatial expression to the grassroots initiatives.

**URBAN RENEWAL AS A SYNTHESIS OF THE TRADITIONAL URBAN CONTEXT AND MODERN COMFORT**

Over the following fifteen years, urban renewal in Dapperbuurt was carried out on the basis of the 1974 community plan. For this, the neighborhood was subdivided into three parts. The northeastern part was prioritized for being the most dilapidated, redesigning the southern part started a year later, whereas in the northwestern part the preservation and renovation of old buildings was on the lead. The latter is therefore excluded from this study. In both the northeastern and the southern part, elaborating the design began with the resident groups specifying the principle demand for the permanence of the street plan, the market and the population present in a design brief, further defining their needs, objectives, requirements, and aesthetic aspirations. However, due to local peculiarities, these considerations differed per part of the neighborhood.

10 IISH, DDB: ARCH01879, inv.no.: doos 01 map 3, uitnodiging aan de leden van de inspraakgroepen voor bustocht d.d. April 27, 1974; inv.no.: doos 01 map 3, Inleiding op programma van eisen voor het bouwplan Wagenaarstraat, April 28, 1974.
12 Ronden and Noorman (red.) 2007, pp. 20–21.
14 IISH, DDB: ARCH01879, inv.no.: doos 01 map 5, De Dapperklapper, November 1974.
In the northeastern part, the architects could draw on a design brief in which the residents proposed to vivify the streetscape through facades that protrude or recede one to two meters on the block perimeter, while simultaneously aiming to (1) reduce car traffic, (2) fulfill the contradictory need for a modern but affordable improvement of housing conditions, (3) have privacy without being shielded from city life, (4) have a view on the street from the living room and the kitchen, (5) have communal courtyards, and (6) retain and strengthen social cohesion.\(^{15}\) Aesthetically, the residents’ guidelines were based on their emotional attachment to the historic cityscape of Amsterdam, making this their source of inspiration. According to the brief, the heights of the buildings, contours, materials, colors, rooftops, and decorative elements should all fit to the context. This program (July 1974) was not only revolutionary in the context of post-war urbanism, but also provided the challenge to accomplish all aims within the margins of building regulations and the financial means of the housing association.

Following the example of their northeastern neighbors, the resident group of the southern part produced a design brief in April 1975, focusing on their principles for urban design.\(^{16}\) In basic terms, these principles corresponded with those of the northeastern part. However, in this part, the existing streets and building blocks were considerably narrower than the northeastern part, which complicated the need for building as many modern tenements as possible to accommodate the population. As increasing natural light in the homes was more difficult, the resident group and architects jointly considered different scenarios to change the street plan. Three options were the outcome: (1) building within the existing perimeters while reducing the building heights, or (2) building within the existing perimeters with hiatuses through additional side streets or by opening up the courtyards, or (3) building with protruding and receding facades for wider courtyards.\(^{17}\)

In response to the scenarios for the southern part, the planning department stated that they “provided too little certainty” about the final outcome to serve as a basis for implementation.\(^ {18}\) Yet another discussion emerged between the residents with their architect allies and the planning department. Although the stakeholders were unable to reach an agreement on the urban design during subsequent meetings, the residents and architects drew a crucial conclusion that “we agree with a great deal of the objectives of the planning department (privacy, quietude, sunlight in the street and the homes), but in our opinion they can be processed in such a way that more justice is given to the character of the neighborhood and the

\(^{15}\) IISG, DDB: ARCH01879, inv.no.: doos 01 map 2, argumentatie voor het gesloten bouwblok, January 3, 1974; ‘Het eindrapport van de inspraakgroepen’, Dapperklapper, March 19, 1974; SAA, HB: 30917, inv.no. 92, Dapperbuurtstraatindeling buurtvoorstel, July 1974.

\(^{16}\) SAA, SDO: 30666, inv.no. 1612, rapport van de inspraakgroep Dapperbuurt-Zuid, April 11, 1975.

\(^{17}\) SAA, HB: 30917, inv.no. 30, drie verkavelingsmodellen behorend bij het rapport van de inspraakgroep van de zuidhoek, April 1975.

\(^{18}\) IISG, DDB: ARCH01879, inv.no.: doos 03 map 3, commentaar op het rapport zuidelijke Dapperbuurt, May 15, 1975.
quality of each phase of urban renewal." Here, the synthesis that became the now typical Dutch urban renewal, is achieved: the comfort of modern living in postwar estates, creatively adapted to the historical urban context.

The decision was made in June 1977 by the Council Committee on Urban Development in favor of the residents with the urgent call to quicken implementation. Subsequently, a building boom emerged. In the northeastern part, the depths of the protruding and receding facades increased to six to ten meters at the suggestion of the architects to diversify the streetscape, slow down traffic, and enhance the possibilities for using public space. In the southern part, three building blocks were constructed with hiatuses by opening up the courtyards and the addition of one side street. The new tenements echoed the voice of the locals through the use of conventional elements to ‘contextualize’ the design, like sloping tiled roofs, variation in building heights, constructing facades in brown brick, off-white protruding trapezoidal bay windows, and lifting beams. However, without historical reproduction. In combination with the rather large-scale volumes, the small-scale detailing resulted in a contradictory designed postmodern cityscape.

CONCLUSION

While the dominant image of Dutch urban renewal is one of municipal leaders who rather heroically invented a more democratic alternative for the preceding technocracy, this paper has demonstrated that it is the creative potential of local social cultures that shaped the urban environment of the 1970s and 1980s Amsterdam. Local residents were empowered to develop and implement urban renewal plans through a convergence of forces with likeminded architects, bringing together the spontaneity and resilience of civil society with architectural expertise and know-how about government funding. In Dapperbuurt, the local action group organized an informal design process, directly involving all residents in decision-making and designing. Together they created a cityscape that they understood to suit their notion of a democratic society, albeit on the most local level, providing a sense of collective ownership for everyone regardless of their income or background. As such, the spatial design of urban renewal became a synthesis of seeming contradictions, combining modern but affordable housing conditions with conventional elements.

19 IISG, DDB: ARCH01879, inv.no.: doos 03 map 3, notulen zuidgroepvergadering d.d. October 1, 1975.
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New Forms of Citizenship. Emancipation, participation and representation
Exploding School. Planning, participation and the Bulletin of Environmental Education

Although we tend to think of the post-war era as the rise of the welfare state in the UK, by the late 1960s, the view that architecture and town planning were somehow a part of the redistribution of welfare began to appear less and less plausible in the eyes of the general public. From controversies over the construction of urban and intercity motorways, to the demolition of historic districts, to the decline of public architecture exemplified by the partial collapse of Ronan Point in 1968, it became increasingly clear that plans authored by public authorities were becoming both architecturally inadequate and politically indistinguishable from the ambitions of private developers. In fact, a decisive turn against planning seemed to emerge — gone was the enthusiasm and trust that had been invested into post-war reconstruction, and in its place, a deep skepticism of urban redevelopment and the conflict and displacement that it brought.

For the first time, architects, planners, and indeed parliament itself, were calling for a reassessment of the social contract between the people and the professions of the built environment. One outcome of this came in 1969 with the publication of People and Planning: Report of the Committee on Public Participation in Planning, known as the Skeffington Report. Providing a wide-ranging assessment of planning procedures across Britain, the report concluded that many conflicts had arisen from a failure to properly communicate planning decisions to non-professionals, and that furthermore, a new emphasis on “participation” could address the problem and perhaps lead to a new consensus.

In many ways the official endorsement of participation simply made visible practices that were already underway in the margins of design discourse, but the recognition and promotion of the idea in the findings of an official committee also paved the way for new initiatives. The Town and Country Planning Association, historically one of the most progressive critics of government planning policy, launched a new Education Unit in the spring of 1971 and with it a journal called the Bulletin of Environmental Education, or BEE. The TCPA hired Colin Ward and Anthony Fyson to run the unit — two schoolteachers with a unique combination of experience in pedagogy, politics, and architecture. Ward and Fyson’s vision of participation began immediately with the large text splashed across the
front cover of the first issue in May of 1971: “Pull out the staples, punch it, put it in an A4 file, and BEE becomes your build-it-yourself month by month up-to-date guide for sources and resources for learning and teaching about the environment...”

With this, BEE announced itself as a kind of toolkit to be assembled; a platform for the redistribution of urban environmental knowledge. It was a simple format — a zine of sorts — with directory listings, educational products, news items, editorials, and over the course of nearly two decades, it became a detailed record of urban environmental politics. However, if the TCPA, in its capacity as a non-profit advocacy organization, was broadly oriented towards political and professional groups, BEE was decidedly not a platform for planners and architects to better communicate the principles of their work to the public, nor was it a policy journal pushing for the reform of regulatory bodies or local authorities. With Ward and Fyson at the helm, BEE was squarely aimed at teachers and schools as the starting point for the cultivation of a new kind of popular engagement with the built environment.

As historian Dennis Hardy has observed, Colin Ward and Anthony Fyson were ideal candidates for the education unit precisely because they were both political radicals with no party affiliations. Ward, who was an outspoken anarchist, commented that BEE’s “informal and unofficial approach allays suspicion that it is propagating an ‘official’ view of planning and the environment.” In fact, environmental education as Ward and Fyson conceived of it was not something that could be received as a discipline but rather an open-ended process of learning-by-doing. Ward described it as “a ‘problem-oriented’ or ‘issue-based’ approach to environmental teaching, believing that children, like adults, learn from involvement in specific issues rather than from an abstract generalized approach or from fact-finding for its own sake.” This non-disciplinary issue-based approach allowed BEE to operate between professions, between political constituencies, and directly on the prevailing urban issues that had turned public opinion against architects and planners in the first place. In this sense, environmental education was a means to reframe participation — not as a mechanism of consent but as a problem to be worked on.

In 1969, Sherry Arnstein had written an influential article looking at the problem of participation in American federal housing and urban renewal programs, in which she discussed what she called a “ladder of participation” to describe different levels of citizen engagement. The ladder had eight rungs: Manipulation, Therapy, Informing, Consultation, Placation, Partnership, Delegated Power, and at the top Citizen Control. Ward and

1 BEE, No.1 (May 1971), cover.
2 Dennis Hardy, From New Towns to Green Politics (London: E&FN Spon, 1991), 127.
4 Ibid.
Fyson frequently referred to Arnstein’s ladder and commented that, “The Skeffington Report, especially as translated into practice, is only up to rung three or four of the ladder.” In Arnstein’s terms, this was in the realm of “non-participation” or “tokenism.” Ward and Fyson’s goal for BEE was to bring together work from across the UK that would challenge the planning establishment – as well as the educational establishment – to work towards the top of Arnstein’s ladder. As they wrote in 1973: “What should our aim be in environmental education? To educate for mastery of the environment: nothing less than that. We are in the early stages of moving from a formal democracy to a participatory democracy, in which people cherish their environment because it is theirs.”

BEE aimed to provide a forum to advance both the intellectual and the technical resources of this participatory democracy, with the understanding that youth education would play a critical role in its development. For Ward and Fyson, this was first and foremost an editorial task. The Bulletin was a kind of filter, sucking up content from around the country to construct a political and pedagogical vision, issue by issue. It acted as a distribution point for educators, providing listings for new products, filmstrips, slideshows, books, periodicals, and institutional resources. Reviews subjected such commonplace items as educational kits and games to rigorous political critique. Case studies afforded serious attention to both classroom exercises and creative ways to get young people out of their schools and into the street.

Drawing on the notion of “fieldwork” from geography and rural studies, Fyson coined the term “streetwork” to describe the kind of urban environmental exploration that BEE aimed to foster. Streetwork suggested that the city itself could become a classroom – an “exploding school” as Ward and Fyson called it – giving students the opportunity to become amateur urbanists and architectural critics. Town Trails were an important initiative supported by the TCPA and frequently featured in the pages of BEE. Based around an urban trail map with a simple visual checklist, the literally pedestrian quality of the town trail was an invitation to environmental scrutiny and the development of a shared narrative and spatial experience of the city.

Despite the Bulletin’s industrious pedagogical enthusiasm, BEE was also a record of the many obstacles faced by environmental education in the urban political context. At the crux of the conflict was the so-called comprehension gap — the discrepancy between professional expertise and the non-expert knowledge of local citizens. All of the work chronicled in BEE dealt with the issue on some level, and as Ward observed, “there will be a continual need to plug this gap and to ‘demystify’ the planning process, but also to enquire why the gap between people and planners has

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7 Ibid., 2–3.
arisen.”

Indeed the Bulletin was created as a journal of education precisely because the politics of the built environment hinged on this question of knowledge power and its asymmetries within planning discourse.

Numerous case studies grappled with the comprehension gap, demonstrating a range of possibilities for rethinking the relations between professionals and communities. Stanley King’s *Design-in* was a celebrated innovation in BEE that focused on large public meetings where open-ended discussion and live drawing exercises led to the collective development of a design brief. Other articles recounted efforts at every level of formal education, from exercises with schoolchildren to understand plan view, to university students working directly with residents on local redevelopment schemes. In issue 109, BEE gave over twenty-five pages to a profile of *Planning For Real*, a project developed by the educator and activist Anthony Gibson. Planning For Real kits were designed for both classrooms and public forums and came complete with instructions for rudimentary models, maps, precedent studies, and “data banks,” allowing participants to run their own workshops without the intervention of expert opinion.

Further to this reconsideration of the role of expert knowledge, two projects supported by the TCPA were of particular importance in the Bulletin: one was Planning Aid, the public advisory service modeled on legal aid that provided free expert advice to citizens, and the other was the initiative to build Urban Studies Centres, where exhibitions, community meetings, and educational workshops could all take place under one roof. In 1974, Malcolm MacEwen — then director of the Royal Institute of British Architects — had published a report called *Crisis in Architecture*, which included recommendations for “architectural interpretation centres” as a means of regaining the public trust. Colin Ward emphasized that the origins of the idea could be traced back to the very roots of radical planning in the work of Patrick Geddes and his Outlook Tower in Edinburgh. In any case, urban study centres, dozens of which were in fact established in cities across the UK, were precisely the institutionalization of what would later be called ‘community technical aid’ as an alternative to the existing methods of planning consultation and public consent. Sir Frederick Gibberd, the architect of Harlow New Town, wrote that, although urban study centres might employ experts to act as consultants, “there can be no image in the public’s mind of an inner sanctum where ‘they’, the planners, hatch up in secret what they think is good for others.” On the contrary, Gibberd argued that, “as the word ‘centre’ implies, it is a place for everyone interested in the environment. Whether they are changing it, deciding to change it, wanting to change it, interested in the way it is changed, or just interested in it.”

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8 Ward, “Say it again, Ben!,” 18.
11 Ibid.
In 1979, both Colin Ward and Anthony Fyson left BEE to pursue other writing and educational projects and by 1982 the TCPA had spun off the education unit as an entity, called Streetwork. Streetwork continued to publish BEE independently but the impact of increasingly conservative Labour and Tory administrations on public, urban, and environmental resources became evident in the following years. In a guest editorial of 1987, Colin Ward lamented the “stolen vocabulary” of mutual aid and self-help, belied by the state’s simultaneous disinvestment in local autonomous organizations. In the 1980s we also see critical debates in BEE on the turn from what was then called “community technical aid” towards a more professional recuperation of “community architecture,” which soon found support from the Prince of Wales and the New Urbanism movement.

Another notable shift for BEE was the increasing attention given to technologies such as tape-slides, video, and personal computers. In BEE, the same high level of political scrutiny that had been exercised on everything from games to government planning policy was now applied to new tools such as the BBC Micro and educational software. In a double issue of BEE from 1984, Christopher Roper provided a detailed analysis of Seymour Papert’s programming language Logo, where he praises the radical potential of the platform while observing that it has arrived at a turning point in British education policy:

Mrs. Thatcher is fond of saying: There Is No Alternative (TINA, for short). In this case, there is a clear alternative, which is to use computers to give human beings greater control over their own lives, by creating a more open society, by breaking down boundaries between the information “haves” and the great majority of “havenots”. If computers are to be used in this way, programming must become a comprehensible activity. Computer programs must cease to be sealed black boxes.

Here again we see the re-emergence of the comprehension gap, and just as urban environmental knowledge could be seen as a political literacy project of the 1970s, so too were the technological upheavals of the 1980s. It is here as well that we might begin to anticipate our own urban conjuncture, as we see the critique of technology and the critique of the urban colliding in the pages of BEE. One might say that it is precisely this increasing technicality of the urban environment that appears to govern our contemporary discourse on the possibilities for personal and collective political agency. In the smart city, we are constantly invited to ‘participate’ and to be counted as creative agents. However, with this considerable history of participatory struggle in mind, we might ask, as BEE did, whether we are any freer now than we were then? Perhaps it is time for a new environmental education.

12 Hardy, From New Towns to Green Politics, 139–140.
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INTRODUCTION

Dutch architectural historiography remains hesitant on advocacy planning in housing of the 1960s and 1970s, resulting in radically opposed evaluations: from “no real change,” to “a dominant factor,” to “successful experiments.”The present contribution highlights one aspect of this phenomenon, namely the way in which the matter was treated — or rather ‘mediated’ — in the architectural periodicals of the Netherlands during the 1960s and 1970s. The main goal is to chart in these media the shifting positions of architects, citizens and government patronage in urban planning and collective housing. How did these intertwine with new philosophical positions on living and the redefinition of the role of an individual within a society? How did new developments in the fields of sociology and governmental management sciences influence these positions? What architectural research co-shape this debate? How did architects react to new governmental regulations, taking democratisation into account? Above all, where did it leave the citizen?

This paper builds on the research *Uitspraken over inspraak. Een discoursanalyse van artikelen over inspraak en participatie uit Nederlandse architectuurtijdschappen* (1959–1979) (A Discourse Analysis of articles on ‘inspraak’ and ‘participatie’ in Dutch architectural periodicals (1959–1979)), which focuses on the concepts of ‘de mens’ (people), ‘wonen’ (living) and ‘samenleven’ (coexistence), as discussed in the following periodicals: *Forum voor architectuur en daarmee verbonden kunsten* (1945–); *Stedebouw en Volkshuisvesting* (1958–1995); *Plan* (1970–1990); *Bouw* (1946–2006) and *Wonen TA/BK* (1946–1968). The aforementioned research concludes with the new and profound role of editorial boards in the debate, especially in enabling non-architect specialists communicate their opinions in

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architectural journals. The purpose, it seems, was not to open up the
debate, but instead to disrupt it, force a definition on it, or — in the more
extreme cases — to foreclose the discussion altogether. Following a short
overview of the terminology, we will dwell on the views on ‘people’ and
‘sociology’ by several non-architect experts involved in the debate, and
subsequently (re)turn to the architect and citizen.

TERMINOLOGY AND DEFINITION

The appearance of the terms ‘inspraak,’ ‘participatie’ and ‘zeggenschap’ in
the late 1960s was accompanied by a lively discussion on their meaning. In
English, these terms are encompassed by the broader term ‘participation’. In
the article A Ladder Of Citizen Participation, Sherry R. Arnstein alludes
on the “acerbated rhetoric and misleading euphemisms” related to this
terminology, that was characteristic also for the Dutch discussion. The
etymological roots of the verbs ‘spreken’ (to speak) and ‘zeggen’ (to say),
refer to the intervention of the citizen in the process between the patron
(the government, politicians and bureaucrats) and the technician (the
architect); this implies a promise that the citizen (stakeholder, future user
and future occupant) is heard and that what has been said is taken into
account. This was often not the case, as the aforementioned ‘ladder of
citizen participation’ also suggests. The ‘ladder’ distinguishes the following
steps: manipulation, therapy, informing, consultation, placation, partnership,
delegated power, citizen control. The first two steps are characterised as
‘nonparticipation,’ the following three as ‘degrees of tokenism’ and the last
three as ‘degrees of citizen power.’ Like in English, the Dutch terms had
multiple meanings and, furthermore, changed in meaning at an astonishing
speed. In 1973, for instance, in an issue of the journal Stedebouw en
Volkshuisvesting, ‘living ecologist (woonecoloog)’ M.J. ter Veer-Bos and
J.M. van Dam, collaborator of the Vakgroep Wonen of the Wageningen
Agricultural College, argue that “indirecte inspraak (here: consultation)”
consists of research on “how people live (wonen van de mens).” Therefore,
it comes as no surprise that in the same journal lawyer and politician
Christina Anna de Ruyter-De Zeeuw (1907–1997) rejects the term ‘inspraak’
because of its euphemistic undertone, as the implied result remained all
too often absent (“waarbij burgers alleen maar ergens tegen aan praatten”).
She goes on to describe her preference for the term “participatie,” which
implies that the citizen is a participant of a certain policy. In his book
Inspraak, in een veranderend ruimtelijk planproces (1975), J.W. van Zundert
(1938) — scientific head collaborator of administrative law of the public

administration workgroup at Twente Technological University of Applied Sciences — returns to the following definition of ‘inspraak’ published earlier in 1973 in the journal Intermediair. He writes that “an organised process is one that offers the opportunity for the people involved to be part of the discussion, to ensure that they represent themselves as much as possible at an early stage, to discuss, in constant consultation with the administration, on the aspects of local spatial policy, whereby, within reasonable limits, what is said may influence the final decision to be taken by the appropriate bodies.” However, it remains questionable whether the future inhabitants of a given housing project would judge this affirmation as sufficient. The introduction of an intermediator was another way to help citizens participate. The role of the “opbouwwerker” was intended to lead the conversation, while aiding citizens to defend their interests. Here, the subtext is that politicians and bureaucrats (‘bestuurder’ and ‘ambtenaar’) first and foremost privileged their own interests at the expense of the citizens.

THE ARCHITECT THINKING OF ‘MAN/PEOPLE’

During the early 1960s architects responded to the limitations of post-war housing projects. For instance, Amsterdam architect Herman Herzberger criticised their monotony in plan and elevation. John Habraken, architect and professor of Architecture at TU Delft, addressed the missing natural relationship between “living (wonen)” and “building (bouwen)” as the principal problem in social housing projects. Jaap Bakema advocated for necessary changes, especially to re-establish a relationship between architects and inhabitants. As the future inhabitant had become ‘anonymous’ to the architect, human needs, such as the variation in living spaces, were not addressed anymore. Dissatisfied with social housing projects and their role in them, architects explored new, and the not yet acknowledged needs of future inhabitants.

8 “Een georganiseerd proces, waarbij in een vroegtijdig stadium aan een zo representatief mogelijk deel van de betrokkenen de mogelijkheid wordt verleend om in voortdurende samenspraak met het bestuur te discussiëren over aspecten van het lokale ruimtelijk beleid, waarbij, binnen de redelijke grenzen, het te berde gebrachte van invloed zal kunnen zijn op de uiteindelijke door de daartoe geschikte organen te nemen beslissing.” J.W. Zundert, Inspraak in een veranderend ruimtelijk planningsproces (Deventer: Kluwen, 1975).

9 The “opbouwwerker” stimulated and supported inhabitants, municipalities and organisations with addressing social and physical questions in certain areas, cities or regions.


14 Both positions of Habraken and Bakema resound with an earlier position taken by architect Jacobus Johannes Pieter Oud, in his article J.J.P. Oud, “Bouwkunst en normalisatie bij de massabouw,” De Stijl, no. 7 (1918): 77–79; republished in Hilde Heynen, et al., ed., ‘Dat is Architectuur’ Sleutelteksten uit de twintigste eeuw (Rotterdam: 010, 2001), 84–96.) of 1918 challenged the exception rules of the 1910s in public housing, which limited the intervention of architects primarily to the exterior realm (Amsterdamse School, i.e.).
The first issue of *Forum* in 1965 published the transcribed lecture of designer and critic Simon Mari Pruys (1927–1980), in which he questions whether “people” are entitled to understand the environment as it has been created by the designer (*Heeft de mens het recht de omgeving, die de vormgever voor hem schept, te kunnen begrijpen?*).\(^{15}\) Pruys deconstructs the question and very critically focuses on the terms ‘people (mens),’ ‘rights (recht)’ and ‘environment (omgeving),’ all of which were fully embedded in the architectural discourse of the time. Pruys objects to the ubiquitous use of the term ‘people/man’ in architectural programs and manifestos. He identifies ‘people’ as a chimera; inexistent utopian beings. Architects, he states, simply misuse this terminology to discuss and judge these matters; it is not the architect’s task to decide who ‘people’ are, how they are, or what their wishes are.\(^{16}\) Pruys considers it the task of sociology to answer these questions. Here, the *Forum* editorial board — which at the time included N.J. Habraken, as well as the engineer/architects S. Dijkstra, P.K.A. Pennink, and L. Wijers\(^ {17} \) — seems to distance itself from a form of discourse that it had stimulated since its instauration.

**SOCIOLGY ON HABITAT**

In the early 1960s, intentions to give a larger consideration on people’s desires were present within the fields of architecture, urban planning, as well as sociology. Research on how people desire to live (“woonwensenonderzoek”) seems like the first attempt on what will later be called participation. In 1962, professor in sociology Leo Turksma (1924) addressed a problem regarding this research; the questionnaires did not exactly address the desire of how people wanted to live, but rather the relationship between these desires and the future behaviour of the occupants; resulting in incorrect interpretations and conclusions.\(^ {18}\)

In 1973, *Stedebouw en Volkshuisvesting* gave a voice to sociologist Paul Pennartz (1935–2011), who attempted to explain in the ways sociological research could contribute to “create new living environments.”\(^ {19}\) In a reaction to the *habitat*-concept central in the 1953 CIAM-congress in Aix-en-Provence, Pennartz states that the housing environment (‘woonmilieu’) not only reflects the processes in a society, but also constitutes “a number


17 *Forum* 19 (1965) 1. Herzberger and Bakema had left the *Forum* editorial board, they were members of this board from no. 7, 1959, till no. 1963.


of conditions that influence man’s actions.”

In his view, the sociology branches of human and social ecology could definitely contribute to the habitat-research of architects.

In the meantime, architects had already turned to sociology and anthropology. In 1973 for instance, almost a decade after their field trip, the Kasba 64 Study Group — a group of architectural students of the Delft Technical University that investigated the forms of habitation in Morocco — published their results.

POLITICS AND POLICY

The journal articles of 1973 are collectively a testimony to a fundamental turn in the architect’s position. It coincides with — and reflects — the Orientation Document Spacial Planning Policy (Oriëntatie nota Ruimtelijke Ordening, 1974) and part of the Third National Spacial Planning Policy Document (Derde nota Ruimtelijke Ordening, 1973–1983), where politicians included the citizens and future inhabitants as stakeholders in the decision-making procedure. This had the double result of democratically legitimising large scale projects and thereby neutralising civil opposition. The Orienteringsnota refocused the role of the architect from ideology, to policy, which was deemed to be better than politics; it established a new collaboration with the new patron so as to find a new basis for communication (“een nieuwe basis voor gesprek”).

Professor of the Faculty of Architecture at the Delft Technical University Umberto Barbieri reflected on this ‘turn’ in 1978. He observed a patriarchal attitude in the early 1970s, in which architects, sociologists, psychologists and artists encouraged local population to speak up and take initiative to formulate their needs and desired living conditions; that is what they should do. In the second part of the decade, this ideological approach made place for a focus on the building process, centred on a renewed collaboration with the ‘renewed’ patron. Barbieri illustrated this with the case of the participation project in Spijkenisse; the apolitical Werkgroep 2000, advised by citizens, decided on the submitted architectural solutions, leaving little room for the architects’ patriarchal attitude or ideologically coloured visions.

20 “tevens een samenstel van condities die de mens aantreft en die handelen beïnvloeden”. Pennartz, “Naar een model,” 291.
23 Note that H. Bakker contended that the large-scale level of these plans was fundamentally in conflict with any true democratic decision-making process. H. Bakker, “Inspraak, de kleine schaal en decentralisatie,” Plan 9, no. 3 (March 1978): 46–52.
CONCLUSION

The above charted discourses regarding the shifting positions of architects, citizens and government patronage on participation in urban planning and collective housing, as mediated in architectural periodicals in the Netherlands of the 1960s and 1970s, suggest the year 1973 as a turning point. Editorial boards, through interventions by well-chosen non-architect specialists, foreclosed decennia long discussions. Architects were required to objectify their research on ‘people’ and their environment (previously referred to as ‘indirecte inspraak’) by applying the standards of the social sciences, including sociology and anthropology. The political remediation of power imbalance — that was formerly in detriment of the citizen vis-à-vis the architect — and the government influences by means of techniques including the ‘intermediator (opbouwwerker)’ or apolitical committees in the building process such as ‘Werkgroep 2000’ in Spijkenisse, made architects’ patriarchal attitude turn towards pragmatism. Policy finally took over from ideology.
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Kirsti Nordin's drawing in her article "Designing daycare centres" (The Finnish Architectural Review).
The welfare state in Finland is relatively young compared to the other Nordic welfare states. The historical turning point of the welfare state and its key institutions took place in the late 1960s and the early 1970s. The period from the late 1960s to the early 1990s may be seen as the period of the developing welfare state. In this regard, my paper focuses on the institutional welfare state architecture in Finland during this period. Of particular interest to my research is the role that architects played, and the way in which they applied their expertise as tools during the early period of the welfare state. As such, they may be considered welfare state architects. This paper is part of my early-stage Ph.D. dissertation, which focuses on the institutional welfare state architecture in Finland from the 1960s to the 1990s.

Kirsti Nordin, a relatively unknown figure in the established history of architecture, is an example of such a welfare state architect. Her architectural practice during these decades, as well as her earlier involvement as a member in Association 9 (Yhdistys 9), in the late 1960s, render her as a textbook example of welfare state architects, who in spite of their active involvement, remained somewhat unknown. I consider anonymity as an essential characteristic of welfare state architecture, especially when female architects are in question. Although the number of female architects increased in this period rapidly, most of them did not have career opportunities that would have made to the traditional canonised history of architecture. In this regard the role of architects, some of them even saw their expertise as a tool for developing the welfare state.

Association 9 was established in 1966 in Helsinki by a group of highly educated women and men, who were interested in the deconstruction of the gender roles in society. They were inspired by a contemporary sociologist gender role research and aimed to transfer the academic research into the development of the society. This kind of research was also done by the members of the association. For example, sociologist, Dr. Elina Haavio-Mannila's published her research on the status of men and women in Finland at the same time she was active in the association with the same social questions. Many of the members were from the Swedish speaking minority of Finland, with active connections to Sweden and other Nordic

1 Elina Haavio-Mannila, Suomalainen mies ja nainen: asema ja muuttuvat roolit.
countries. The history of the association is an excellent venue for future research. I aim to interview Kirsti Nordin next year, but for now my sources on her work are her published writings.

The Association 9 has been linked to the second-wave feminism, but its members did not see their activism as specifically feminist, since their agenda was wider than the agenda of their contemporary feminists. Association 9 aimed for the change of the gender roles of both men and women, not only women. Some of the female members were simultaneously active in the pro-women movement and associations, such as the League of Feminists (Naisasialiitto Unioni), oldest pro-women association in Finland, which only (still today) allows women members. They differentiated Association 9’s activism from the feminist movement, as it’s perspective was also focused on men and even children.2 Retrospectively Association 9’s work can be seen as feminist activism as feminist work in the 21st century is not only focused on pro-women questions but a society at large. What was different from the contemporary and earlier feminists, besides the inclusion of the male perspective, was the focus on their activism. The association aimed for a change that would affect the lives of all citizens, not just their own, academic, middle-class reference group. The activism was directed to society with writings, public debates, and demonstrations. One of the methods of activism was to spread information about the deconstruction of gender roles to its members’ professional forums.

The members were divided into working groups, each member applying their expertise within a specific group. The association had a housing group, domestic group, juridical group, daycare group, sexual group, research group, labour market group and an education group. The themes were chosen based on the idea that these questions are crucial for the equality of men and women and the development of the society. The other two architect members of the Association 9 were Nordin’s then-husband, Norwegian born Egil Nordin and Leif Sundström. All three architects worked at first in the housing group of the association, as it was thought that the architect’s education was most useful in the housing questions.3 When the legislation of public daycare developed in the beginning of the 1970s, Kirsti Nordin began to specialize on daycare architecture. At that time, the active years of the association were behind but the working groups of the association and especially the daycare group did have an impact on the way Kirsti Nordin developed her expertise on daycare architecture.

Kirsti Nordin, as a member of the 1968 generation represents the generation of women who took an active role in the society, addressing pro-women questions, such as the abortion right, equal pay, and childcare.

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However, Nordin and her contemporaries were not the first generation of female architects to practice architecture or actively take part in building a new society in Finland. Kirsti Nordin had a joint practice with Egil Nordin, but differently than earlier generations women architects, her prolific writing output makes it possible to examine her individual career. When the daycare question emerged in societal debates towards the end of the 1960s, Nordin took interest in it, and specialized her research and writing on daycare architecture. Her first article about daycare architecture was published in *Finnish Architectural Review* in 1970. In it, she dealt with women rights for working life and children rights for early childhood education, questions that had not been addressed in the professional forums of architects before. Later her articles handled the design questions of the daycare centre as a building type. Nordin’s writings introduced the idea of public daycare as a welfare service and a building type to Finnish architects.

Arguably, the activism promoted by Association 9 shaped many of its members’ careers, including Kirsti Nordin’s architecture. In the following decades, her architectural practice was central to the development of public daycare service as one of the building-types upon which welfare institutions were based in Finland. She worked in the National Board of Social Welfare in the 1970s and 1980s, developing a design manual for a public daycare centre. The manual was part of the new public daycare legislation which was implemented in 1973. The main goal of the Association 9, concerning daycare, was adapted to the legislation: the new legislation enabled daycare services for all families. Before the legislation, there were only few kindergartens, playground nannies and various other public and private daycare services in cities. The staff working in them was mostly uneducated. The legislation was an important turning point for the early childhood education as the development of the university based early childhood education began with the legislation. As Kirsti Nordin described the meaning of the legislation in her article, it prescribed standards for daycare services.

The association and the work of its daycare group gave important specialized knowledge and contacts for Nordin, which were useful for an architect developing a design manual for a building type of a new welfare state institution. In terms of the public funding of daycare, architects had to follow the manual, edited by Nordin and published by the National Board of Social Welfare, on designing daycare centres. The manual introduced child centered design to architects and functionalized daycare architecture. Along with the development of the prefabricated construction industry, it was an efficient model for implementing daycare services all around Finland. National Board of Social Welfare inspected the new daycare centres in the planning phase and after completion. This was firstly a way to provide equal and safe environment to children in the public daycare, and secondly a way to inspect the implementation and funding of daycare centres.

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The manual defined advisable locations of daycare centres in urban environments, and provided room plans for daycare centres. The room plan was based on the thought of children’s scale planning. The manual advised each daycare group to have its own “home area” in the building. The term for daycare centre in both official languages of Finland, Finnish and Swedish, point at the building type: The Finnish word *päiväkoti* and the Swedish word *daghem* mean “day home” in English. The legislation defined the new buildings designed by the manual as “day homes”, differing from the buildings and spaces of daycare, called *kindergartens*, that were built and arranged before the legislation.

Besides the specialist work in the National Board of Social Welfare, Nordin continued her design practice in the joint office with Egil Nordin. They designed several public daycare centres in the following decades. When the economic depression of the early 1990s struck Finland, the public daycare was one of the welfare state institutions that was most compromised. The funding of public daycare, and the construction of daycare centres, decreased significantly, while funding of stay-at-home care was increased instead. The construction boom of public daycare centre throughout the 1980s came to a halt. Public funding for stay-at-home care was developed in the 1980s for the families in countryside as a substitute for the daycare services. In the 1990s the funding was opened to all families as a part of the defunding of public daycare. Interestingly, in the midst of the depression and rising unemployment figure, one municipality built a new daycare centre which was seen as “a depression medicine” and designed by Kirsti Nordin. The Ylpönpiha daycare centre, in the city of Toijala, Pirkanmaa region was completed in 1992, when other municipalities had quit the development of the public daycare services.

Kirsti Nordin is a key figure in developing the building type of a public daycare centre in Finland. I aim to point on my case study, how her versatile architectural practice can be seen as an example of the development of equality in architecture and society in a welfare state. The established history of architecture hasn’t canonized architectural practices such as Nordin’s practice, but with this case it is possible acknowledge that seemingly anonymous architecture is in fact a very important tool on building a new society.
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Courtesy of Archives municipales d’Ivry-sur-Seine.
Marxist attitudes toward social change, historical action and democracy dominated the conversation within the French Left since 1945 and played a major role in shaping political and cultural debates. However, these shared languages and ideals also had a concrete effect on the built environment: they allowed partisan architects to collaborate with communist civil servants, as well as agree on ‘the city’ as a common project representing a means of utopian thinking, and a unit of governance and design. Modern architecture became a way to think about and implement evolving Marxist ideas that lay at the heart of the communist political project in postwar France. As the most effective field of action for the French Communist Party (PCF) — the largest Western European Communist party next to the Italian — was the municipal level of government, partisan architects helped assert the Party’s centrality in France’s post-war cultural life.

As these architects became more engaged with governing the city together with successively reelected mayors and officials, the communist utopia was soon confronted with local action and the everyday management of the municipal sphere. They fostered architecture as a mode of spatial and ideological control, transforming cities into veritable communist bastions that provided the Party with its most solid electoral base and much of its cultural identity. The proliferation of communal and social facilities allied to social housing contributed to this end, helping to program the city around a particular communist lifestyle that emphasized the promotion of culture. New architectural typologies helped propagate the belief that the communist society had been realized, at least at a small civic scale. What distinguished communist municipalities like Ivry-sur-Seine, in the so-called ‘red suburbs’ — former industrial areas around Paris — was the way in which their sociability was structured along communitarian lines, intertwining everyday life, labor and Party politics.¹

This paper examines the radical master plan that Renée Gailhoustet and Jean Renaudie designed for the city center urban renewal of Ivry-sur-Seine; a redevelopment that lasted almost 25 years, spanning the period before and after May 1968. Responding to the plea of Roland Leroy — PCF Central Committee representative and a champion of the idea of culture as a means for workers to join the struggle for social and political change — the master plan was strategically structured around the cultural center of its “third zone.” The dismissal of the cultural center epitomized the challenges that the project faced from the mid-1970s onwards, when the problem of representation of the working class created a scission between communist architects and leaders.

Building on the imbrication of structuralism with politics — relying on claims for participatory democracy and self-management — the architects’ collaboration aimed to assert agency in the complexity of systems, forms and spaces over people’s “potentialities.” Despite all the efforts, the communist municipality raised the suspicion that it was dissociating itself from the true working class based on the critical feedback on the housing parts of the master plan.

French planning entered a new phase with the advent of the Fifth Republic in 1958 and Charles de Gaulle’s ascent to the presidency, who modernized the country through unprecedented large-scale housing and infrastructure projects. For communist local leaders of the red suburbs, the newly engineered highways leading to Paris had a twofold effect; they distressed their jurisdiction, but represented a unique opportunity to leverage top-down Gaullist urban legal apparatuses to foster their own agenda. The widening of two perpendicular streets merging at Ivry’s downtown triggered the idea to use de Gaulle’s new decree on urban renewal. For communists, the modernization of Ivry’s city center was a means to fight against land-speculation and thus safeguard social balance through the combination of new social housing estates and amenities in what would be the city’s first ever master plan.

For its conception, the then appointed chief architect in 1962, Roland Dubrulle, not coincidently a Party cardholder, soon hired Gailhoustet, a newly graduated communist architect, to develop the ambitious project. Their work relied on recent developments of French urban sociology; the

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3 Jean Renaudie, “Faire parler ce qui jusque-là s’est tu,” Techniques et architecture, no. 312 (December 1976): 78. This and all subsequent translations in the paper are by the author, unless otherwise noted.
6 This was required by the departmental infrastructure authority. See Renaud Epstein, La Rénovation urbaine. Démolition-reconstruction de l’État (Paris: Presses de Sciences Po, 2013).
surveys that were carried out led to the diagnosis that the derelict urban fabric of Ivry’s central district should not be preserved. Therefore, the master plan became the object of successive revisions, all of which overlaid the historical accumulation of buildings. They made no concession to the red brick chimneys of local industries punctuating Ivry’s skyline, along with the brick-and-stone townhouses that precariously sheltered the city’s working class.

The first version of Dubrulle’s master plan followed an urban solution that was widespread in France’s post-1958 urban planning era. It consisted of mixed-function towers and slabs, including housing, public spaces, shops, offices, hotels and parking lots, sitting on elevated pedestrian platforms and bridges, all organized around a low-rise cultural center. The convergence to a cultural facility was not anodyne; local communist leaders took pride in their policies by stating that, unlike the state, they devoted a significant part of their budget to cultural amenities.

The costly policy of rehousing the displaced population on the site made it necessary to split the master plan in different mixed-use zones and carry out the work in several phases. The third zone, structured around the cultural center, remained undeveloped. In the plans and elevations of 1966, the cultural center was only featured as a series of shifting stacked volumes. Two housing towers, Raspail and Lenin, located in zones 1 and 2, were the first to be built. Gailhoustet was alone in charge of their design as high-rise versions of Le Corbusier’s Unité d’habitation, inside which she ingeniously combined variants of semi-duplex typologies, drawing from the research that Team 10-member Georges Candilis had carried out in French-colonized Africa in the 1950s.

In 1968, the 18-storey Raspail tower was erected entirely of reinforced raw concrete. Regardless of its large and sunny apartments, its tectonic aspects allied to an absence of detail soon stirred up polemics among communist city councilors for Ivry’s constituency. They foresaw the contrasting material townscape that the new master plan would produce in Ivry when completed inasmuch as the inevitable comparison to Ivry’s most celebrated postwar social housing achievement, the adjacent 14-storey Cité Maurice Thorez inaugurated in 1953. Designed by local architects in the first years of the Cold War, it alluded both to the city’s working-class vocation of which communists were proud, as well as to its communist politics; its red bricks were a reference to the city’s factories, whereas its monumental features, crowned with a spire, evoked the official socialist realist architecture that was built in the USSR under

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Stalin’s rule. Its hues paid honor to “Ivry-la-Rouge,” and the building was ultimately baptized “the Kremlin.”

Georges Gosnat, Party national treasurer and Ivry’s member of parliament, urged Gailhoustet to bring variations such as terraces and windows to her monolithic design, which she incorporated into the Lenin tower. Curiously enough, only a few years later in 1971, Gosnat appeared on French TV revering the ‘modern’ aspect of the new national headquarters for the Party’s Central Committee that Oscar Niemeyer designed with glass and reinforced raw concrete in Paris. The building, with which Gosnat was personally involved, was the main symbol of a larger campaign to update French communism in a moment of crisis with the rise of radical leftist on the eve of May 1968.

Nevertheless, this clash over the issue of raw concrete in Ivry led to the resignation of Gailhoustet’s boss, Dubrulle, who aimed to avoid further confrontation with communist leaders. Gailhoustet therefore was appointed chief architect of urban renewal in 1969. A year later Renaudie, who was one of the co-founders of Atelier de Montrouge (1958–1981), joined Gailhoustet’s office as joint chief architect. This happened since Renaudie left the Atelier after disagreements with his partners on the utopian resonances of the drawings he conceived for the study of Le Vaudreuil, one of France’s new towns.

Paradoxically, Renaudie and Gailhoustet’s co-authored master plan became more radical as the economic and political panorama grew more hostile. Molecular biology and structural Marxism afforded Renaudie insights into the concept of “the city is a combinatorics”; a manifesto proclaiming an urban theory for an open system of architecture aimed at innovating the discourse on human agency, sociability, and urban life. Combining, on three-dimensional level, constituent elements of the city in all of its “complexity,” it called zoning principles into question through a structuralist emphasis on “relations” rather than on “elements” constituting the whole. On the one hand, by incorporating post-Fordist criticisms on modernism, they aimed to make every dwelling unique to favor an architectural expression of individuality that was directly opposed to modernist mass

12 Georges Gosnat, “Une grande œuvre dont la fierté sera ressentie bien au-delà de nos propres rangs,” La Nouvelle Critique, no. 46, “La Maison du Parti communiste français” (September 1971): IV.
production. Postindustrial standardization — the social flattening that had permeated the communist paradigm for decades — was suddenly displaced to accommodate social difference; a political right with personal choice.

Their stance represented, in the words of Jean-Pierre Lefebvre, “a reflection on the perversion of Marxism into a totalitarian leveling […] focusing on the autonomy and originality of human personalities.” It resonated with a geopolitical mentality of the end of the Cold War in which the world, the city and society at large were composed of several poles or groups. On the other hand, based on ideas of participatory democracy and self-management largely informed by Henri Lefebvre’s writings, the duo established close collaboration with Ivry’s inhabitants, not as “users,” but as interlocutors capable of “experimenting, judging and critiquing.” Anticipating the Party’s own theoretical revision of some of its most fundamental dogmas such as the “dictatorship of the proletariat,” their project was ultimately conceived as an architectural response from within modernism and communism, to the upsurge of the radical left and ultimately, of French postmodernism.

Hence, by 1972, their co-authored master plan had progressed to a topological entity conceived as a “communication system,” blurring the boundaries between public and private that was ultimately meant to be triggered by the population’s feedback loop or, in Renaudie’s own words, to “give voice to what has heretofore been silent.” While the third zone was put on hold, the first parts of their master plan to be built were two mixed-use complexes entirely designed in raw concrete, namely Danielle Casanova and Jeanne Hachette. Sitting on ground-floor retail spaces, both projects consisted of unusual star-shaped layouts for various apartment types that were superimposed and interconnected by proliferating pyramid-like structures fanning outward, intended to be transformed into mountainous, leafy cascading terraces. The implication, for Renaudie and Gailhoustet, was to grant the population new ways of experimenting, customizing and even self-managing space together, from within the domestic confines to the city and its very townscape.

In order to activate the process and endorse such an appropriation relying on the city’s own communist networks of sociability, the architects proceeded not only by means of several public campaigns including posters, written brochures and articles published in Ivry ma ville (the municipal newsletter), but also public meetings and even exhibitions. Ivry

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21 See Renée Gailhoustet and Bénédicte Chaljub, La politesse des maisons (Marseille: Actes Sud, 2009).
80 was the city’s first show on urban planning featuring the master plan inside a futuristic inflatable plastic pavilion designed by Gailhoustet in 1971. They also organized Opération Porte-Ouverte, an exhibition inside Danielle Casanova which preceded its rental procedure to convince the population that its already-built star-shaped apartments could indeed be fully furnished. The ‘innovation’ in the design conception was such that the Ministry of Equipment even asked the municipality for an authorization to commission sociologist Françoise Lugassy to carry official surveys in registering the visitors’ first reactions both during the event and once the apartments were inhabited.

The Danielle Casanova and Jeanne Hachette buildings came to incarnate, however, a turning point in the financial evolution of the master plan. On the eve of the 1973 oil shock, the state decided to backtrack from the urban renewal to which it formerly assured support. No longer involved, it claimed that the city should promote real estate other than social housing and use new public-private mechanisms to financially rebalance itself; a controversial alternative for French communists who were obliged to include different kinds of tenancy and homeownership, giving the impression of privileging the middle and upper classes. Worse yet, both buildings changed downtown Ivry’s urban morphology once and for all.

There were many reasons that destabilized all meanings engendering the “lack of popular identification.” Lugassy’s survey showed how they encompassed reluctance vis-à-vis a new architectural vocabulary of triangular layouts fostering a new sociability — with large living rooms and much smaller bedrooms — which inhabitants found difficult to furnish, especially after visiting the “modernly” decorated show flats. Yet what mattered to Ivry’s elected officials was that Lugassy’s data evidenced a real questioning of their own social policy, and therefore of the master plan. The consequence was the revision of the third zone with the dismissal of its cultural centre, which evolved to comprise an ambitious program intertwining workshops, an indoor public market, a library, a transforming theater, and even apartments and retail spaces.

In the latest versions of the master plan, the cultural center came to embody Renaudie’s earlier plans for the new town of Le Vaudreuil, borrowing patterns from the architect’s utopian urban thought. Its organic structure unfolded into different levels of concentric circular units with

terraces connecting to Jeanne Hachette and other surrounding buildings and streets, as if the whole master plan converged into a convoluted spiral of culture. Indicating various flows of relationships, it seemed to be the very representation of the ‘system’s’ cybernetic loop.

To conclude, the master plan as it evolved in the 1970s was never fully achieved; despite successive public campaigns, the municipality struggled to fill the project’s holes. The image of Jeanne Hachette, with an amputated bridge, persisted for a decade, even after Renaudie’s premature death in 1981, the same year of France’s presidential elections that marked the PCF’s irretrievable decline. The impaired overpass was completed in 1986 with Voltaire, a housing project designed in lieu of the cultural center by Nina Schuch, Renaudie’s design partner.

However, perhaps due to the dismissal of the cultural center — allegorically conceived as the heart of the master plan — the urban vitality and sociability that Renaudie and Gailhoustet envisaged for Ivry’s center never came through. If the apartment units are fully inhabited and their terraces abundantly planted despite the initial criticism, the collective spaces seem to be gradually depopulated and abandoned, especially at Jeanne Hachette’s retail areas. What happened in Ivry is evocative of what Manfredo Tafuri described as a “disenchanted mountain” when examining the advent of the American skyscraper since the turn of the nineteenth century.”

Tafuri explained how the skyscraper, which he defined as an “unnatural architectonic structure,” evolved from a “single event” towards a new conception of enclaves like the Rockefeller Center. While also comprising cultural amenities, the latter reproduced something that reflects the complexity of the city on a smaller scale. However, its purely speculative aims represented for Tafuri the end of the utopian dimension of its predecessors, since the European and Russian avant-gardes had also experimented in skyscrapers.

Renaudie and Gailhoustet’s knotty topological system of towers and “mountains” in Ivry, even if programmed to avoid speculation and commend the autonomy of human personalities in the city’s already 90-year-old municipal communism, have something to do with this lineage, embodying the tensions between an enchanted utopia and a disenchanted reality.

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Welfare State Conditions. From biopolitics and economy to housing regulations
The health of democracy. Coop Himmelblau’s Entspannungsarchitektur and the expansion of the Austrian welfare state, 1970–77

The political, cultural, and institutional landscape of Austria had gradually shifted towards the end of the 1960s, but was radically reshaped with the historical election of Federal Chancellor Bruno Kreisky of the Socialist Party of Austria (SPÖ) in 1970. Described as “breath of fresh air,” the arrival of the Kreisky government did not only have a symbolic effect on the Austrian cultural life, but also a very tangible fiscal effect for individual artists, architects, and institutions, as generous new funding initiatives were made available for the arts and sciences. Following the SPÖ’s rallying cry to “saturate all aspects of life with democracy,” the Kreisky Era in Austrian politics (1970–1983) was marked by an expansion of the welfare state and comprehensive educational, penal, and health reforms, as part of a larger effort to foster social democratic values and middleclass society. The biopolitical stakes of the Austrian welfare state were not only the care of its citizens, but the creation of the conditions necessary to sustain a modern democracy and an “open society” in a country still riddled by its totalitarian past.

At the height of the Kreisky Era in 1976 the experimental architecture group Coop Himmelblau (CH) and the Austrian doctor Manfred Haider

1 I would like to thank Rixt Woustra, Michael Faciejew and August Sarnitz, as well as reviewers Dirk van den Heuvel and Nelson Mota, for their comments and feedback on this paper. The Socialist Party of Austria (Sozialistische Partei Österreichs) has been called the Social Democratic Party of Austria (Sozialdemokratische Partei Österreichs) since 1991.

2 This included both the rise of Austro-Fascism in the early 1930s and, more significantly, Austria’s annexation into the Third Reich in 1938. The collective understanding that Austria was a victim rather than collaborator of Nazi Germany remained largely unchallenged in public life until at least the 1980s, when the Waldheim affair brought Austria’s covert handling of its Nazi past to international attention.


4 Wolf Prix, Michael Holzer and Helmut Swiczinsky originally called themselves Bau-Cooperative Himmelblau when they founded the group in 1968, but were also referred to as simply “Himmelblau” until 1970, when they are more consistently referred to as Coop. Himmelblau, Coop-Himmelblau, or Coop Himmelblau. Michael Holzer left the group in 1971. The firm was later renamed Coop Himmelb(l)au, which is the name that the office operates under today. Helmut Swiczinsky retired in 2001 and Dieter Dreiholz joined as partner in 2000. Since I am dealing with the historical group and not the contemporary office I use the denomination Coop Himmelblau. Despite the group’s central role in the experimental architecture scene there are no critical monographs on their early work. Architekturzentrum Wien’s excellent source book The Austrian phenomenon: Architecture Avantgarde Austria 1956–1973, edited by Johannes Porsch (Basel;
at the Institute of Environmental Health published a small booklet called *Entspannungsarchitektur 1* (Relaxation Architecture 1). Haider had been appointed by the Kreisky government in 1970 to direct a new research center at the University of Vienna focusing on environmental health. *Entspannungsarchitektur* was the report of a multi-year federally funded research project that claimed to investigate “possibilities to prevent psychological damage in existing residential buildings and urban structures.” The 52-page booklet presented plans to retrofit substandard 19th century Viennese apartment buildings to the new physiological and psychological health standards that were being proposed and tested by the institute. The project replaced traditional furniture arrangements with objects designed to promote relaxation, and included plans for enclosed garden balconies as well as new floor plan templates. In order to accommodate different income levels and family structures, *Entspannungsarchitektur* was envisioned as a modular project and stepwise implementation model, offering options ranging from a studio apartment with a therapeutic waterbed for a single household, to abundantly equipped full floor living areas with integrated audiovisual components and children’s furniture. The project was geared towards the rapidly growing urban middle class, which had, with the Kreisky-government, replaced the political and rhetorical status of the working class.

Today, the architecture of Austrian Social Democracy has become more or less synonymous with the expansive social housing projects first initiated in the interwar period. Differing significantly in form and scale from Red Vienna’s social reform architecture, the architecture of the second phase of the country’s progressive Austro-Keynesianism has received far less attention, or its many divergent forms have simply not been identified as part of the Kreisky government’s vast reshaping of Austrian society and everyday life. Starting from *Entspannungsarchitektur*, this paper examines one architectural response to the expansion of the Austrian welfare state in the 1970s. It argues that *Entspannungsarchitektur* proposed to expand the concept of welfare to also account for a new psychophysiological paradigm of health, signifying both a shift from curative to preventative medicine, and from a welfare state that covered ‘primary needs’ in the immediate post-

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war years to one that increasingly saw it as its role to address ‘secondary needs’ like emotional wellbeing. At the same time, *Entspannungsarchitektur* was also a response to Austria’s rapid shift to a post-industrial economy and the pressure that new forms of labor were expected to exert on the population. With projects such as *Entspannungsarchitektur*, the confluence of grassroots preservation movements, ‘soft’ urban redevelopment policies, and a renewed focus on environmental health gave rise to a new understanding of what an architecture of social democracy could look like.

Where Red Vienna aimed to provide the working class with affordable and sanitary dwellings and an urban *Wohnkultur*, the post-war welfare state expanded the idea of publicly funded housing to all of society.\(^8\) Terminated by the Austro-Fascists in 1934, the *Gemeindebau* program was reintroduced in 1947 as part of the reconstruction. In the late 1960s Vienna also began concerted efforts toward what has become known as a model of soft urban renewal; national and municipal financial aid programs that focused on small-scale preservation and renovation, often in collaboration with the tenant.\(^9\) At the time, renewal of the city’s building stock had become increasingly unavoidable; although new construction had helped quell the post-war housing crisis, over half the buildings in Vienna’s inner districts were still located in the Gründerzeit tenements built during the massive population boom in 19th and early 20th century. The former seat of an empire, ‘Grey Vienna’ was now situated at the periphery of Western Europe, had a steadily sinking population, and around 300,000 Gründerzeit dwellings in dire need of renovation, many of which had never been upgraded and lacked basic amenities such as plumbing and running water.

Suggesting interventions for a so-called *doppeltrakte* building typology from the late Gründerzeit (1890–1918), *Entspannungsarchitektur* was designed for the financial structures provided by Vienna’s soft urban renewal. The actual research was financed through the Housing Support Act of 1968, which earmarked a certain percentage of the federal housing budget for research on issues such as quality of life, building law standardization, and urban renewal.\(^10\) The renovation plans that were offered in *Entspannungsarchitektur* were based on an earlier research proposal by engineer Helmut Grasberger to modernize floor plans and supply bathrooms and kitchens through service cores, which was also financed through the same means.\(^11\) While Grasberger’s 1970 proposal was primarily concerned with the sanitation and upgrading of derelict apartment buildings, *Entspannungsarchitektur* was described as a program to prevent ‘psychological damages’ in urban apartments, expanding the idea of welfare

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beyond sanitary and functional living and emphasizing emotional wellbeing. The project proposed a catalogue of customizable designs and devices presented as the combined effort of environmental health research, and earlier CH projects such as Villa Rosa, Relab 1, Airbox, and Wolke. At the heart of the project was a tier-based and incremental implementation model similar to Grasberger’s.

Ideas about modularity and flexibility were, of course, ubiquitous in the post-war period, from Otto Koenigsberger’s “core” housing schemes to Reyner Banham’s consumerist “design by choice.” In the project summary, Haider had stressed that *Entspannungsarchitektur*’s piecemeal implementation model was designed to “meet the financial situation of the users,” suggesting that stress-reduction was something that could and should be made available for everyone. The project’s stepwise approach, however, also reflected a reform-based idea of social transformation dominant in Austrian politics. In 1945, Austrian philosopher Karl Popper had introduced the concept of empirically based “piecemeal social engineering” in his polemic against utopian and totalitarian thought, *The Open Society and its Enemies*. In the 1960s, the book was read by European political leaders and students alike, including CH’s Wolf Prix.

As part of the project’s stepwise approach, *Entspannungsarchitektur* included layouts for four different apartment sizes, ranging from studio to a full-floor unit. Although CH’s floor plans were more spacious, they were based on Grasberger’s proposal. They also included a version of his suggested “CLIP-ON Elemente,” a concept that had first been introduced by Archigram in the mid-1960s. However, where Grasberger had proposed clip-ons containing basic amenities such as a bathroom and a kitchen, CH introduced a garden loggia with a hydrophonic garden to filter outside air and a smaller ‘sun oriel’ option. These components could be acquired individually to provide additional recreation and living areas, as well as to provide better light conditions.

*Entspannungsarchitektur* also included several fittings for the apartment interior based on the same step-by-step modular approach. Some of the more basic options included a waterbed, and different forms of orthopaedic floor coverings intended to improve foot musculature. The ‘Relaxation Landscape,’ a modular sectional made out of cast elastomeric foam, was one of the larger objects, designed to be freestanding or built-in. It was molded to accommodate six distinct options for seating and reclining. One of the positions was based on NASA’s zero gravity position, developed to minimize strain on the bodies of astronauts during takeoff. It was also, according to Haider, optimal for intensive relaxation. The largest investment

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on offer, however, was the 'Intensive Relaxation Room,' a kit of parts that allowed the user to gradually construct a separate, nestled space within the open loft layout it was intended for. In its final form, the relaxation room was a freestanding cylinder crowned by a transparent plastic dome equipped with a variety of medical and audiovisual equipment. It was a cybernetic system providing the optimal climatic, atmospheric and ergonomic conditions for human reconvalescence. It included a music program and recordings of two different relaxation exercises — autogenic training and progressive muscle relaxation — as well as equipment for biofeedback training, an emerging experimental treatment form often used to treat stress related illnesses.

In the publication, Haider described Entspannungsarchitektur as a prophylactic against stress, a term that was still relatively new in the 1970s, especially in Austria. As western society established efficient treatments and vaccines for major communicable diseases in the post-war era the medical profession increasingly shifted their attention towards new ‘lifestyle’ or ‘affluence diseases’ such as hypertension, diabetes, and stress. More than any other term, stress would become a privileged marker of the relationship between physiological and psychological health, and the effects of modern, urban life on both.

It had first been coined by Canadian-Hungarian endocrinologist Hand Selye in the 1930s and was popularized in North America with his bestselling book The Stress of Life (1956). A parallel concept with similar symptoms had been invented in Austria and West-Germany in the 1950s. ‘Managerial disease,’ however, was a socio-historically specific concept used to describe a condition that seemed to afflict men in leadership positions and was understood to be directly related to the increased responsibility and workload caused by the post-war ‘economic miracle.’ Where managerial disease was a gendered and class-specific phenomenon, the North-American concept of stress was used to describe a non-specific state of exhaustion connected to environmental factors, and that was equally applicable to suburban housewives as to white-collar workers.

As indicated by the coining of ‘managerial disease,’ problems related to workplace productivity had also been identified as an issue in Austria. In fact, much of Haider’s scientific research focused on the mental and physiological toll exerted by productive life, especially on people tasked with highly focused work. He envisioned Entspannungsarchitektur as a way to reset and adapt. On the very first page of the publication he writes:

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“There is a real need for large sections of the population to seek out or bring about relaxing situations, be it to reduce inter-individual tensions encouraged by urbanization and industrialization, or to simply meet the demands of daily working life.” What counted as “the demands of daily working life” was changing in the rapidly developing Austrian economy, where the amount of white-collar workers increased sharply in the 1970s. Where the disciplining of the worker’s body had been integral to Fordism, the problems threatening the post-industrial worker’s productivity included attention decline, burnout and stress; issues that Entspannungsarchitektur was specifically designed to address through the integration of relaxation practices into everyday life. Hans Selye’s stress-research had shown that the human organism was capable of reorganizing itself and adapt in response to external stressors, and research on biofeedback, meditation and relaxation training indicated that many of these autonomous processes of self-regulation could in fact be observed and manipulated by the self. Thus, while Entspannungsarchitektur might have purported to redesign old apartment buildings, it was as much about modifying people’s interior makeup as reconfiguring their environment; to induce measurable changes in the user’s brain, muscle tissue, and heart, and to alter the flow of neurons and hormones.

Although the different components and implementation scheme of Entspannungsarchitektur were developed in utmost detail — architect Karl Odorizzi was commissioned to draw the furniture plans and engineer Hans Steidl from the institute created diagrams for the electronic components — the project was never realized. According to Wolf Prix, there was simply not enough interest in the project. Still, the federal funding that had financed the research had likely helped keep the economically struggling architecture group afloat, which might, in the end, have motivated the project as much as anything. For years Coop Himmelblau had attempted to find economically viable ways to sustain their practice. Already in 1969 they stated that designs such as Villa Rosa were not simply installations for performances and gallery shows, but “prototypes” for future mass production. After Coop Himmelblau member Michael Holzer was introduced to the waterbed following a trip to New York in 1972, the group even briefly entertained the idea of producing waterbeds, and went as far as to produce advertising materials for it.

In conclusion then, how should we understand this curious project, lodged between pop architecture, medical equipment, and welfare state

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20 “Für weite Bevölkerungskreise besteht ein echtes Bedürfnis, Entspannungs situationen aufzusuchen oder herbeizuführen, sei es zum Abbau interindividueller Spannungen, die durch die Urbanisierung und Industrialisierung gefördert werden, sei es, um einfach den Anforderungen des täglichen Beruflebens gewachsen zu sein. In jedem Fall werden stressphrophylaktische, umwelthygienische und psychophyloge Anforderungen an der Wohnungsbau in den Vordergrund rücken.” Haider et al., Entspannungsarchitektur 1, 1.


23 Coop Himmelblau, “Plastic Years” (Coop Himmelblau, 1969), Künstlerhaus Archive, Vienna.

bureaucracy? While *Entspannungsarchitektur* was not a direct translation of the Kreisky government’s policies, it was still made possible by new welfare funds, and a willingness on behalf of the government to directly support and fund the country’s artistic avant-garde in order to forge a new narrative of Austria as a modernized and progressive nation. As an attempt to institutionalize and integrate experimental architecture into the welfare state, *Entspannungsarchitektur* must, at least in part, be seen in extension of the neo-avant-garde’s aspirations to transform everyday life. However, where the neo-avant-gardes of the 1960s had experimented with emancipatory sensory experiences as a way to counter the alleged disenchantment and homogenization of modernity, emotional wellbeing was, in *Entspannungsarchitektur*, codified within a new paradigm of stress that at once both limited and instrumentalized the user’s emotional life, regardless of how pleasant and relaxing an experience in the ‘Intensive Relaxing Room’ might be. Ultimately, *Entspannungsarchitektur* was designed to induce an adaptive response in its users; it was about manipulating the human body and mind to withstand the pressures of late 20th century productive life. As the concept of stress metamorphosed from a theory of dynamic physical self-regulation in organisms in the 1950s, to a self-description of Western societies in the 1970s, *Entspannungsarchitektur* suggested to medicalize architecture and domestic life, reconfiguring the home as a site to rest and digest, to self-regulate and adapt. As historian of science Mark Jackson and others have pointed out; although discourses on stress often pointed to environmental and societal factors such as urbanization and changes in professional life, the management of stress was predominantly rendered as a personal rather than collective responsibility. This was also the case with *Entspannungsarchitektur*, which offered architectural solutions to problems that were inherently political, social, and economical.

If *Entspannungsarchitektur* was a response to the Kreisky government’s expansion of the welfare state, it was also a product of that government’s reformist and interventionist approach. At the same time, the project’s goal of individualized stress-reduction also engaged a central and perhaps ultimately irreconcilable tension at the heart of the modern welfare state; the balance of human wellbeing with economic development. The project’s distinctly post-utopian and interventionist ideology did not envision a society of leisure free of stress, but of middleclass wage earners cared for in newly refurbished apartments. In *Entspannungsarchitektur*, stress was something to be treated rather than eliminated by the welfare state, and accepted as the prize paid for modernization.

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25 Haller et al., “Stress — Konjunkturen eines Konzepts.”
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FROM A TAX STATE TO A DEBT STATE

In my research more generally, I am interested in finding ways to frame the relationship between the intangibility of finance and politics and the tangibility of architecture and urbanism in ways that go both beyond causal dependency and avoid claims of architectural autonomy. In this paper, I attempt to theorize the role of taxation in architecture, housing, urban renewal, and democracy in the United States of America. Tax revenue is the financial tool of the state, and in the United States, this is purportedly a democracy. My aim is to consider housing through the lens of taxation to understand the relationship of architecture and democracy in a different light.

I am intrigued by the parallel between the growing invisibility of taxation and the growing invisibility of low- and moderate-income housing in the past fifty years. Beginning in the mid-1960s and firmly codified by the late 1980s, the United States shifted its housing policy from both direct taxation and direct public investment of tax dollars in housing development, toward fiscal tools consisting of tax incentives for the private market to provide some below-market-rate dwellings. In parallel, the issuance of bonds to raise capital in lieu of raising taxes — similarly less visible in state budgets — has become an established practice of municipal and state governments alike, all while often delegating implementation to a sub-municipal level, the community.

These indirect tax expenditures are invisible because they do not appear as line items in a yearly budget, which would need to be approved by elected representatives. As such, this form of housing finance has been remarkably resilient to political attacks. In addition, by generating low- and moderate-income housing largely through, and as part of, private development, these incentives also lead to invisible architecture; the housing does not stand out visibly as ‘subsidized’ through low-cost construction nor as ‘public’ through separate ‘projects’ or ‘estates.’

In his recent book, \textit{Rated Agency}, philosopher Michel Feher diagnoses the problem of states becoming increasingly accountable not to voters, but rather to bond holders; to those who have given capital in order for the state to cover public expenditures without having to raise taxes. Drawing on
the terminology of sociologist Wolfgang Streck, he diagnoses the transition as, from a “tax state” to a “debt state.”

How are we to understand this vanishing act? How has this shift from direct to indirect tax policies in housing affected our understanding of housing in democracies? If publicly financed housing is no longer recognizable as a distinct matter, is that a positive direction since its inhabitants are no longer ostracized? Or does it make the issue of low- and moderate-income housing disappear from the public debate which is central to a democracy?

TAXATION AND DEMOCRACY

Taxes, collected from individuals and companies, create the financial coffer through which the whole, society, spends money on projects relevant to the public good. In the case of a democracy, it is generally a body of elected representatives that decides what tax revenue is used for, in line with its constituents’ goals. This democratic control mitigates, at least in theory, what law scholar Wolfgang Schön describes as “the most prominent and most extensive intrusion of the State’s power into the sphere of the individual.”

In the United States, the relationship of the state’s tax authority and democratic control is central to the nation’s origin story, the American Revolution, as captured in its rallying cry: “No taxation without representation!”

How a democracy is then to accomplish its goals, has led to two schools of thought. One stipulates collective state action, the other tends toward the agency of individuals and the private sector. Is the provision of a decent home at an affordable rent in self-managed ‘community units’ — as Catherine Bauer argued in the 1930s — the best way to ensure a functioning democracy? Or should the state encourage individual homeownership — as Frank Lloyd Wright extolled around the same time in his vision for Broadacre City — as the basis of good citizenship and hence a functioning democracy?

Then there is the question of which level of government is to tax which asset. The US system is built on a notion of local self-determination granted by the state, and is rarely superseded by the federal level. For this local level, property tax, levied on the assessed value of a home and the land beneath it, has always been and remains the primary source of revenue, highlighting the central fiscal function of housing in relation to public services. In contrast, the federal income tax was introduced only in 1913, and many states still have no income tax.

Finally, there is the question — as law scholar Schön points out — of what taxes are deemed acceptable to voters. Schön argues that the balance

3 Schön, “Taxation and Democracy,” 1.
of power between the state and its constituents functions well as long as there is “‘congruence’ and ‘equivalence’ among those who vote on the tax, those who pay the tax, and those who benefit from the tax.” Yet individuals often pay taxes regardless of whether they have the right to vote. What happens when a large part of the population cannot effectively express its interests at the ballot box, as was the case with African-American citizens well into the late 1960s?

CIRCA 1968

The mid-1960s were, in fact, precisely such a moment. Postwar prosperity, fueled by the direct tax expenditures of highway construction and indirect tax expenditures of mortgage insurance — taking the risk out of private homeownership — and the mortgage interest deduction which allows homeowners to deduct their mortgage payments from their federal income taxes was benefitting only one part of the US population; those considered ‘white’ and therefore eligible for these tax benefits. Anyone considered ‘non-white’ became confined to increasingly disinvested, deindustrializing cities, where generally the many direct tax expenditures only seemed to cement the basic inequalities; both through slum clearance financed by the urban renewal program, and through public housing, which soon became a further instrument to segregate the poor and non-white population.

Of course, there were always third-ways, for instance, the cooperatives in New York City, democratically governed within their self-drawn boundaries. Many were sponsored by labor unions or religious organizations and many explicitly advocated for housing developed on mixed-income, mixed-race basis. Most were proposed as nonprofit models, enabled by direct state-level financing and municipal property tax abatements, and adhered to clear the ideas of slum clearance and modern planning ideas of combining towers and rowhouses. By the mid-1960s, precisely at the moment that the nation was passing a series of civil rights laws to address the legal barriers to the full participation of African-Americans in postwar democracy, African-American citizens rebelled. Among the solutions proposed by various task forces was the massive federal investment in new housing.

In 1968, the US Congress passed both the Fair Housing Act, outlawing racial and other discrimination in housing, as well as the Housing and Urban Development Act, a list of financing programs intended to accelerate housing production. This included the traditional public housing program, but more significantly initiated a redirection toward public-private partnerships. At the same time, the disillusionment on both the right and left with direct government action fueled a spike in the creation of ‘public-benefit corporations.’ These entities are endowed with the right to issue bonds to raise capital for the fulfillment of their specific public mission, whether that be building bridges, airports, hospitals, or housing. These

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4 Schön, “Taxation and Democracy,” 1.
corporations could avoid the politically charged, and often, lengthy process of requiring an elected assembly’s budgetary approval, leading to what Feher diagnosed as the debt state.

Finally, in contrast to, or perhaps, as a condition for the increased role of private investment in housing, there was a shift in the rhetoric of federal policies from ‘public’ towards ‘community.’ Community was equated with the neighborhood level and the term generally referred to those previously excluded from power. As such it was posited in contrast to the formally constituted democratic institutions of mayors and city councils. Examples of this shift are the 1964 Community Action Program (CAP) and the 1966 Model Cities program where both required ‘citizen participation’ in their program planning. In the case of CAP, the federal government gave funding directly to local groups, whether churches, political organizations, or other neighborhood-level associations. This was quickly contested by mayors, given that it undermined their power. While both initiatives were not housing programs per se, they did also affect how housing was planned.

The urban crisis of the late 1960s thus constituted a moment when liberal and conservatives alike agreed that saving the American democracy would require direct federal action and investment in cities made politically palatable; by bringing in the community level and making them financially palatable through incentivizing private capital. Architecturally, this shift was made palatable by a preference for smaller-scale projects conceived to, in the words of the planners then, “fit in” to existing neighborhoods; projects which today would be described as ‘contextual’ designs. The 3,500-apartment Cardinal Spellman Village planned in 1963 as nonprofit housing, was never realized; it would have required too much direct public action. What was realized, also very nearby, was Beekman Houses with 1,300 apartments in rehabilitated tenement buildings, and Plaza Borinquen with 88 apartments in newly constructed rowhouses. Both projects were made possible in partnerships between community organizations and for-profit investors, and both largely hid the related public expenditure in form of direct financing and indirect tax benefits to make them financially feasible. While likely not intended this way, this constellation of community, capital, and context contributed to the vanishing act of housing from public debate and the related socio-economic struggles which had led to the civil unrest of the mid-1960s.

1974, 1986, AND TODAY

President Richard Nixon’s 1974 Housing and Community Development Act ended the direct federal programs that made Beekman and Borinquen possible and introduced a resolutely market-based strategy; of which tax incentives became to play an ever-more central role. The primary vehicle was to support the individual tenant through a voucher system that pays for the difference between household income and market rate. This demand-side subsidy was argued in terms of both empowering citizens as
consumers, and desegregating and decentralizing low-income housing. Of course, it was also a boost to the private market, even if it severely limited supply-side subsidies.

To circumvent the politically difficult process of organizing a congressional majority for more direct expenditures for low- and moderate-income housing, proponents of what was now termed ‘affordable housing’ construction initiated the idea of Low-Income Housing Tax Credit (LIHTC). It was piloted as part of President Ronald Reagan’s 1986 Tax Reform Act and made permanent ten years later. Today, it remains as the most important source of equity for low-income housing construction. In essence, it allows corporations a reduction of their tax liability if they ‘invest’ in low-income housing. What makes it politically acceptable is its universality and invisibility because the credits are allocated to states on a per-capita basis, but also because these tax credits do not show up on any budgets as direct spending, just like the mortgage interest deduction. Architecturally, most housing financed by the tax credit program has followed the contextual model of fitting in; mid-rise, mid-size developments barely distinguishable from market-rate development. This type of housing is thus largely invisible not only politically, but also architecturally. Its invisibility has also made the terms on which this housing is built hard to understand. Most voters do not know it exists, or do not know the terms that they have indirectly paid for, for instance, that the income- and price-restrictions — that is, the public benefit — often expire after only 15 years.

In 2019, housing returned on the national agenda, largely because the unregulated, rising housing costs are negatively affecting even the well-to-do. A central feature of the plans of the Democratic candidates’ running for the Presidential nomination is the call for renewed direct federal investment in housing made possible by new taxes, whereas some even called for a new “public option for housing.” Today, then, taxation — long considered a no-go politically — is being debated as a necessary tool to ensure a functioning democracy, possible only if there is a semblance of equality among its citizens. We are thus witnessing a potential reversal of a decades-long vanishing act; it remains to be seen how architecture will assert itself in this reappearance. Interestingly, in seeking ways to “counter […] the sway of bondholders over public policy,” Michel Feher uses a spatial metaphor; he argues for “sheltering the spaces and institutions in which popular sovereignty is most firmly rooted.”


Council Housing in the Age of Property-Owning Democracy and the Parker Morris Standards, 1960s–80s

In 1981, Margaret Thatcher famously declared that “economics are the method, but the object is to change the soul,” echoing the intertwining of politics and the indispensability of policy-making in everyday life. The realisation of this became evident with the 1980 Housing Act, of which the popularity was not promoted overnight, nor existed in a vacuum. When council tenants were given the ‘Right to Buy’ their homes at a discount rate of up to fifty percent, it was an appealing financial opportunity not to miss, but it was also an idea cultivated in people’s minds — and ‘souls’ — since the 1950s. Particularly, Thatcher’s path towards a “property-owning democracy” was preceded by Harold Macmillan’s “experiment towards liberty,” which was firmly associated with the initial ideas refined by the so-called neoliberal intellectuals since the 1930s.

The British long tradition of council housing often overshadows the country’s even longer tradition as a “nation of homeowners,” it was endorsed since the early 20th century. The growth of homeownership paired with notions of ‘liberty’ and ‘freedom’ were associated with pride of possessions and home centeredness in social life. Therefore, housing became more than just a “shelter and a room over their head,” even for the working-class population, who saw an upgrading in their life due to wages increase and, almost, full employment. Moreover, mass production and consumerism made accessible to the working-class luxuries that were once available only to the middle class. However, the ‘privileges’ of freedom and choice remained limited, if not inexistent, to council housing tenants who, given their ‘upgrading’ in status, began to demand better housing to fulfil their new living patterns.

Following these, this paper, drawing on archival research, aims to investigate the role of space standards for the *ideal home* in a society of aspiring...

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1 See, for example, Harvey, David. *A Brief History of Neoliberalism* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011).
2 Initially, Minister of Housing and Local Government, and then Prime Minister of the UK (1957–1963).
4 Specifically, during the 1930s, houses were at their cheapest values due to low building costs. See also, Burnett, John. *A Social History of Housing 1815–1985* (London: Routledge, 1993). Homeownership reached its peak during the 1960s: While in 1954, owner-occupied homes constituted 26% of all households, by 1966, this number grew to 47% anticipating the climax of this evolution in the 1980s. Statistics from *Social Trends* 15. Government Statistical Service, 1985.
5 See, Burnett, *A Social History of Housing*.
7 This information was acquired from the National Archives in London.
home-owners despite their shared path with the, initially, social-minded architecture of council housing that emerged to accommodate the lower classes in the early decades of the 20th century. The Parker Morris Report serves here as the backdrop to highlight the inherent contradictions of council housing in Britain, and therefore, of the welfare state. Domestic aspirations for better housing conditions seemed to have turned the majority of the public away from the benefits offered by the state; a depiction of how the accomplishment of the policy-makers in compiling an ambitious set of space standards confined within itself the seeds of its own rejection.

HOMES FOR TODAY AND TOMORROW

The Parker Morris Report, or *Homes for Today and Tomorrow*, was published in 1961 and it was the last governmental report on space standards, following the Tudor Walters Report (1918) and the Dudley Report (1944); reports on space standards with the purpose to qualitatively prescribe recommendations for council housing only. The private enterprise was never obliged to follow these recommendations because housing the working-class was a national responsibility and, also, for financial purposes so as to balance their cost-profit numbers. This last report, though, was different. Its necessity aroused neither after a World War nor after a crisis. It became essential due to mutations on living patterns — the employment of women, the popularization of the television and the widespread use of the car, children’s education and a rising percentage of people attending university by the late 1950s, the seeming affluence of the golden 1960s — all of which made clear that “standards that were more than acceptable 20 years ago may already be out of accord with current ideas.”

These new living patterns called in question the traditional housing typology. Instead, they called for flexibility, which was translated by the Sub-Committee in two primary suggestions; (1) the increase in size, and (2) better heating.

Known for its generous sizes and its progressive recommendations, the Report, paradoxically, was the product of a Conservative government that explicitly throughout the 20th century favoured the market. The Parker Morris Sub-Committee was comprised of nineteen members, including actors involved in local authorities and the Council Housing Advisory Committee of the Ministry of Housing and Local Government. Moreover, members were from a wide range of disciplines, such as public health and social work professions, while it purposefully intended to invite women, architects, and private enterprise representatives. The publication undertook two years of meetings and a meticulous collection of evidence from a long list of individuals/consultants, institutions, manufacturers, and housing organisations. The Sub-Committee also undertook visits all

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8 See more on the decision to inaugurate council housing in Swenarton, Mark. *Homes Fit For Heroes* (Ashgate Publishing Limited, 1981).
9 From the “P.W. 169” circulated at the 77th meeting of the CHAC — PRO HLG 37/111.
around Britain during which they observed and documented more than six hundred houses, in council estates, New Towns, and private developments. Eventually, but not surprisingly, the same government that dedicated effort, time, and resources to formulate this Report refused its enforcement.

The Parker Morris standards were only activated briefly when the Labour government returned to power in 1964, and by 1967, they became mandatory for homes built in new towns. By 1969, any housing provision by the local authorities required compliance with the standards if it was to receive subsidies from the central government. Coincidentally, the Report’s standards came to accompany some of the most well-known examples of British post-war architecture. When the unwelcoming high-rise failed to meet the expectations with the Ronan Point collapse in 1968, architects called for a new typology; the high-density low-rise housing estate was already emerging, most famously at the London Borough of Camden after 1965. While this period produced, perhaps, the best quality of social housing, it was also the beginning for the decimation of the long British tradition in council housing. The rise of homeownership in Britain from the 1950s to the 1980s was phenomenal. It came along with an increase in the numbers of voters for the Conservative government; voters that were ‘upgraded’ from the stigmatised working-class and were no longer interested in good-quality council housing as long as they could afford a home of their own. By 1980, council housing came to an end, and the abolishment of space standards followed as “an obstacle to development.”

“WHILE FORMS ARE FLUID, THEIR ‘MEANING’ IS EVEN MORE SO.”

While there were arguments that the abolishment of the Parker Morris standards was “the end of an era of collective housing,” which indeed could be the case for council housing in general, the recommendations of the Parker Morris oscillate around the concepts of flexibility and individualism. Commodification and mass production, brought along a radical deviation from what originally initiated space standards for sufficient housing conditions to overcome issues of disease, scarcity, and overcrowding:

10 See for example, Bullock, Nicholas. Building the Post-War World: Modern Architecture and Reconstruction in Britain (London: Routledge, 2002); Manoochehri, Jamileh. The Politics of Social Housing in Britain (Peter Lang AG, Internationaler Verlag der Wissenschaften, 2012).

11 In the 1950s the rate of owner-occupied housing was 29.5%, by the 1980s it became 55% and kept increasing. However, today’s unaffordability has dropped the 63% rate of home owning houses in 2003 to 47% in 2018. Figures for 1950s–1980s taken from: Obelkevich, James and Peter Catterall (eds) Understanding post-war British society. (London: Routledge, 1994). Figures for 2003–2019 taken from: Architects for Social Housing, “The Capitalist Revolution in Housing.” Lecture at the University of Cambridge (May, 2019).

12 The abolishment of space standards as part of the broader set of policies laid out by Margaret Thatcher in the 1980s.


One household in three has a car; the same proportion have a washing machine. Television sets are owned by two households in three; so are vacuum cleaners; and one household in five has a refrigerator. These possessions are spreading fast through all income groups, fastest of all in the lower brackets.\textsuperscript{15}

It, furthermore, improved sanitary conditions with an indoor toilet and a fixed bath and amplified the convenience of the home with central heating and hot water; facilities that, until then, were highly neglected for the lower classes of the population.

The first emphasis of the Report was on size, given that

\[ \text{homes are being built at the present time which not only are too small to provide adequately for fairly life but also are too small to hold the possessions, in which so much of the new affluence is expressed.}\textsuperscript{16} \]

This enlargement of space was crucial to achieve flexibility in space. Flexibility as a concept in architecture gained significance, especially after the 1950s,\textsuperscript{17} and with this Report “the architects had got what they wanted.”\textsuperscript{18} For the first time, an official report on space standards would not measure minimum sizes for each room accompanied by paternalized layouts that confine creativity and enforce uniformity for the sake of economic calculation. Instead, the Parker Morris Report would provide only one size to designate the overall floorplan, understanding that

\[ \text{the belief that the design of homes is a job that anyone can tackle with success is entirely without foundation — it is one of the most difficult tasks in the whole field of architecture.}\textsuperscript{19} \]

Similarly, every room had to be comfortable and designed to accommodate a mix of uses. For instance, the kitchen had to be large enough to fit all the current and future equipment that the tenant would desire to buy, including the washing machine. Common laundry rooms were unwelcomed to the British lifestyle, despite their popularity in Germany or the US; countries that served as paradigms to the making of the Report. The kitchen was no longer solely the cooking room, but now the family would undertake informal meals along with several other casual and simple tasks of daily life, and for this, the request was for the kitchen’s size to have at least extra room to fit a table. Likewise, the bedroom had to be larger to facilitate more uses for the teenagers of the household. The bedding room was now a combined study area or leisure room for the teenager to relax and listen to records or have a

\textsuperscript{15} HLG, \textit{Homes for Today and Tomorrow} (Ministry of Housing and Local Government, 1961) 1–2.
\textsuperscript{16} \textit{Homes for Today and Tomorrow}, 47.
\textsuperscript{19} \textit{Homes for Today and Tomorrow}, 14.
friend over. Moreover, the ‘open-plan’ layout, while still unpopular at that time, was recommended only if combined with the use of moveable partitions and sliding doors to allow adaptability depending on the needs of the household.

To reassure the architect’s freedom in design, even the Report’s illustrations\(^{20}\) aimed to depict flexibility by remaining in the form of diagrammatic perspectives. By 1968 though, the Report was supplemented by the Design Bulletin 6; a publication that came to bolster the usefulness and appropriateness of this encouraged flexibility by providing a set of furniture with specific dimensions necessary for each room. This furniture was accompanied by a series of activities for younger and older families laid out on schedules from 7 am to 3 am of the next day; conditions that further increased the ongoing criticisms on the paternalism of the state, even in domestic living patterns.

The second emphasis of the Report was on heating, which was introduced as another means to achieve flexibility in design and use, even though, eventually, it was considered to be somewhat unreasonable due to several increases in costs. However, the recommendation was that central heating or any other possible equipment that could satisfy full-house heating would allow the individuals in the home to use their own space at their convenience and privacy without being confined to the only warm room of the house. This room of seeming confinement was the same room for years, and many of these families used to hold the symbolic connotation of the hearth, sitting around the fireplace. It was then, again, another domestic alteration that was gradually dismissing collective habits for the sake of privatizing self-containment:

> teenagers wanting to listen to records; someone else wanting to watch the television; someone going in for do-it-yourself; all these and homework too mean that the individual members of the family are more and more wanting to be free to move away from the fireside to somewhere else in the home.\(^{21}\)

For the working-class population in need of council housing, and especially those relocated due to ongoing slum clearance programmes, the concepts of privatisation and individuality were still unknown to their living patterns, which constituted this ‘ideal’ home for ‘everyone’ as somewhat problematic. On the one hand, the recommendations were a translation of the consumerist boom into the design of the home, with electrical sockets being more important than the walls, and the car park more essential than the ownership of the car itself. With the current housing stock being without an indoor toilet, a bathroom, or hot water, the car park was a distant dream for social housing tenants. Even more, some of those who could afford to get a home with a car park would often consider the area as a spare room for storage leisure activities, such as DIY projects.\(^{22}\)

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20 The sub-committee invited Gordon Cullen for the illustrations; well-known for Townscape and the illustrations of the Architectural Review.

21 Homes for Today and Tomorrow, 2.

22 See for example, Abrams, Mark. “The Home-centred Society,” The Listener, November 1959; Prizeman,
On the other hand, flexibility in the adaptable domestic environment projected the post-industrialized shift that brought work back to the home and blurred the once rigid separation of the home as the place of rest and the office or the factory as the place for work. Moreover, the open-plan layout became the pretext for developers to exploit space and minimum sizes on the name of ‘affordability’ and economical solutions. Eventually, these same changes that were regarded as ‘levelling-up’ for the working class, were resented by the middle class as ‘levelling-down.’ Unavoidably then, the following period between 1975 to 1985 came as a substantial check for this once affluent society.

EPILOGUE

Indeed, the affluence of the golden 1960s upgraded a large part of the working-class population to claim their status as ‘classless,’ anticipating the infamous declaration of the 1990s “we are all middle class now,” and dismissing the Thatcherite myth of a consumer revolution solely during the 1980s. However, by the late 1960s, the seeming affluence was already troubling with a failing economy, rising unemployment, and several other issues, including a growing number of immigrants in need for housing, racial division, unresolved slum clearance programmes, poverty, and homelessness. Therefore, the recommendations remained infeasible for both the council housing and the private enterprise, which could not build in these sizes and retain affordable rents without receiving subsidies from the central government.

The Sub-Committee’s intentions for possessive privatisation and individual freedom failed to envision the present home, but at least, they aimed to project the home for tomorrow. In the twenty years that followed, though, and within a society characterised by rapid changes, council housing and space standards were abolished, positioning England on top of the list with the smallest rooms in Europe. The aftermath of the financial crash in 2007/8 with explicit origins on a property crisis demanded the reinstatement of space standards which brought back the sizes as suggested by the Parker Morris Report fifty years ago. Still, earlier this year, Theresa May, former UK Prime Minister, called for mandatory design standards to eliminate the growing number of ‘tiny houses’ in a market increasingly unaffordable for even the middle class. Unavoidably, the debate on space standards remains a complex issue, which waits for a change in “our political, economic, institutional regime of the production of truth.”


24 See for example, Young, Sarah. “England has the smallest average home in Europe, New research says,” Independent (February 24, 2017).

Integration! Integration! One of four graphic assemblies in the issue of Forum. Edited by the Liga Nieuw Beelden in 1959.
In an interview with Constant Nieuwenhuys that Betty van Garrel and Rem Koolhaas conducted for the magazine *Haagse Post* in 1966, the artist criticized the Pampus Plan by Van den Broek and Bakema for its reliance on “werken” (labor).\(^1\) Indeed, the concept of labor went against everything Constant’s New Babylon project stood for, as it famously offered a future world for a mankind rebranded as ‘homo ludens’; freed from the duty to work in favor of a ludic lifestyle enabled by full automation. A classic understanding of labor, it seems, and specifically traditional labor-capital distinctions, simply could not hold anymore.\(^2\)

Seen from this perspective, the act of rebellion in New Babylon was not a visionary future in which automated and collectivized means of production provided endless free time. Its real provocation was an undermining of the agreement between labor and capital that had enabled the postwar welfare states in the first place; a status-quo bolstered by various forms of Keynesian policy-making aiming at full employment and countercyclical public investment that had spread throughout the Western world.

By the 1960s Constant’s project circulated through his own published texts, a number of exhibitions, and both print and televised media, including interviews such as the one described above. As such, both the criticism of the welfare state that he offered, as well as the alternative society he provided, made him an important voice in the Dutch protest movements of the mid-1960s that would eventually lead to several waves of democratization. He became somewhat of an inspirational hero to the Dutch Provo’s, who would devote one of their magazines to him in 1965.\(^3\)

In what follows I will provide a prehistory to show how Constant’s heavily theorized positions on labor — and the eventual rejection of labor in favor of automation — did not suddenly emerge around the time he started working on New Babylon, but are in fact part of a longer discourse that can be traced back to discussions on the synthesis-of-the-arts that had started


\(^2\) In the context of this paper, and specifically New Babylon, labor should be understood as human employment whereas capital equals (private) investment toward the mechanization-automation of human labor.

\(^3\) *Provo*, issue 4 (October 1965)
as World War II came to an end. Originating primarily within CIAM through figures like Sigfried Giedion before spreading toward other groups, these desires for a synthesis between art and architecture sought to reinvigorate modernism with a humanist agenda that moved away from specialization; a ‘modern’ path forward after the perceived dead-ends of functionalism and the Fascist embracing of traditionalism and symbolism. An important term used within the discourse Constant was part of was the word ‘integration,’ a word that would be defined in various ways.

Once criticism of the technocratic welfare state with its perceived paternalism and uncritical attitude — something which Constant dubbed “the hurray-mood of Wirtschaftswunder culture”4 — became more vocal during the 1960s; a desire for integration moved from an aesthetic sphere with political ambitions — the desired integration of arts and architecture — to something that became politics in itself. For Constant, I argue, in line with the classical Marxism that informed his agenda, this reflected a desire for the labor-capital dialectic to be fully integrated in a globalized, postcolonial world. Of this desire New Babylon would have been the perfect, synthesized outcome — yet at the same time paved the way for a neoliberal mindset that ultimately contradicted his own intentions and ideological position.5

A rebellion against the welfare state had not always been present in Constant’s work, and up until the late 1950s, he was at least tangentially involved with a number of actors whose output was in large part shaped by the welfare state’s various institutions, and in turn desired to shape postwar society from within. Exemplary is his involvement in the Liga Nieuw Beelden (League of New Plastic Creation); a group of artists and architects aiming for a synthesis-of-the-arts through a CIAM-heavy discourse as well as a closer collaboration between industry and artists, both of which they considered forms of ‘integration’.6 The Liga would exist from 1955 to 1969, and brought together an eclectic and inter-generational group of figures through (1) its bulletins; (2) the organization of so-called ‘forum’ discussion evenings; and (3) an agreement with the Stedelijk Museum under Willem Sandberg’s direction that allowed them to have ‘demonstrative’ exhibits annually. The Liga somehow bridged the gap between pre- and postwar avant-gardes as it was heavily indebted to interwar discourse on het nieuwe bouwen (the new building or Dutch Functionalism). People affiliated with

4 Constant Nieuwenhuijs, Opstand van de Homo Ludens (Hilversum: Paul Brand, 1969), 43. This volume (in Dutch), in which Constant bundled and republished a number of his writings from the mid-1960s provides detailed argumentation for his theoretical positions at the time, in particular his critique of the welfare state that underlies much of this paper.
5 A perspective from which a reading of New Babylon as proto-Junkspace — a term used by Rem Koolhaas to describe much of the architecture stock of the contemporary, globalized world — makes sense. On this suggestion, see: Bart Lootsma, “Now switch off the sound and reverse the film,” in: Bart Lootsma, Reality Bytes: Selected Essays 1995–2015 (Basel: Birkhäuser, 2012), 90
6 Of Constant’s work this is perhaps the least-known period, overshadowed by Cobra and his New Babylon years. Mark Wigley gives an in-depth account of Constant’s involvement with architects around this time, including the Liga, in: Mark Wigley, Constant’s New Babylon: The hyper-architecture of desire (Rotterdam: Witte de With/010, 1998). A 2016 exhibition at the Cobra Museum in Amstelveen, Constant: Space + Colour has shed some light on this period, in particular Ludo van Halem’s essay in the accompanying catalogue. The translation “League of New Plastic Creation” is taken from the art historian Jonneke Jobse’s work, and captures well the league’s affinity with inter-war avant-gardes (De Stijl’s Neoplasticism).
the league reflected this inter-generational character and among those from the fields of architecture and design, were Cornelis van Eesteren, Jaap Bakema, Gerrit Rietveld, Wim Crouwel, and Charles Karsten, who was its secretary and arguably the most active member.

Constant first appears on the Liga’s members list in 1955, the year of its founding, and the year in which a number of its affiliates were engaged in the manifestation E55 in Rotterdam; an event that drew about 3,000,000 visitors in celebration of the achievements of the Dutch in the 10 years since the end of the Second World War. The office of Van den Broek and Bakema had been responsible for the planning of E55. Constant designed the logo, and contributed a couple of sculptures including the large work Symbol of Dutch Volition and Labor. Indeed, labor was central to this manifestation, and a key feature was the participation of actors from both the private and the public sectors, including ministries, proto-multinationals, small businesses and a number of artists. As such it presented a spatialized image of an ideal form of postwar society, contained in space and time. Bakema said of the fair:

"the way in which these subdivisions are formed, i.e. by a collaboration of existing businesses and artists, was always a stimulation of the development of the area most left behind in our times, which is to say that of the art of living together through labor (werken). this [sic] stimulation will prove to be more important for the near future than the extension of our cultural inventory with poetry, paintings, sculptures and buildings."

The remark captures well the broader Dutch context of the 1950s and showed that if anything, E55 suggested a way of ordering the world; a welfare state structurally held together by full employment. Preferring businesses and artists to live together through labor over an expansion of a cultural inventory not only marked a desired integration of the arts within society-at-large — a form of synthesis in line with the Liga’s agenda — but also suggested full employment and a direct agreement, a collaboration, between the spheres of labor and capital while keeping them each in place. Bakema recognized that the entrance to E55, situated right between the Boijmans Museum and the headquarters of the industrial giant Unilever — sitting between culture and business — perfectly illustrated this status quo spatially.

7 “Ledenlijst Liga Nieuw Beelden juni 1955” Het Nieuwe Instituut, Karsten Archive, KARS0011, B28. Unlike Constant, Bakema was not an official member but was affiliated with the Liga through participation in a number of events and correspondences, and sympathized with the league’s ideas.
10 For an expansive account on the ‘long’ 1950s in the Netherlands, and on the shift from cultural to economic preoccupations specifically, see: Kees Schuyt, Ed Taverne, Welvaart in Zwart-Wit (Den Haag: Sdu, 2000), 415
Though its ultimate achievements were already questioned at the time, E55 can be considered symbolic for the early integrative ambitions of the Liga. It was covered in international architecture magazines, and discussed by Bakema, Constant and others in various contexts. These included a special issue of the Dutch architecture magazine Forum in 1955, in which Bakema defended E55 against criticism it had received. In the issue, Constant published the text From Collaboration to Absolute Unity Among the Plastic Arts. Illustrated by an image of his large sculpture for E55, the text showed a remarkable alignment with Team X ideas, as it touched upon the notion of ‘habitat’: “The community sets the individual a task: to form the habitat, a fundamental form that encompasses all facets of life.”

Yet if the Liga of the mid-1950s tended to operate within the reality of society’s existing institutions, then by 1960 it sought to renew its ambitions. Instead of an exhibition-oriented group that focused primarily on their annual shows, it hinted at a more activist agenda, and intended to become an instrument actively participating in society’s imminent changes; changes “so massive and essential that the turbulent developments of the past fifty years will appear like a prelude compared to it.” Texts produced by Liga members at this time suggest a remarkable awareness of the societal changes that came just a few years later with Dutch countercultural movements, and strengthen the idea of a ‘long 1950s’ in which the political upheavals that characterized the following decade can, in fact, be traced back to the 1950s, and as such make that decade more ‘radical’ than the ensuing one.

It was an awareness that also revealed an increasing split between Constant and the Liga’s prior, more coherent ambitions. Constant, following Situationist discourse in which he was already heavily involved in since 1957, started to define these societal changes as paving the way for the desired ‘unitary urbanism’ that would come to define New Babylon. A majority of the group, however, would define these societal upheavals as the logical outcome of what they saw as various processes of ‘integration’.

A key moment both in this theorization of integration by the Liga as well as Constant’s eventual split from the group had been an issue of the magazine Forum which the league had edited in 1959 on ‘the integration of the arts.’ The magazine was illustrated with a number of graphic arrangements — in which Constant most likely had a hand — that through their content appear to link the Dutch welfare state with international discussions on synthesis [Fig.].

13 The idea of a ‘long’ 1950s (and a claim that the 1950s were more radical than the 1960s) can be found in the work of a number of authors. For a key example, see: Tony Judt, Postwar: A History of Europe since 1945 (New York: Penguin, 2005)
15 Forum, Issue 6 (1959)
16 The issue holds importance in the history of the situationist international for causing a split between Constant and Guy Debord because of the photographs of a church it contained. On the issue, see: On an
Constant was part of the editorial committee of the issue, and a document of unclear authorship in the Constant archives at the Netherlands Institute for Art History in the Hague reveals how the editorial considerations had moved to a much more political concept of integration in favor of a synthesis of the arts:

we all assume the necessity of integration/synthesis. integration [sic] of various people and races, integration of culture and people etc. what exactly integration is we hardly know, let alone how to bring it into practice, but we can sense it and will attempt to achieve it.\textsuperscript{17}

The tangibility of an art-architecture synthesis was thus replaced by a vaguely-defined political desire. Although the editorial statement still suggests a certain ambition toward its achievement, Constant would be increasingly removed from the league’s desires. He officially resigned in 1962, and in 1965 reflected on the \textit{Forum} issue by retroactively adjusting its outcome. Despite the issue’s ambitions, Constant argued, nobody had believed in the actual possibility of integration in the first place:

Credit is due to the Liga for having designed an ambitious program: the integration of all arts into a new unity, thought through in its utmost conclusion: to create a new type of culture. Is the Liga afraid of its consequences? An example comes to mind. Progressive Americans promote the integration of the black section of the population into a white-controlled society. Do they realize that the consistent integration here means a mixing of races and the emergence of a new mixed race? Or do they shy away from reality? The absence of an extreme position among the ‘progressives’ also gives every opportunity to reactionary extremists. The policy of the ‘broad basis’ always works to the disadvantage of those who also focus on the future.\textsuperscript{18}

Within the span of a few years an apparent dead-end had emerged; a recognition that integration could never overcome the ‘broad basis’ status-quo, and that more radical means were needed. As such, it should come as no surprise that New Babylon was meant to happen \textit{after} the revolution. Within the context of the Liga, but representative of larger discourse, discussions on integration had thus moved from artistic ones on synthesis-of-the-arts, via discussions on labor-capital relations within the welfare state, to a highly political notion; one that includes a racial component and that reflects emerging discourse on postcolonial situations — the dis-integration of Empire — and talk about increased European ‘integration.’ If, by the 1960s, the welfare-state kept on being defined by a labor-capital status-quo, then definitions of integration had changed. Though Bakema

\footnotesize{in-depth account of Constant affinities with Team-X members see: Mark Wigley, \textit{Constant’s New Babylon: The hyper-architecture of desire} (Rotterdam: Witte de With/010, 1998), 31–33\textsuperscript{17} Netherlands Institute for Art History, Constant Archive, Folder 294 [transl. Author]\textsuperscript{18} Ibid.}
and Constant could still discuss integration along somewhat similar lines in the E55 Forum issue from 1955 (the notion of Habitat) their positions differed radically by the 1960s. Consider Bakema’s Pampus plan mentioned above. This project can be said to represent a desire for integration that could overcome the doctrine of functional divisions set forth by CIAM’s Athens Charter while remaining the welfare state’s agreement between capital and labor, yet simultaneously, it was precisely the continuing reliance on ‘labor’ by the plan that was criticized by Constant.19

For Constant, I would argue, integration — in line with the Marxist dialectics he adhered to — ultimately became a form of dialectical sublimation, erasing all opposition. In this form of integration, the labor-capital agreement of the welfare state — precisely the status-quo that would still characterize a project like Pampus — would have to be taken apart and sublimated into something in which both terms become fully indistinguishable and redefined; collectively owned automation. The logical outcome of integration as a political project would mean total equality on a global scale that would ultimately rely on self-governance: “When the world economy is realized the state will be eliminated automatically.”20 It is significant that remarks such as these, despite the intentions, eerily predict a neoliberal condition in which labor-capital distinctions are severely distorted, with minimal state-intervention.

To strengthen his discourse, Constant’s criticism of the increasingly technocratic character of the welfare state relied on renewed definitions of labor by precisely those economists that sought to carry the labor-capital status-quo forward. His prolific written output of the 1960s targeted economists such as Jean Fourastié for example, who would famously define the ever-growing tertiary sector and the thirty-hour work week in books such as Le Grand Espoir du XXe siècle and les 40.000 heures. Constant was highly critical of schemas such as these, which he characterized as a capitalist caricature.

One could hypothesize that the calls for democracy that emerged in the 1960s would fall under the essentially forward-looking, progressive and inclusive ambitions of ‘integration’ too. But if these calls had reached a dead-end for Constant, then it is as if democracy did as well — and it is likely that he saw democratic ideals as a tool for an ultimately capitalist welfare state. The Liga, after the upheavals of May ‘68, realized that their means and strategies had become ineffective and outdated in a discourse defined by younger generations, and it decided to terminate itself in 1969. That same year, Constant delivered a talk during the groot Kempische cultuurdagen, a festival that in that year had as its topic the ‘democratization of art’.21

19 I would like to thank Dirk van den Heuvel for suggesting to see Pampus as a form of ‘integration’ as well.
20 Betty van Garrel and Rem Koolhaas “De Stad van de toekomst. HP-gesprek met Constant over New Babylon,” in: Haagse Post, August 6, 1966
21 “Democratisering van de kunst?” Speech delivered by Constant during the “Groot Kempische Cultuurdagen,”
Democratization of art? Of what art? Of the art that is subsidized by a bureaucratic government? Of the art that is being traded as an investment, tied to indexes, directed by art managers – museum directors, gallery owners – stored in the safes of banks [...] There is no art, there is nothing to democratize.
City Planning and Urban Renewal. Between commercialisation and de-colonisation
The famous column at the Alvorada Palace, so well accepted and popularly assimilated, resembles for me, naively, and perhaps for all of us, an indigenous doll, a baroque porch; only possible through the boldest expression of the technique. Elegant caryatid. From the indigenous to the contemporary Brazilian, what we want is to be modern; although modern can mean, as I imagine, anything other than underdeveloped.¹

Between the 1960s and the early 1980s, Brazil witnessed an accelerated process of urbanization and industrialization. Endorsing such process, the road was consolidated as the main way of transport with state support throughout the integration plans. In this context, the bus terminal station became an indispensable program for Brazilian cities of different regions and scales. This program became thus a laboratory for the modernist production of public architecture in a large scale. Following the example of Brasília’s Plataforma Rodoviária (Road Platform) in 1960, many bus terminals developed to a monumental and urban scale; an infrastructure capable of symbolically dissolving the limits between architecture and urbanism and stand as part of a desired modern city center.

This phenomenon was also the result and the end of a long-lasting modernization process. Throughout the twentieth century, the state and modernist architects envisioned the possibility of transforming Brazil into a modern country. Their main intentions were to overcome the colonial, agrarian and rural past, leading to a desired modern, urban and industrial future. As Argentine architectural historian Adrián Gorelik pointed out, architectural modernism and the state together set out the foundations of such conversion in the cultural and economic fields,² with its highest point undoubtedly being the construction of Brasília in 1960.

This history merges with the development of road transportation. During the republican period of Brazil, the highway was seen as an efficient means to promote national integration and internalization. It was aimed to take the place of the nineteenth century railways, which, despite the developments they provided, were not an integrated network. Rail transport in Brazil was

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² Adrián Gorelik, “Das vanguardas a Brasília”.

made mainly by private investments, resulting in isolated lines connecting inland to coast, focusing on the exportation of raw materials. The state then sponsored highways as a mode to integrate the huge Brazilian territory and provide the formation of an internal market; the first step towards the desired modernization. The statement of President Washington Luís in 1928 sums up this sentiment as “to govern is to open roads.” This policy lasted throughout the twentieth century, with the construction of Brasília being one of its main results. It was one of the pillars of modernization undertaken by the state, alongside the promotion of industrialization and urbanization.

Therefore, bus terminals represented the materialization of such phenomena in many Brazilian cities. Buses became the main means of passenger transportation and the bus terminals turned into modern gares, foreshadowing the arrival of modernity. Until 1960 there were few examples of modernist bus terminal stations; the most famous being the Londrina station in the countryside of the state of Paraná, designed by João Vilanova Artigas in 1952. During this period, many cities did not have a building to support the transportation of passengers. The construction of Brasília would change this scenario and accompany the development of this program across the country in the next two decades, along with new highways connecting the territory.

In the urban project for Brasília, Lucio Costa proposed the Road Platform that occupied the geographical center of the city, as a result of the intersection between the Road and the Monumental axes. The center of this great infrastructure was the bus terminal station, which articulated various programs such as commercial centers, the national theater and the national library. For Costa, the Road Platform should be “the city’s amusement center (adequate mix of Piccadilly Circus, Times Square and Champs Elysées).” It also establishes a modern relation par excellence, standing as a counterpoint of Praça dos Três Poderes (Three Branches Square) at the end of the Monumental axis, with its civic and symbolic character. This ambivalence of the Brasília plan recalls the words of French poet and essayist Charles Baudelaire, who in the nineteenth century defined modernity as “ephemeral, the fugitive, the contingent, the half of art whose other half is the eternal and the immutable.” In essence, the Road Platform stands for the frugal and daily aspects of modern cite des affaires, while the Three Branches Square refers to the perennial aspects of modernity as pillars of the democratic republic.

After Brasília, modernist bus terminals would often echo this idea of an amusement center of everyday life. Following such ideal use of public space, in 1968, the unbuilt project for the Jundiaí bus terminal in the São Paulo countryside – designed by Vilanova Artigas – proposed for a large

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5 Lucio Costa, “Memorial do plano piloto”, 169.
square covered by a concrete slab with a central void. Under this square would stand complementary programs such as a ticket office and also spaces for commerce, services and restaurants. Buses would stop under an overpass beside the covered square, transforming the station into an independent building capable of supporting many functions beyond the basic premise of a bus shelter.

In 1973, Artigas would repeat this concept of a covered square in the Jaú bus terminal, also in the countryside of the state of São Paulo, one of his most notorious projects. Connecting the higher level to the lower level of the city, the bus station was, as a result, a three-storey pedestrian infrastructure. From the upper street level, the building is experienced as a square covered by a concrete slab, naturally illuminated by skylights at the intersection between columns and the slab. Buses, on the other hand, cross the building at mid-level in a simple street near the retaining wall without interrupting the pedestrian flow. Returning to Costa’s ideas for the Road Platform, Artigas also saw the bus terminal as a model of a possible modern city center:

In the medium-sized cities of the state of São Paulo, especially in older ones, the leisure aspect of their population is usually forgotten, with a lack of hotels, restaurants, parks, etc. The bus terminals therefore act as a point of convergence to where most of their population is headed in their just moments of leisure.7

This form of public architecture practiced in late Brazilian modernism — the covered square — also finds a kind of synthesis in the Brazilian Pavilion for the Expo 70 held in Osaka. Its roof, an independent structure of explicitly apparent concrete placed over an undulating terrain, was the main characteristic of the design by Paulo Mendes da Rocha, Ruy Ohtake, Julio Katinsky and Jorge Caron. It was a door-less building, wide open to the city; and in the words of its creators: “an uninterrupted and barrier-free path which is still in the hope of many.”8

“The concept adopted was a big covered square,”9 as architects Benno Perelmutter and Marciel Peinado described the 1978 São Carlos bus terminal station; a structure that, much like the Expo 70 Brazilian Pavilion, is characterized by its urban intention with the roof as an independent and symbolic element; the same idea found in the ‘covered square’ of the bus terminals of the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s in creating a prolific field for experiences.

Until the mid-1980s, some of Brazil’s most influential modernist architects — as well as important regional names — developed projects for bus terminals, affirming its importance within the architectural field between the 1960s

and early 1980s. Among the bus terminals of the period are buildings designed by architects such as Lucio Costa, Vilanova Artigas, Paulo Mendes da Rocha (Cuiabá, 1978; Agraí, 1981; Goiânia, 1985), Oscar Niemeyer (Londrina, 1978; Brasília [Former interstate terminal] 1978) and Diógenes Rebouças (Salvador, 1971).

Following the demand of road integration aimed at the military-logistics, bus terminals proliferated throughout the country. It was, nevertheless, also a place for modernist experiences. Modular structures in apparent concrete pointed out the flexibility of design solutions; as a manifesto for new public buildings that could be applied not only in bus terminals. Stations were built in several regional capitals throughout the country, for instance in Fortaleza (architect Marrocos Aragão, 1973), Porto Alegre (architect Elyseu Mascarelllo, 1969), Curitiba (architect Rubens Meister, 1972) and João Pessoa (architects Glauco Campello and José Pinho, 1977) to inland cities including Bagé (1978), Limeira (architect Zenon Lotufo, 1973), Blumenau (architects Sérgio Mantovani and Sônia Fumagalli, 1980) and Feira de Santana (architects Yoshiakira Katsuki, Alberto Hoisel and Guarani Araripe, 1962).

This ideal of modern public architecture capable of congregating the population and reorganizing urban life projected on these modernist bus terminals, contrasted with the reality of concomitant urban development. Brazilian urbanization between the 1960s and 1980s was marked by a two-way laissez-faire; large real estate speculation in the central areas and precarious settlements in the peripheries, which, according to geographer Milton Santos\textsuperscript{10}, led to a ‘chaotic’ urbanization.

In addition, these goals of the public architecture were somehow opposite to the post-Brasília political situation. Until the construction of the new capital, the government and modernist architects had a cohesive narrative of the modern country. This would change after the military coup of 1964. The regime, which lasted until 1985, was remarkably oppressive, politically as well as socially. The situation had effects on the architectural field as well; Oscar Niemeyer was exiled until the late 1970s whereas Vilanova Artigas and Paulo Mendes da Rocha were removed from their teaching positions at the University of São Paulo, returning to classes only in the late 1970s. Military censorship also closed down numerous architectural magazines, monitoring critical thinking, especially in cultural sphere.

However, as seen, the political conjuncture did not avoid a huge production of modernist architecture during the regime years. The state remained a modernizing force, investing in infrastructure and public buildings. This meant a large deal of work, even for the architects persecuted by the regime. The public works of this period between 1964 and 1985 were then marked by this ambiguous sense; on the one hand they still represented a desire for a fully modern country, on the other hand they served as

\textsuperscript{10} Santos, “A urbanização brasileira”.
symbolic capital for the military governments with the dictatorship being antagonistic to modern goals of democracy.

The military government took advantage of the popularity of modernist aesthetics to spread its imaginary of development. Such ideas were not very different from the project that envisioned Brasilia, however the inconsistencies of its authoritarian bias would cause reflections and deformations in the project of national modernization. Brazil had, in fact, in the late 1980s, turned into an urban and industrial country and modernist architecture had been applied in a large scales as the public architecture model throughout the country. However, that did not mean the conversion of the country into a modern developed nation. Endemic social problems prevailed, which were always underestimated in national modernization plans, except perhaps for the reforms of socialist president João Goulart, overthrown precisely during the 1964 military coup.

Following the same critical approach of Swiss artist Max Bill in his visit to Brazil in 1953\(^\text{11}\) — at the height of the international prestige of Brazilian modernism — there seemed to have been too much confidence in using form as a vector of development during the modernism era and the process of Brazilian modernization; as if it was capable of automatically revolutionizing social and economic structures. A similar reflection was also made by the economist Celso Furtado:

> The thesis, which prevailed immediately after the war, that industrialization would be a sufficient reason for absorbing the underdevelopment is certainly discredited. If we look at the two types of underdevelopment together — the exporter of primary products and the industrialized, which in the present world are combined in different proportions — we find that in both cases there is an anomaly in the form of assimilation of technological progress.\(^\text{12}\)

Curiously, after the re-democratization in the late 1980s these experiences of democracy and public spaces have decreased, so that the idea of a bus station as a central public space — urban and architecturally relevant — is far from the reality of the Brazilian contemporary production. On the one hand, the structure of Brazilian cities was already consolidated despite several problems resulting from the chaotic urbanization, on the other hand, in Latin America, the end of the twentieth century was marked by neoliberal policies that took the role of inducing modernity from the state. Nowadays, most of the new urban mobility equipment is segregated from the urban discussion. The contemporary bus terminal stations seem to follow the model of the globalized ‘generic airport’\(^\text{13}\); suburban hermetically sealed structures with its internal spaces controlled and often privately

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12 Furtado quoted in Bresser-Pereira, "Estado e subdesenvolvimento industrializado", 10.
managed, in which the only complementary program to boarding and arrivals is the shopping mall. This is clearly an opposition to the imaginary of a public building integrated within the city, as observed in the modernist bus terminal stations.

The deactivation of the former São Paulo Bus Terminal located at the central district of Luz in 1982 is a concrete example of this change in status. The paradigm shift was not only due to the removal of the station from the central area, sprawling into the more remote neighborhoods like Jabaquara, Vila Guilherme and Barra Funda. There was also a displacement in the discourse tied to the bus stations program. Unlike Brasília's Road Platform and many other bus stations built between the 1960s and early 1980s, the most recent bus terminal stations were considered to be peripheral buildings, aiming to solve the flow of passengers and buses strictly from a technical point of view:

Considering that a bus terminal holds two very specific functions: boarding and arrival, our project is basically composed of two distinct blocks — boarding and arrival — and an annex to the set of technical rooms and offices for company carriers.¹⁴

Modernist bus terminal stations eventually became discredited places in the context of the Brazilian social segregation, seen by the elites as popular and degraded spaces. This discrediting of bus terminal stations became notorious in the 2000s due to the popularization of air transport in Brazil which, until then, was an elite means of transport. Airports full of passengers and even people from lower social classes were pejoratively compared to bus stations; a phenomenon that was described in a chronicle by writer Antonio Prata in 2011.¹⁵

Modernist bus terminal stations remain, however, as a reminder of an incomplete modernization project and its desires for public architecture. These works are an interesting memory of the kind of project that dominated the Brazilian late modernist imaginary and its contradictions. Commenting on Brasília's Road Platform in the late 1980s, Lucio Costa pointed out the virtue of this space, being a rare meeting place between the various social strata, highlighting the persistent social inequality of the country:

Instead of that exquisite cosmopolitan center that I had projected, [the Road Platform] had been occupied by the peripheral population, the population of those workers of Brasilia. It was a point of convergence, where they arrived and there was then this trace of union, it was a union between the bourgeois population, the bureaucrat and the working population that lived in the periphery [...]. It was the real Brazil, the popular base that

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took over the area. This gave the capital enormous strength, it made me happy to have unintentionally contributed to this achievement.\textsuperscript{16}
BIBLIOGRAPHY


Drawn by author from the database of TUIK (Turkiye Istatistik Kurumu, Turkish Statistical Institute)
1977 Kars Plan. Planning for a conflicted city in Eastern Turkey

Kars, a border city of the Ottoman Empire — occupied by the Russian Empire at the end of the 19th and the beginning of the 20th century — became part of Turkey after the establishment of the Turkish Republic. In this paper, an analysis of the 1977 Kars City Plan will be used to demonstrate the 1970s city planning practices from the perspectives of the welfare state and democracy in Turkey.

Following a brief history of Kars, the paper will discuss the idea of democracy in the discourse of architectural and urban planning in the 1970s and then locate architect-planner Haluk Berksan's practice within the Turkish context. After having this framework, the paper will look at the Berksan's 1977 Development Plan for the city of Kars. Using Haluk Berksan as an example, the paper argues that city planning as a profession had underestimated the poverty levels of Kars and the degree of which its economy was declining, that were, at that time, still affected by the conflicts with Soviet Russia. The paper argues that Haluk Berksan's Plan was driven by the goals of the welfare state politics and was based on the projections of industrialization and growth. However, these projections were not based on 'real' facts. The paper will also show that in addition to Berksan’s misreading of the social and economic realities of Kars, his plan did not show appreciation for the Russian architectural heritage of the city. As a result, Berksan's Plan paved the way for the replacement of the precious heritage of the 19th nineteenth century historic architecture with high rises that connote the welfare state’s discourse on industrialisation and growth that, however, Kars was not able to achieve even today.

A BRIEF HISTORY OF KARS

Since studies of colonization primarily focus on European empires, Russian colonization policies have been largely neglected in historiography. However, the city of Kars demonstrates the colonization effects of the Russian Empire at the end of the 19th and beginning of the 20th century. Located at the Armenian — formerly Soviet Russian — border of Turkey, Kars was once a multicultural city composed of Turks, Kurds, Georgians, Armenians, Azeris, and Caucasian highlanders. The city and its province were occupied by Russia from 1877 to 1917, when the Russian administration completely rebuilt the city according to a
gridded urban plan and furnished it with magnificent churches and other public buildings.¹

After the revolution of 1917 and during World War I, the Ottoman Empire regained the city as the Russian Empire lost its power in the area. Even before the establishment of the Turkish Republic, a parliament and a Republican government were established in Kars and the city was declared as a capital of its region. Russian modernization and revolutionary ideas of the surrounding region’s development had a great impact on Kars. One may also argue that the city’s vision of modern governance opened a way to democracy by establishing its own republic. Upon the founding of the Turkish Republic, Kars joined Turkey.

However, located at the border of the Soviet Russia, the city always felt tensions between the two states. In 1945, the Soviets reclaimed Kars, but dropped their claim again in 1948. Due to the tension on the Soviet border, the city lost economic relations with its geographical hinterland. As a result, unemployment and poverty levels increased in Kars.

DISCOURSE OF DEMOCRACY IN ARCHITECTURAL AND URBAN PLANNING PRACTICES OF 1970S TURKEY

From the establishment of the Turkish Republic in 1923 until the 1950s, the architectural profession was highly engaged not only with the state but also with the Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi (CHP, Republican People’s Party), the founding party of the republic.² The single party period ended in 1946 with multiple party elections and in 1950 the Demokrat Parti (DP, Democrat Party) became the second party in the Turkish parliament. In 1950, DP won the elections and ruled the government until the 1960 military intervention. Between the 1960s and 1980s, three military interventions left their marks in the history of Turkey; 27 May 1960, 12 March 1971, and 12 September 1980. In tune with the 1968 international political movements around the world, people were highly politicized in Turkish cities that began to urbanize after the 1950s. Turkish leftist politics and a claim for a democratic society peaked in the 1970s, but it was also a bloody period because of the clashes of different opinions on the streets. The 1980 military intervention and the constitution of the coup blocked the way to democracy. The 1980 military intervention was also the beginning of the end of the welfare state in Turkey. After 1980, prioritizing the private sector lead to a financial liberation in 1989.³

As it was said, in the 1970s, civil movements and leftist politics were at their peak in Turkey. Architecture and planning professions were also affected by

¹ My research on the subject will be published with the title “Russian Modernization in East Anatolia: The Case of Kars” in the next 2020 issue of Harvard University Journal Muqarnas.
² Neşe Guralar (Yeşilkaya), Halkevleri: İdeoloji ve Mimarlık (İstanbul, 1999).
claims of democracy and equality during that period. Parallel to the political movements of the 1960s and 1970s, Turkish architects and urban planners dealt with urban problems and particularly housing issues in the rapidly urbanizing major cities. In 1971, a minor group of socialist young architects took over the Chamber of Architects and supported squatter settlements not only in their housing needs but also in the organization of related political actions and demonstrations.\(^4\)

It can be said that the majority of the architecture and urban planning professionals — even the young socialist architects that took over the Chamber — were going through their routine without paying too much attention to the economic and social issues in the country. Architect planners were basically defining new standards for their professional practice in the name of urban planning. Urban planning was not yet an independent field from architecture but was indeed mostly dominated by a group of architects born in the 1920s and earlier. The subject of this paper, Haluk Berksan, was likewise from this generation and his 1977 City Plan for Kars is only one of the many examples of the practice during this period.

As an independent field, the first Department of City and Regional Planning was established at Middle East Technical University (METU) in 1961. With the appearance of the first graduates in urban planning, an opposition between architect planners and urban planners developed in the beginning of the 1960s. Specifically, urban planners accused architect planners for being naïve, non-political and uncapable of working at macro levels. Berkan was one of the subjects of this critique and his humble, peaceful, and non-political persona was frequently noted during the interviews for this research.\(^5\) The analysis of the disagreement between these two groups is beyond the scope of this paper and needs further research. However, we should note that a new form of opposition emerged between architect planners and urban planners thereafter.

**HALUK BERKSPAN AND HIS ARCHITECTURAL AND URBAN PLANNING PRACTICE**

Haluk Berksan (1928–1992) was born in Kırklareli, a small city next to Istanbul. Berksan attained his architecture degree from Güzel Sanatlar Akademisi (Academy of Fine Arts) in Istanbul in 1952. Ankara’s Etiler Sitesi was his first significant project designed in 1957 which was built in 1961. Etiler is one of the examples of the results of the 1950s housing cooperatives’ funding, which supported the housing market until the 1980s in Turkey. Berksan’s last designs — for summer homes in Kuşadası, İzmir

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\(^5\) As a son of a teacher mother and a constructor father, he travelled several cities in Turkey and went to high school in an East Anatolian city, Malatya. I would like to thank to his family and colleagues for sharing information about him. Here, I owe special thanks to Tulin Akman for her inspiring comments about the urban planning practices of the period.
in late 1970s and early 1980 — were also again supported by housing cooperatives.

As an architect, Berksan and his generation were able to design urban plans thanks to the codes of the planning policies. His urban planning profession began with the urban planning competition of the city center of Konya in 1965 with fellow architect planner Yavuz Taşçı. Apart from his collaborations with Taşçı, Berksan planned the cities of Kirşehir (1970), Burdur (1972) and Kars (1972–1977). He was also the planner of the eleven towns from throughout Turkey.

1977 KARS PLAN OF HALUK BERKSAN

Not only Kars, but also its hinterland cities such as Baku, Batum, Tbilisi, Yerevan and Gymri were occupied by the Russian Empire in South Caucasus in the nineteenth century. Russian modernization also left significant changes in agriculture and economy, besides urbanization and architecture. Nevertheless, Kars became a forgotten landscape, located in the farthest corner of the Turkish Republic. As a city located on the border of Communist Russia and the carrier of the unpleasant memories of Russian occupation, Kars did not have a chance to maintain its trade, cultural and social relations with its natural hinterland in South Caucasus.

In the early 1970s, the population of the city center was around 53,000. Berksan envisioned a doubled population of about 110,000 in the year 1990 and prepared his plan according to this projection. As it was claimed in his report, Berksan was aware of the condition of Kars as a border city with a historically military character, with 30% of its population comprised of army members. He was also clear about the poverty and undeveloped economy in Eastern Anatolia. He noted the lack of the accumulation of the capital in Kars and its undeveloped industry. However, similar to his projection of doubled population, the plan was highly optimistic about the future of Kars. Berksan based his vision on the government’s Third Economic Development Plan, which aimed at industrialization in tune with the welfare state’s vision of the period. Besides state influence, Berksan assumed that private investments would have an active role in Kars’ economy in future. Instead of agriculture, he envisioned services — particularly an education centre for the entire province — and industry — mainly agricultural and stockbreeding

6 Since the 1960 military intervention abolished the DP, conservatives established Adalet Partisi (AP, Justice Party) in 1961. When Haluk Berksan was commissioned with the urban plan of Kars in 1972 through İller Bankası (Provincial Bank), Turan Çelebi, AP mayor of Kars from 1970 until 1977, was in charge. Parallel to the victory of the leftist politics in Turkey, Muzaffer Selçuk, the candidate of CHP won the elections in 1977. Berksan’s plan was applied in Kars until his successor Bülent Çoskun’s plan was approved in 1988.


8 The following information are all taken from Haluk Berksan’s Kars İmar Planı İzah Notu, an unpublished original report, from the archives of Provincial Bank.
industries — as the locomotive sectors of Kars’ economic development in the next 20 years. He also assumed that trade and transportation would follow the development of services and industry.

By using his analysis as the basis for his plan, he located 10,000 additional people into the existing housing area which was nicely built around the courtyards on the gridded plan of the Russian period. For the other 47,000 people, he proposed new housing areas in the west through Erzurum. Parallel to Berksan’s proposal of a doubled housing area based on the doubled population, he doubled areas for all other activities in the city, such as trade, education, and industry.

Unfortunately, in spite of his optimistic vision of the future of Kars, the city’s population never reached 110,000; even today it is less than 90,000. The population of the province instead dropped dramatically after 1985. Industrial and service sectors never became a locomotive for the economy of Kars. People, who did not have a chance to survive in Kars, migrated for jobs elsewhere.

Berksan’s plan also proposed future housing projects. Before he presented these new housing projects, he briefly analyzed the current housing situation of Kars in his report. Berksan did not appear to be happy with what had been done during the fifty years of Republic period and implicitly appreciated the buildings erected by the Russians. Nevertheless, he tried to figure out the Turkish character of the city from Kars’ historical heritage. He found a house in the Sukapı district and even made drawings of it. However, he did not refer to that heritage in his proposals. He proposed three different housing projects of one, two and five floors. These houses were planned without much attention to their land plots. For Berksan, the renewal of the existing city just meant building higher buildings in the city centre.

While Berksan was noted that the houses from the Russian period were non-detached types, he never noticed that these non-detached houses were centred around courtyards that were full of life and enjoyment for the people; in fact, the name of the courtyard, hayat, meant ‘life’. His contempt for the value of the courtyard system in the gridded urban plan of the Russian period was probably coming from the nationalistic requirements of the political climate and/or his personal approach. Even though Berksan was a non-political person, nationalistic biases could have played a role. Furthermore, he did not envision his earlier cooperative houses as a model for Kars and he did not suggest any economic model related to housing. By proposing detached apartment buildings and ignoring the benefits of courtyard centred housing, he was, in fact, paving the way for the replacement of the historical urban fabric of the courtyard system with

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9 It should be noted that, Kemal Ahmet Aru, Berksan’s predecessor, had already imagined the expansion of the city through the west. It was usual for a city to expand along internal routes. What is particular in this case is while Kars was under the Russian rule, as a west border of the Empire, the city was supposed to expand through Gyumri in the east. After becoming the east border of the Turkish Republic, now it was supposed to grow in the opposite direction.
typical ‘build-and-sell’ apartment blocks. As a result, today, we cannot find even a trace of courtyards in Kars.

CONCLUSION

While developing his 1977 Kars City Plan, Haluk Berksan was aware of the poverty in the city and its restricted situation on the border of the Soviet Russia. However, he was not able to analyze Kars’ situation deeply and therefore could not propose established arguments. Projections on increased population and industrialization were mere planning mottos of the Turkish welfare state. Similarly, Berksan’s analysis was more of a pretext for his plan rather than a well-thought out basis for it. To make a plan for a larger population in a larger area, Berksan only increased the numbers. Moreover, his optimistic projection on the population and industrial growth were part of his job and were echoed by his colleagues in the 1960s and beyond. While welfare state policies were supporting industrialization, it was necessary for a planner to make a plan according to those *a priori* projections.

Adding to this, Turkey, a country located between communist Russia and liberal Europe, had to deal with the problems of the Cold War. Kars, a former colonial city of the Russian Empire that needed protection from the Turkish Republic, further complicated the situation. The doubled population projection and an optimistic view of the future were necessary to announce Kars as an undividable part of Turkey against Soviet claims.

In Turkey, the 30-year welfare state policies between 1950 and 1980 accomplished industrialization in many cities, but Kars was not one of them. Kars, the ‘forgotten city’ of Turkey until the 2000s, is now becoming a popular destination for winter tourism. Today, the welfare state policies have been replaced by neo-liberal policies that are linking city development to tourism.

İlhan Tekeli summarised the 80 years-long history — “the life span of a human being” — of the development of the largest cities in Turkey, as “modernization, democratization, and urbanization that has taken place in far shorter time and with less efficient form of capital accumulation than one finds in other European cities.”

Nowadays, the Turkish urban history is primarily focused on major cities to explain this story of rapid urbanization and scarce resources. However, we need more research on smaller cities and towns to see the entire picture. To understand the urban politics in a country, we need to look at the town and its relations to major cities as well. While major cities became attraction points, small cities and towns could not achieve industrialisation and lost their population in favour of industrialised cities, as observed in the case of Kars. Further discussions on

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10 Tekeli, İlhan. Cities in modern Turkey (November 2009), accessed 8th October 2019 https://LSECitie.es/u3a51135d.
less developed, small cities in developing countries may help us have better understanding of urban history.\textsuperscript{11}

\textsuperscript{11} I would like to thank Semih Solak, Egemen Gurallar, and Elif Tektaş for their help in the preparation of visual materials. I would also like to thank Alice West for her comprehensive proofreading of my paper.
Figure 1—1969 — BDP plan for Belfast — the plan and its drawing ignore all the existing housing areas in the north, west, east and south of the city.
CastleCourt. The shopping centre as an imposed symbol of civic normality

INTRODUCTION

This paper seeks to draw on the call of the conference to explore the complicated relationship between architecture and democracy in Belfast, Northern Ireland, between 1965 and 1989. We intend to address the issue by analysing the development of CastleCourt Shopping Centre as a device for 'normalising' life in Belfast City Centre in the late 1980s. We argue that despite the conciliatory intentions of its construction, this process and device ended up being an instrument of socio/ethno-spatial segregation, which contributed to the damage of community relations for decades.

While the province’s capital shares many traits with other cities in the United Kingdom and Ireland, during the time in question, it also had to contend with the violent ethno-political conflict which gripped the region for more than four decades, known as ‘the Troubles.’ Belfast bore a significant brunt of the conflict, with approximately 1,800 explosions recorded in the city between 1970–1975; forty per cent of which impacted commercial premises. This left Belfast City Centre devoid of investment with developers unwilling to take risks. The violent situation in Northern Ireland was paired with the devolution of planning powers in 1973 from local authorities to the Northern Irish government via the Macrory Report. This would have serious consequences to the spatial and social fabric of the city throughout the following four decades.

In Belfast City Centre, the number of terrorist attacks declined after the creation of an extensive security zone, named the ‘ring of steel’, which encircled the major shopping streets through the 1970s and the 1980s. In the 1980s, as civic leaders sought to bring a renaissance to commercial life, a consortium of British property developers — strongly backed by key decision-makers — proposed a major shopping complex in the northern quarter of the city centre. CastleCourt became a cornerstone of the efforts to ‘normalise’ Belfast in the face of terrorism, as demonstrated by the unprecedented public funding injected into the scheme.

In this paper we will explore (1) the complex politico-spatial context of Belfast, (2) the relationships that existed between the various levels of

government involved, (3) the lack of opportunity for democratic participation in the “single largest commercial development ever undertaken in Northern Ireland”2 and (4) the legacy of CastleCourt as the first of several retail-led regeneration schemes in Belfast.

BELFAST: 1965–1989

Before 1965

Much of Belfast’s history as it relates to democracy, particularly within the sphere of city development, can be understood from the city’s birth; it was given as a gift from the British state to the Chichester family. Belfast’s birth was not a democratic one, but one that steeped in private ownership. This sets the scene for development in Belfast, which took place with little to no public participation; a common trend among British and Irish cities at the time. Perhaps this is best summarised in the development of a broad thoroughfare, Donegall Place and Royal Avenue, which cut through the town, sweeping away dozens of independent local stores. The construction of the grand new boulevard did not just have an enormous effect on the building stock of the city centre, it had significant social effects. As Bardon 3 remarks, the movement of wealthy residents to the suburbs “left commerce in full control of the city centre.”

The Political Landscape: The Troubles

Attempting to summarise the decades-long conflict in a short paper is impossible, however a brief overview of the key tenets should provide enough context to aid the objectives of this paper. The ‘Troubles’ as it is colloquially known, was a four decade-long violent conflict between Irish republicans who resented what they considered British occupation of Irish land, and British loyalists who retaliated to the violence in kind, resulting in more than 3,500 people being killed during this time. The tension between these two communities existed long before the 20th century, however grew pronounced as Ireland left the United Kingdom in 1921 to form a republic. However, this did not include the northern-most six counties, which became Northern Ireland and remained under the jurisdiction of the UK.

The beginning of conflict is difficult to pin to an exact date; however local scholarship generally accepts that the civil rights movement of 1969 was the approximate beginning. In short, it was a civic movement opposing the discrimination of working class Catholic families in regards to social housing. Once again, the origin of the conflict in Northern Ireland is not central to the paper but it does demonstrate the willingness of the polis to protest against undemocratic planning decisions.

3 Bardon, J. Belfast: An Illustrated History (Belfast: Blackstaff Press, 1982), 168.
The Planning Landscape: Plans, Plans, Plans

Much of the decision-maker’s reasoning for construction of a large-scale commercial complex rested on the economic context of Belfast at the time. Between 1965 and 1989, Belfast was subjected to a number of plans, policies and strategies to combat issues of underdevelopment, economic stagnation and regeneration. Particularly important to mention is that planning powers were removed from city councils in 1973, which left Regional government in charge of planning, and society thus more detached from the policies that dictated their use of space in the city. Each of these plans substantially influenced the process of Belfast’s developments, arguably to the city’s overall detriment. In short, they led to the development of satellite towns in a bid to ‘demagnetise’ the city, stripped the council of powers beyond “burying the dead and emptying the bins,” and paved the way for projects symptomatic of the 20th century’s modernist planning: a new urban motorway and retail complexes. The plans were basic land-use plans; zoning exercises rather that a strategic set of steps to improve the city. A key problem throughout each was the lack of public agency and such, they posed “a direct threat to the city’s working class areas,” many of which are in close proximity to the site of this paper’s case study. The destruction imposed by World War II, deindustrialisation and the Troubles meant the legacy of the 1970s for Belfast, which according to Berry and McGreal, “was one of economic physical decay with outward movement of business, retailing, population and housing.” Defensive policies such as the ‘ring of steel’ in the 1970s led to economic decline, increase in vacancy and “virtual closure after 6.00pm” of the city centre.

CastleCourt

In 1984, a planning application by private developer John Laing proposed the construction of ‘CastleCourt’; a large commercial development on Royal Avenue predominantly comprised of shops, offices and a multi-storey car park. Opening in 1990, CastleCourt originally contained 70 shop units, a Debenhams department store, a multi-storey car park with 1,600 spaces, and government office accommodation.

CastleCourt was described by Richard Needham, the then Under-Secretary of State for Northern Ireland with a special responsibility as ‘Minister for Belfast’, as “perhaps the biggest single commercial investment in

Belfast”⁹ in the twentieth century. Brown¹⁰ takes it further, articulating that at the time of its construction, CastleCourt was the “single largest commercial development ever undertaken in Northern Ireland and one of the largest city centre schemes currently planned in the UK.” For others, it not only represented the “the jewel in the crown”¹¹ of the continuing commercial revitalisation of Belfast, but helped lay the foundations for two further large-scale city centre initiatives: Northside¹² and Laganside. Neill described it as a “heart transplant for Belfast city centre,”¹³ whereas McEldowney et al. dubbed CastleCourt as the ‘zenith’ of Belfast’s “pursuit of new investment and a confident modern identity.”¹⁴

Indeed, even before the design of CastleCourt’s main façade was finalised, the development had already acquired a “semi-mystical significance,” and was likely to become “a symbol of the renaissance of the city.”¹⁵ The CastleCourt development is of wider significance, however, in the context of the government’s approach to managing the Troubles in Northern Ireland. Whereas the resolution of the housing problem in Belfast was the most critical social policy objective of the 1970s and early 1980s, planners and other policy-makers were increasingly pressing for action to address the continuing decline of the city centre.¹⁶ Moreover, given that the city centre was perceived by both communities as ‘neutral’ territory, policy-makers determined that it should be “harnessed as a symbol for a normal Northern Ireland.”¹⁷ In essence, large-scale developments in the centre would become places where both sections of the community could work, shop and socialise, while representing modernity and government and investor confidence in the future. In effect, developments such as the CastleCourt complex offered “symbolism around state control […], state triumph over the bombers, and […] high levels of subsidy that created a new service class unbounded by sectarian labour markets.”¹⁸

DISCUSSION

CastleCourt Design

CastleCourt is comprised of shops (70 units), government offices and a multi-storey car park (1,600 spaces), constructed behind “an extensive

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12 Which is now named ‘Tribeca’ and will be mentioned in the concluding thoughts of this paper.
façade [...] largely of glass and tubular steel framing, punctured by circular towers.” Furthermore, the ‘bold “Hi-Tech” architectural treatment’ of the main façade of CastleCourt was constructed in glass in defiance of the known Irish Republican Army (IRA) bombing; CastleCourt suffered bomb attack four times during its construction. The development involved the building over of several old streets in Belfast, including Garfield Street, Charlemont Street and part of Smithfield. This reconfiguration of the urban fabric completely transformed the way pedestrian and public transport worked between the city centre and the working class areas of the west.

A Lack of Agency

CastleCourt’s formulation and construction raises three questions, according to Brown, that all stem from a lack of democratic agency. Local, independent traders within the area had little opportunity to push back against plans to sweep away their premises to be replaced by a complex with higher rents. Little attention was paid to those who warned against the potentially negative social, economic and environmental consequences that such a development might have, as determined from the experience of similarly large shopping centres elsewhere. Finally, conservationists were opposed to the destruction of several buildings on the site. Much of the discussion on CastleCourt “was less concerned with its possible impact on smaller-scale traders [...] than with the appearance of its façade.” The Ulster Architectural Heritage Society (UAHS), for instance, was largely concerned with the threatened destruction of existing buildings, and, in the immediate aftermath of the demolition of the Head Post Office, a spokesperson exclaimed that the city had lost “a part of our Victorian birth right.” “In a future history of Belfast [...] the building of CastleCourt [sic] will be considered a landmark, not just for what it has contributed to the city but for what it has taken away.” McClelland supports this and links political will with issues of heritage and conservation. He describes the development of CastleCourt as a process of destruction of heritage, challenging the message of the government of the time that there was more ‘construction than destruction’ in Belfast.

Street Space

More recently, a report of the Northern Ireland Department for Social Development (DSD) highlighted ‘the “blocking” effect which the current CastleCourt Centre has had to connectivity and urban regeneration to the

19 Larmour, Paul “Bricks, Stone, Concrete and Steel: The Built Fabric of Twentieth- Century Belfast,” 49.
20 Hi-Tech’ is defined as: ‘a particularly mechanistic idiom in modern architecture of the late twentieth century involving steel and glass, often with extravagant use of tubular supports’ (Larmour, 2006a, p.54).
rear’ of the development. The amalgamation of built fabric and removal of through streets became a strong element of spatial segregation of the city centre from the working class communities on the western side; both the Catholic Falls Road and the Protestant Shankill. In addition, the report underlined how the design approach taken was characteristic of the 1980s push for internal shopping malls that ignore the historic character of the place, which was best practice in urban design “has rightly moved away from.” This latter point is ironic given that the CastleCourt scheme won an architectural award in 1990 for the “successful integration of [a] large-scale building into an urban framework of great complexity.”

Government Influence

The involvement of the Department for the Environment (DOE) in promoting the CastleCourt scheme provides insight into the conflicts of institutional sponsorship and public participation in planning. With public investment of around £10m to go along with John Laing Corporation’s £50m, it seems pertinent that questions are asked. Was it appropriate that a rich corporation should be claimant on public welfare to the tune of £10m? The question is even more pointed when considered that the money came in the form of an Urban Development Grant, which was originally intended to favour the least advantaged communities. Beyond the initial £10m, the government’s agreement to rent office space in the building meant in effect further public subsidy; what did that amount to? What help did the Department of Environment give Laing in the acquisition of this lucrative piece of city centre land? Given these subsidies and guarantees, the CastleCourt project might well be better seen as a public sector development dressed in the clothes of private initiative. Perhaps this is demonstrated most poetically in the fact that the state sought to control the city from the military headquarters set up in the Grand Central Hotel, which was then torn down to make way for a heavily government-subsidised commercial space that was seen as a peace-making device for the city.

Fragmented Governance Not Conducive to Democratic Input

The number of plans, policies and strategies that have bearing on Belfast’s built environment are complex and require a reasonable working knowledge of both history and governance to understand, making democratic input difficult to accommodate. Also, the nature of the peace process and the structure of government departments in Northern Ireland has led to significant fragmentation, including in the spheres of planning, architecture and regeneration. At least three regional departments have a say in the matter, with councils possessing little by way of their own

28 Ibid, 11.
power to affect change in their areas. Both of these issues — governance and excessive numbers of plans — have left a legacy that has continued to breed limited opportunity for public participation in planning and architecture in Northern Ireland.

CONCLUSION: IMPLICATIONS FOR TODAY

The relationship between architecture, planning and democracy has been a fraught one in Belfast in the second half of the last century; the legacy of which is still felt today. As part of the efforts to ‘normalise’ the city and sterilise it of political and/or ethnic conflict, civic leaders continued to seek investment and regeneration with very little opportunity for democratic input. The case study of CastleCourt is not isolated; two more retail centres were either proposed, planned or completed over the next 20 years.

Victoria Square was a commercial symbol of Belfast in ‘peacetime’, exemplified by the grand opening being hosted by two previous political enemies and now the first and deputy first minister of Northern Ireland: Ian Paisley (Democratic Unionist Party, the largest Protestant/Unionist party) and Martin McGuinness (Sinn Fein, the largest Catholic/Nationalist party). Once more, there was staggeringly little democratic opportunity to contribute to Victoria Square’s planning process and it was pushed through at the 11th hour with ministerial involvement.

In a third case of déjà vu, another large retail-commercial scheme was proposed for the city centre. ‘Tribeca Belfast’ as it has recently been renamed, is currently in the planning process with several phases having already been approved in Belfast City Council. This proposal comes in the context of a change in planning powers, where they were devolved to local governments in April 2016. Therefore, the city seems to be in a different season than it was 20 years ago, but a similar sentiment seems to be present; any development is better than none. This is demonstrated in the lack of regard given to swathes of the city’s built heritage, home to many independent retailers and charities, slated for demolition to make way for more office and retail space. The developers for this scheme have been more inclined towards public participation and for the first time, it seems as though protesting voices have been heard and taken into consideration.
Model of Muziekcentrum Vredenburg’s final design, 1975. In the right top corner its connection to Hoog Catharijn; in the top left corner the car-free Vredenburg square. Source: Persfotobureau Sticht.
A Tale of Two Urban Futures.
Dutch city centres in the age of affluence (1960–1980)

As the years of austerity in the Netherlands drew to a close, new possibilities opened up for Dutch architects and planners. From the early 1960s onwards, building companies, in close consultation with local governments and property developers for which they worked, began proposing ever-more ambitious plans for multi-lane expressways, luxurious shopping centres and spacious office blocks, often at the expense of historical districts. Throughout the 1970s, with the first redevelopment schemes underway, a combination of socio-economic changes and new insights into how cities worked led to growing dissent amongst local residents. They were soon joined by a younger generation of designers, who instead of comprehensive redevelopment opted for a careful renovation of the older urban fabric and the provision of affordable housing and low-profile cultural venues.

Architectural and urban historians have often explained this post-war conflict on urban renewal as a clash between technocratic and democratic worldviews, in which elected officials ultimately gave in to bottom-up demands for more participatory planning. In contrast, this contribution understands the original modernist schemes to be just as democratic as their postmodernist successors, both in their layout and the decision-making process preceding their construction. At the tail-end of the post-war economic boom, the question of which kind of architecture represented a democratic society became key to public and professional debates on the future of Dutch city centres. Was it the mass consumerism and car-centred typology of the shopping mall, or rather the physical and social embeddedness of the cultural centre? Both typologies aimed at enlightening Dutch citizens; the former by providing them quick and easy access to the affluent society, the latter by providing them with a place to meet and enjoy culture. This demonstrates how more than one architectural typology is capable of embracing and invigorating local democracy.

By examining the Dutch struggles for urban redevelopment during the 1970s through the spatial layout of buildings, the ideals of their creators, and their representation in political circles and popular media, this paper opts for a

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comprehensive approach towards the democratic values anchored in the post-war built environment. Discussions over the future of Utrecht's city centre will demonstrate how planning for a consumerist democracy was increasingly in confrontation with both ideas about grassroots democracy and with the social values of communal, non-commercial spaces introduced by a younger generation of urbanites and architects. Rather than focusing on specific neighbourhoods, this paper proposes to examine the city centre as a democratic space in its own right. Due to their function as economic, social, and cultural hubs, city centres have always been at the heart of public and professional debates on the future of urban societies, both as material and as imagined spaces. Moreover, their mixed use and historical rootedness means residents feel a sense of collective ownership and emotional attachment to them, which obviously influence the outcome of the conflicts on urban renewal.

In Utrecht, the Hoog Catharijne shopping mall came to represent the peak of consumer democracy. The scheme — the brainchild of Bredero Building Company constructed between 1965 and 1973 — was geared towards the central accommodation of shopping venues, office locations and parking space. City councillors greeted the building plans with much enthusiasm. One city councillor described the feeling of momentum as “a clap of thunder in a clear sky,” with Bredero hitting the right nerve. Another proclaimed that Utrecht was offered a “once-in-a-lifetime opportunity” to implement the modern ‘movement’ into its citiescape. During a ballot in 1964, only 2 out of 45 city councillors voted against the public-private partnership underlying the construction of the scheme, thus making Bredero a power broker in local politics. Hoog Catharijne would cure the ills of the affluent society all at once by accommodating both the emerging service-based economy and the rapidly growing numbers of cars within and around Utrecht. With its separation of traffic flows and urban functions, it was a typical product of functionalist urban planning, replacing Utrecht’s central railway station, a long stretch of canal, four large tenement blocks, an outdated exhibition centre and a complex of military barracks with a series of modernist slab developments encompassing 200,000 square metres of newly-developed office and shopping space, traffic amenities, exhibition spaces and hotel facilities.

The political and public approval of Hoog Catharijne only altered around 1970, when Bredero rejected an alternative plan for a parcel within the predetermined redevelopment area. In response, a motley crew of preservationists, resident action groups and shop owners began criticising Bredero’s technocratic modus operandi. Herman Hertzberger, then a young architect and an important voice in the structuralist movement, quickly joined the protesters. As an architectural antidote to Hoog Catharijne’s world of consumerism he proposed Muziekcentrum Vredenburg, a venue

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3 Utrechts Archief (hereinafter: UA), Gemeenteblad 1963, 670.
4 Hans Buiter, Hoog Catharijne: De Wording van het Winkelhart van Nederland (Utrecht: Matrijs, 1993), 47.
where people of all ages and classes could mingle and enjoy cultural performances. Hertzberger’s thinking amounted to a structuralist building with multiple corridors, nooks and crannies connected to the winding alleyways of Utrecht’s medieval core. Furthermore, the building was supposed be able to shrink and expand according to the changing of future culture lovers. Obviously, the building’s explicit democratic programming translated into its architectural appearance and relationship with the surrounding urban fabric. As elected officials and residents increasingly chose Hertzberger’s side, they attached particular democratic values to the functioning of this design for a central urban space.

Remarkably enough, the idea to erect a cultural venue within the borders of Hoog Catharijne’s redevelopment area was already proposed by Utrecht’s municipal executive in 1968. City councillors immediately expressed their doubts if Bredero would be expected to accept Hertzberger’s alternative plan, stating that its management was too ‘business-minded’ to consider the changing needs and wishes of Utrecht’s citizens. Indeed, Bredero’s representatives feared that the Muziekcentrum would lead to tedious deliberations over car accessibility and lines of sight. Given Hertzberger’s frequent attacks on urban redevelopment and the functionalist thinking of the time, these fears should come as no surprise. By calling for spontaneous and informal interactions in public space, Hertzberger aimed to counterbalance Hoog Catharijne’s emphasis on the separation of urban functions and its swift circulation of people, cars and consumer goods, or as he criticised the status quo in Dutch architecture and planning at the time; “The whole repressing system of the established order is an institution for the avoidance of conflicts; protecting citizens from each other's singularities while acting over their heads.” This was supposedly the reason why there was “a dominating fear of disorder, mess, and the unexpected,” and why ‘distance’ was preferred over ‘interaction’ in the urban environment. Referring to Hoog Catharijne, Hertzberger stated that:

> Everything has to be regimented and quantifiable, so that it can be completely under control; the oppression exercised by the orderliness that makes us the lessees instead of the owners; subordinates instead of shareholders. Thus, the system itself creates alienation, and claiming to represent the people, starves out the conditions that could lead to more habitable world.⁶

Clearly, Hertzberger was pulling out all the stops to convince a broader audience of his good intentions. What is more, his vocabulary signalled a different reading of Utrecht’s old city centre: “The city is an instrument that is being played over and over, thereby continuously changing its face, but without losing its soul.”⁷ This notion of cautious urban fluidity was incorporated into the Vredenburg plan: the cultural venue was supposed

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⁶ Herman Hertzberger, “Huiswerk voor meer Herbergzame Vorm/Homework for more Hospitable Form,” Forum XXIV, no. 3 (1973).
to be a ‘transformer’ between the ‘transplanted’ rectangular lines of Hoog Catharijne and the fine-grained street patterns of the medieval city centre. Within Hertzberger’s concrete maze of concert halls, boutiques and bistros, agitated city dwellers could lose themselves without being forced to work or consume — the pace of modern life was to be slowed down by bringing people together, creating space for coincidence and chance encounters. In Hertzberger’s philosophy, individuals were to be given the opportunity to occupy a personalised space within the broader social and functional framework of cities. The main objective of the Muziekcentrum was to integrate the enjoyment of culture into the day-to-day community by making itself accessible and non-elitist. According to the architect, the scheme was supposed to be “an urban living room for the free development of 276,000 citizens instead of just the happy few.”

With such statements, Hertzberger denounced Hoog Catharijne as an artificial and alienating structure, whilst his vision was supposed to be an authentic and original intervention. The architect knew very well that his observations would chime with the lifestyles of a younger generation of artists, students, professional and managerial workers, who by the end of the 1960s had come to live in Utrecht’s central districts. In response to Hertzberger’s scheme, city councillors were struck by the notion that public spaces could not only condition consumer behaviour, as in the case of Hoog Catharijne, but could lead to cultural enlightenment as well. During their plenary discussions of the plan in February 1969 and October 1970, they were quick to link the democratization of Dutch society to the built environment. According to one councillor, the integration and intertwinment of activities and thoughts were typical features of the time in which he lived, for which the Muziekcentrum proved to be a perfect breeding ground. His colleague stated that the venue would become a place for a joyful night out, where citizens could “feel at ease and behave unconstrained, be it alone or with other people.” Other officials even labelled Hertzberger’s conception as a “fantastic journey” to the nearby future, with pedestrians no longer seen as “consuming cattle[s]” but as real people with a will of their own. Eventually, a small majority of 23 against 19 councillors voted in favour of the Muziekcentrum. The outcome was mirrored in a new policy document on the future of Utrecht’s city centre, which broke with the redevelopment agenda and called for a “lively exchange of thoughts with local residents.”

The discussions in Utrecht were exemplary for deliberations in other Dutch conurbations. In Amsterdam, protesters clashed over the future of the
surroundings of Leidseplein, for which a property developer had proposed to replace the present-day Paradiso and Balie buildings with modern hotel and retailing facilities. The action group’s alternative plan maintained both buildings and instead proposed a plan for affordable starter homes, housing for the elderly, small-scale shopping venues, workplaces and a cultural centre. Not only did the preservation of seemingly obsolete structures contradict common planning practices, it was also the action group’s plea for safeguarding Leidseplein as an urban living room open to all that created a revolutionary ardour.\textsuperscript{14} In the words of one newspaper, they would deliver for “the fancy as well as the shabby.”\textsuperscript{15} Only after their ideas had been fully developed did the action group reach out to a number of architects; amongst others Aldo van Eyck, Frans van Klingeren, Herman Hertzberger, Jan Rietveld, Henk Klunder, Tjeerd Dijkstra and Jan Verster. Their provisional sketches, presented in 1976, all shared the same departure point: Leidseplein had to remain a hub in “an accessible and amenable city centre full of continuous movement, where people could be found strolling, swarming around and touching down.”\textsuperscript{16}

The urban living room, often presented as a cosy counterimage to the cold-bloodedness of the typologies of the service economy, clearly was a recurring motive in Dutch planning debates of the 1970s. In the end, both Hoog Catharijne and Muziekcentrum Vredenburg were more or less built according to plan, creating a physical symbiosis between two opposing visions on urban democracy; one dominated by Bredero’s consumerism, the other by Hertzberger’s culturalism. Despite Bredero’s technocratic stance on planning matters, its vision of a better urban future was not necessarily undemocratic. Hoog Catharijne was geared towards the comprehensive accommodation of the automobile era, the rapidly growing population and the advent of the post-industrial economy, which were all outcomes of the burgeoning consumer democracy of the 1960s. The support for Hoog Catharijne both inside and outside of Utrecht’s political arena demonstrates its mass appeal during a time of rapid urban change.

As this contribution has shown, we should be careful not to sketch a monolithic image of the Dutch urban renewal. When one researches the politics underpinning this realm, close attention should be paid to shifting positions and the mutual conflicts between blocks that at first sight might seem to represent a singular interest, but actually have a more complex motive in shaping urban democracy. Even more so, we should not only investigate the decision-making process as such, but also the ways in which contemporaries understood and presented their living environment as the embodiment of local democracies. The changes here were much more the result of a generation shift in the demographics of inner-city neighbourhoods and political parties than regime change, which was as limited in Utrecht as in other Dutch cities. A younger generation of

urbanites, who were often still studying or employed in non-productive sectors of the economy, demonstrated a growing aversion of pro-growth policies and projects such as Hoog Catharijne. Their re-evaluation of the older cityscape and structuralist architectures such as the Muziekcentrum was underpinned by a more bohemian definition of city life. Their growing participation in local politics accelerated the shifts in thinking about public space during the 1970s, and eventually came to dominate present-day planning policies.
Original Call for Papers


The international conference of the Jaap Bakema Study Centre focuses on the years 1965 to 1989, in which welfare state arrangements were contested on both left and right, by counterculture movements and the rise of populism. While government institutions sought a proper response, urban renewal and city repair became a new field of work for architects and planners. Academics and professionals from the architecture field are invited to submit their abstracts before 15 July 2019.

The years 1965 and 1989 have been chosen as the bookends of a transitional period. In the late 1960s and early 1970s, it was still generally believed that nationalization and collectivization of large parts of the economy were essential in order to achieve fair redistribution, curb wasteful mass production and control inflation. By the end of the 1970s, however, deregulation and free-market ideology were being embraced as the antidote to stifling bureaucracy and economic stagnation.

In the Netherlands, the year 1965 marked the beginnings of the radical anarchist Provo movement, which proposed a set of policy alternatives to failing housing policies, oppressive policing, air pollution, consumerism and car ownership. Although non-violent by nature — in contrast to terrorist groups of the 1970s such as the Red Brigades in Italy and the Rote Armee Fraktion in West Germany — Provo is best remembered for setting off smoke bombs at the royal wedding in Amsterdam, in 1966. More importantly, Provo heralded a turbulent era of urban protest which would last throughout the 1970s and 1980s. Its special contribution was its combination of local action, political agitation and art happenings, addressing real urban planning issues.

1989, which famously saw the fall of the Berlin Wall, is perhaps an obvious choice for the second bookend. Yet along with the subsequent break-up of the Soviet Union and the gradual opening up of communist China to global trade, it marked a new and disruptive world condition — triumphant capitalism — replacing that of the Cold War era.

Where is architecture in this period? How did architects, planners, institutions and the building industry prepare for, and respond to, the shifting conditions — to citizens' protests and squatters' movements, the first waves of immigrants from the former colonies, the first awareness of a
burgeoning ecological crisis, and feminist critique? The overall picture is far from unambiguous. Whereas some chose to become activists and agents of advocacy planning, others pursued projects for autonomy — sometimes politically, sometimes aesthetically.

In light of the current political and ideological crises in liberal democracies around the world, the conference seeks to probe the complicated relationship between architecture and democracy during the 1965–1989 period. At what intersections was architecture able to propose a new, if precarious, balance between planning and citizens’ empowerment? How did this impact the disciplinary institutions of architecture and its epistemologies? And perhaps more speculatively, where do these shifting conditions leave architecture today, considering questions of democratic values, a ruthless market logic that penetrates all sectors of society, and a divisive populism dominating the public debate?

The following themes are suggested for further elaboration:

- Urban renewal, local action and citizens’ participation
- The rise of populism in architecture, both left wing and right wing
- The hegemony and transformation of welfare state institutions.

Please note, we not only encourage contributions that illuminate the historical context of the hegemonic West during those decades, but also proposals that investigate the dynamics at play under post-colonial conditions in what was then called the developing world.
Keynote lecture by Esra Akcan

Open Architecture as Radical Democracy. Gentle Urban Renewal of Berlin-Kreuzberg

With her thorough analysis of the urban renewal of Kreuzberg-Berlin in the 1980s Esra Akcan explores the concept of ‘open architecture.’ Her work offers a rare insight into the intimate spaces of the often-silenced non-citizens, immigrants and refugee residents by combining historical research with interviews and architectural reflection. By recounting the interlocking histories of architects, policy makers and residents, Akcan shares her ideas on open architecture as radical democracy in her keynote lecture at the Jaap Bakema Study Centre conference 2019, Architecture and Democracy 1965–1989: Urban Renewal, Populism and the Welfare State.

Esra Akcan is Associate Professor in the Department of Architecture and the Director of the Institute for European Studies at Cornell University, New York. She has taught in Chicago, Berlin, New York and Ankara. She is the author of Landfill Istanbul: Twelve Scenarios for a Global City (2004); Architecture in Translation: Germany, Turkey and the Modern House (2012); Turkey: Modern Architectures in History (with S. Bozdoğan, 2012), and Open Architecture: Migration, Citizenship and Urban Renewal of Berlin-Kreuzberg by IBA 1984/87 (2018).
20.11.2019
TU Delft
09.00
Doors open
09.30
Opening words
Dirk van den Heuvel
09.45–11.15
Ideologies and Politics
Ambiguities and contestations in and of the welfare state
Moderated by Jorge Mejía Hernández (TU Delft)
From Le Droit à la Ville to Rechte Räume. Legacies and legends of the Movement for the Reconstruction of the European City
Isabelle Doucet (Chalmers University of Technology), Janina Gosseye (ETH Zürich) and Anne Kockelkorn (ETH Zürich)
Political Postmodernism.
Architecture and democracy in Chile, 1975–1990
Lidia Klein (University of North Carolina)
Manuel López Segura (Harvard University)
From Harlem to New Haven. The emergence of the advocacy planning movement in the late 1960s
Marianna Charitonidou (ETH Zürich)
11.30–13.00
Community Actions
Protest, negotiations and lived experience
Moderated by Alper Alkan (TU Delft)
From Vision to Reality.
Emile Aillaud’s untenable arrangements at Cité de l’Abreuvoir and Cité Aillaud
Pari Riahi (University of Massachusetts Amherst)
An Epic Silent Film.
Alexandra Road and the shifting grounds of welfare state housing in Britain
Tom Davies (Oslo School of Architecture and Design) and Luis Diaz (University of Brighton)
Sticky Architecture.
Relating to Niagara Falls, New York
Monica Hutton (University of Toronto)
Design by Direct Democracy.
Citizens as architects of urban renewal in Amsterdam
Aimée Albers (Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam)
14.00–15.30
New Forms of Citizenship
Emancipation, participation and representation
Moderated by Heidi Sohn (TU Delft)
Exploding School.
Planning, participation and the Bulletin of Environmental Education
Tim Ivison (ArtCenter/SCI-Arc)
Architects’ and Citizens’ Empowerment.
Dutch architectural periodicals on ‘inspraak’ and ‘participatie’, 1959–1979
Elke Bruns and Dirk van de Vijver (Utrecht University)
Feminist architectural practice and the turning point of the welfare state in Finland

Hanna Tyvelä (Tampere University)

'To Give Voice to What Has Heretofore Been Silent'. The 'Third Zone' and the crisis of representation in Ivry-sur-Seine’s city center urban renewal, 1962–1986

Vanessa Grossman (ETH Zürich)

15.45–17.00
Concluding Panel: Architecture and democracy as a research programme

With Esra Akcan, Jorge Mejía Hernández, Nelson Mota, and Marina Otero.
Moderated by Dirk van den Heuvel

17.00
Drinks
21.11.2019
Het Nieuwe Intituut

13.00
Doors open

13.30–14.15
Archive Presentation
Presentations of selections from the National Collection for Dutch Architecture and Urban Planning
Ellen Smit and Maaike Waaldijk (Het Nieuwe Instituut)

14.15–15.45
Welfare State Conditions
From biopolitics and economy to housing regulations
Moderated by Nelson Mota (TU Delft)
The Health of Democracy: Coop Himmelblau’s Entspannungsarchitektur and the expansion of the Austrian welfare state, 1970–77
Victoria Bugge Øye (Princeton University)

Notes on a Vanishing Act. Taxation, democracy, and architecture in U.S. housing between 1965 and 1989
Susanne Schindler (MIT, ETH Zürich)
Council Housing in the Age of Property-Owning Democracy and the Parker Morris Standards, 1960s–80s
Savia Palate (University of Cambridge)

16.00–17.30
City Planning and Urban Renewal
Between commercialisation and de-colonisation
Moderated by Amy Thomas (TU Delft)
Brazilian Modernist Bus Terminal Stations.
Diogo Mondini Pereira (University of São Paulo, FAPESP)
1977 Kars Plan. Planning for a conflicted city in Eastern Turkey
Neşe Gurallar (Gazi University)
CastleCourt. The shopping centre as an imposed symbol of civic normality
Agustina Martire, Thomas McConaghie (Queen’s University Belfast)
A Tale of Two Urban Futures. Dutch city centres in the age of affluence, 1960–1980
Tim Verlaan (University of Amsterdam)

19.30–21.00
Keynote Lecture: Open Architecture as Radical Democracy
Gentle urban renewal of Berlin-Kreuzberg
Esra Akcan (Cornell University)